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**Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and
Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896–1938**

Kangas, Roger David, Ph.D.

Indiana University, 1992

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FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV: NATIONAL COMMUNISM IN BUKHARA
AND SOVIET UZBEKISTAN, 1896-1938

Roger D. Kangas

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
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
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
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Roger D. Kangas

Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in
Bukhara and Uzbekistan, 1896-1938

In their consolidation of power in Central Asia, the newly-formed Bolshevik government employed the services of a number of nationalist leaders. Faizulla Khodzhaev, a key figure in the Young Bukharan, and later Uzbek Communist movement, was instrumental in this process. As head of the Bukharan Soviet Peoples' Republic (1920-1924) and the Uzbek SSR (1924-1937), Khodzhaev attempted to combine the socialist program of the Bolsheviks with his own nationalist intentions. As a result of his excessive nationalist tendencies, Khodzhaev was removed from office in 1937, and was executed the following year after the last of the Great Purge show trials.

A political biography of Khodzhaev not only addresses the historical questions surrounding this period, but the broader issues of emerging nationalism. In this dissertation, the case study of Khodzhaev's activities is used to analyze the role of elites in the formation of national identities in regions where they did not previously exist. Although not successful himself, Khodzhaev and the other early Uzbek nationalists laid the foundations for the current nationalist movements in Soviet Uzbekistan.

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CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION

I. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Since the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet leadership has had to deal with the multi-national nature of its country. This is especially true of the last six years. Mikhail Gorbachev's reform measures, to an extent, have exacerbated tensions in the republics. More importantly, the liberalization of information in the Soviet Union has increased the awareness and discussion of the nationalities problems. The late 1980s have seen a change in the pattern of ethnic unrest in the USSR, with much of it taking the form of large-scale demonstrations and even violence. Such is the case of Uzbekistan. In 1989 and 1990, violence erupted in the Uzbek republic, and once again, Mikhail Gorbachev had to address the "national question" of the Soviet Union. In 1989, Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks clashed over a number of issues, including the Uzbek concern that the Meskhetians were receiving preferential treatment in housing allocation. By the time order was restored, there were over 100 dead and 1000 injured. The Soviet government had to send in an estimated 12,000 troops just to stop the unrest and put the ethnic tensions in check.¹ A year later, conflict between Uzbeks and Kirghiz in the city

¹Nancy Lubin, "Uzbekistan: The Challenges Ahead," Middle East Journal 43/4 (Autumn 1989):619.

of Osh resulted in further casualties. Regardless of how or why these incidents occurred (and the speculation continues), it appears that all is not well in the Uzbek republic.²

With a population of roughly 20 million, the Uzbek SSR is the third most populous republic in the USSR. This, coupled with the fact that it is the central Muslim republic in the Soviet Union, means that what happens in Uzbekistan often has a direct impact on the surrounding Muslim republics and the Soviet Union as a whole. With the opening up of discussions on topics ranging from health issues to political reform, Gorbachev's glasnost' policy has indirectly abetted in the re-emergence of nationalism in Uzbekistan. Uzbeks are more willing to find fault with their system and often put the blame on the shoulders of "Russian colonizers" and the Soviet government. Already, political organizations are emerging that express anti-Soviet, or at least pro-Uzbek feelings in the republic. In recent discussions and protests, alternative economic and political structures have been proposed as solutions to the current problems. One such course of action has been a re-examination of its own revolutionary past. Ideas of individuals who had previously been considered non-persons by the Soviet state are being evaluated in an effort to find

²William Fierman, ed., Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp.2-3; The Washington Post, September 16, 1991:A18.

alternatives to the present political arrangement in the region. Much of the debate involves the Jadidist period in Uzbek history, as it was during this time that national-based state structures were being addressed.³

Prior to the 1900s and the Jadidist period, there was no real national identification in the region currently called Soviet Uzbekistan. The majority of the population still attached themselves to the Dar al-Islam, the Islamic community.⁴ The emergence of the Jadidist movement and "modern ideals" signified the beginning of a national identification, albeit only among the intelligentsia. The formation of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic was the first attempt by this group to transfer such beliefs to the general population. Efforts to create a national identity included the unification of educational institutions under a separate ministry, with Uzbek as the primary language (as opposed to Arabic or Farsi). This measure itself created a backlash in the Turkmen region which was granted semi-autonomous status in 1921.⁵ Internal pressures coupled with pressures from the Bolshevik leadership and the Basmachi

³Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, a cultural history (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), pp.160-166.

⁴Edward Allworth, ed., Soviet Nationality Problems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.62.

⁵Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.169.

uprising created a situation of unbearable compromise.

Helene Carrere d'Encausse sums this up well when she writes that:

The old ruling strata could accept neither their own dispossession nor the Jadids' programme of social reforms. The mass of peasants and nomads had contradictory demands, all of which were also in opposition to the ideology and policies the Jadids pursued. Social reforms were subordinate to national demands. But at the same time that they wanted an absolute change in their material situation, the masses remained attached to the conservative Islam of their ancestors. Therefore, to gain an audience among them, it was necessary to move in the direction of religious orthodoxy, which ultimately put a brake on social transformations. It was that isolated position within Bukharan society that constituted the tragedy of the local reformism and the basic reason for its collapse.⁶

This brief experience with reformist tendencies left the Young Bukharans confused and defeated. They attempted to introduce western notions of nationality and state-formation that were soundly rejected by those whom they had hoped to reform (the various ethnic groups of Bukhara) and those that permitted this temporary experiment (the Bolshevik government). With the reorganization of the Central Asian region during the delimitation of 1924 and the creation of separate Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik regions, the Pan-Turkic Bukharan ideals of the Bukharan leadership were essentially eliminated. However, the ideas presented and debated by these early nationalists

⁶Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution, trans. Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. LaFarge (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp.190-1.

were themselves not eliminated. Indeed, with the current expressions of nationalism in Uzbekistan today, one could argue that the goals of the earlier nationalists are now being realized. I contend that in order to better understand the current movement, it is essential to clarify and analyze the nationalist goals of this first generation of Uzbek leaders and clarify the political foundation that they created.

Several research approaches could apply to this inquiry. One could analyze a specific point of contention in Uzbek history, such as language policy, economic development, or the national delimitation of 1924, and trace the role that the nationalists played in them.⁷ Another alternative would be an analysis of Soviet policy in the region as a responsive force to nationalist expression. Specifically, this approach could address the issues of Soviet cadres policy, anti-religious propaganda, and the integration of the national units in the Soviet economic infrastructure.⁸ While these approaches offer interesting and productive insights into different aspects of Soviet

⁷For example, the dissertation by William Fierman on language policy applies this approach. William Fierman, Nationalism, Language Planning and Development in Soviet Uzbekistan (1917-1941) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980). This approach is also employed in Nancy Lubin, Labor and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁸Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

policies in Uzbekistan, they do not address the question of why the nationalists of the early Soviet period in Uzbek history acted the way they did and made the choices that ultimately lead to the current state of affairs in Uzbekistan.

I argue that by presenting the emergence of nationalism in Uzbekistan in the format of a political biography, the questions of motives and rationale can be examined more closely. In the case of the early Uzbek nationalists, a study of the career of Faizulla Khodzhaev, who was the political leader of the early Uzbek Jadidists, could be the vehicle for this approach. I will discuss in detail the events of this period in Soviet Central Asian history primarily from the perspective of the indigenous leaders. What were the objectives of the indigenous elite? What were their strategies? How did they adjust to the ever-increasing domination of the centralized government in Moscow? These questions are the foundation of the historical chapters of my dissertation.

As Faizulla Khodzhaev was the leader of the local elite, I will center most of my discussion around his activities. By employing the biographical approach, I will be able to trace the development of this period chronologically and from the perspective of one of the Uzbek actors. I believe that a political biography can lend important insights into the reasons why decisions were made

on given issues. Although focusing on an elite actor might preclude us from better understanding the social and mass involvement in the nationalist development, I contend that during this early period, it was the elite that represented the nationalist position. In fact, it was their inability to cultivate a mass involvement that lead to their initial failures.

Within this framework, several assumptions must be made. In studying Khodzhaev's career as representative of a nationalist leader, we must address the issue of how nationalism emerges. In order to successfully answer this question, one must first define the slippery concept of nationalism and determine how such an identifying belief is transmitted. I argue that an organized and well-established political and social elite is essential to the development of a nationalist identity. Furthermore, a successful nationalist movement requires (a) a coherent program; (b) a leadership able to express these ideas; and (c) a willingness/ability on the part of the population at large to accept the nationalists' program. The failure to comply with these criteria will result in a weakened or failed nationalist agenda.⁹

In discerning the role that the first generation of Uzbek nationalist played, it is important to note the

⁹This is argued in Kemal H. Karpat, "Introduction: Elites and the Transmission of Nationality and Identity," Central Asian Survey 5:3/4 (1986):5-24.

broader significance of what nationalist movements intend to accomplish. In order to address these concerns, we must define the concept of "nationalism" and consider the role that elites play in such a movement. Nationalism is a complex term that is difficult to clarify. Nevertheless, before one discusses the impact that it has, a working construct of nationalism, in its innumerable variations, must be developed.¹⁰ A biographical analysis of Khodzhaev should reveal the strategies he employed in this endeavor, and the resulting mass involvement. If Khodzhaev was able to cultivate a coherent national identity among the general population of Uzbekistan, then we lend credence to this notion of elite supremacy in nationalist movements.

Secondly, I argue that Khodzhaev was a nationalist who attempted to address the three issues above. In order to answer this, we must evaluate Khodzhaev's role in the "nationalist" tradition of the Jadidists and note what nationalism actually meant to the leaders of this group. If variations existed, where did Khodzhaev fit? For example, does nationalism mean the creation of a state? Does it necessitate the protection of customs, values, language, and religion? Is it important to include the modernization of a

¹⁰The need to establish a working definition of nationalism in studying nationalist movements in general is becoming more evident in the literature. For example, see Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

region and the economic advancement of a people? Stemming from the overall theoretical discussion of nationalism, these questions and issues can be applied to the Jadidist movement in an effort to ascertain its level of "nationalist identity." Along this line of reasoning, we can then address Khodzhaev's aims as they pertained to the nationalist movement. Were they personal, political, and was there an attempt to benefit his own people? I argue that Khodzhaev's beliefs coincided with those ideas necessary for a nationalist, and thus can be considered a nationalist.

Thirdly, Khodzhaev was a nationalist who used the Communist movement to further his own aims. It has been a point of contention in the general literature on this period that Khodzhaev wholeheartedly adopted the program and ideals of the Bolshevik movement. In addressing this issue, one must examine the role of the Communist movement in Central Asia and how was it to Khodzhaev's advantage that he enlist. Although he actively participated in, and requested assistance from, the Bolshevik movement, his primary goal was to establish a was attempting to carry out a distinctly different political agenda. As early as 1918, and most certainly by 1920, Khodzhaev openly associated with the Bolshevik officials in an effort to obtain support for his own agenda. Furthermore, he believed that it was possible for the Bolsheviks and the Nationalists to co-exist in

Bukhara. Again, an evaluation of his actions and writings will determine the veracity of this claim.

This leads to a fourth assumption. Khodzhaev's power was ultimately limited because of the hierarchical structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the local political leaders, Khodzhaev included, were incorporated into the CPSU, they found themselves in a contradictory situation. On the one hand, Khodzhaev was attempting to implement his own nation-building program in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, he was compelled to adhere to directives from the CPSU leadership. This raises the question of what was his relationship to the CPSU and the Soviet (Russian) leadership as a whole. More importantly, when there were conflicts, how were the questions solved? By investigating the role of the CPSU in Bukharan and Uzbek politics, it will become evident that this "external" force played a significant role in the policy options and decisions of Khodzhaev.¹¹

As a research guide, this assumption will aid in explaining the limits on local authority. How far can an indigenous leader in the Soviet Union go before that person's policies contradict Soviet nationalities policy? In the case of Khodzhaev, if he can be considered a

¹¹Critchlow focuses on this thesis in his analysis of Khodzhaev's position regarding the land reform debate of 1925. James Critchlow, "Did Faizulla Khojaev Really Oppose Uzbekistan's Land Reform? (An Old Document Surfaces)," Central Asian Survey 9/3 (1990):29-41.

nationalist, how successful could he have been before alienating the leadership in Moscow. This is a critical question in that it sets the parameters in which Khodzhaev had to act. By examining his options and choices, the limits of Khodzhaev's power and, consequently, the success or failure of his nationalist agenda can be better defined. In this case, I believe that Khodzhaev was severely restricted in his activities which resulted in his resorting to non-Soviet approved behavior. Although this is perhaps the most evident assumption, it is nevertheless important in understanding the actions of Khodzhaev and the course of the early nationalists.

Khodzhaev's ultimate legacy, and contemporary significance, is that he left a blueprint for action to future nationalists in Uzbekistan. This specific issue will be addressed by examining the course of his political rehabilitation and the rationale behind it. In addition, I will look at the effect that this has had on contemporary Uzbekistan and the status of the nationalist movements today. As previously stated, such a study will shed light on both the historical aspects of Khodzhaev's life and his influence on Uzbek nationalism as a whole.

II. HISTORICAL REVIEW: IMPORTANT TIME PERIODS IN KHODZHAEV'S LIFE

Before outlining the dissertation itself, I will briefly sketch the major events of the period in which Khodzhaev lived. On September 2, 1920, the Emirate of Bukhara collapsed as the Bolshevik-supported forces of the Bukharan Communist Party seized the capital. The Emir of Bukhara escaped the city and joined the growing Basmachi movement, and, in his place, Faizulla Khodzhaev assumed the leadership of the newly-created Bukhara Peoples' Soviet Republic. Barely 24 years old, this former Young Bukharan and now Communist Party member sought to create a nation based on the ideals of the Jadidist movement and shaped by the principles of the Bolshevik regime in Moscow. Eighteen years later, Khodzhaev was tried and shot for the crimes of extreme nationalism ("Sultangalievism") and conspiring to overthrow the Soviet government. The BPSR had ceased to exist, and, by 1938, the last remnants of the Uzbek revolutionary elite had been systematically eliminated.

Jadidism was the driving ideological force behind Khodzhaev's policies and the source of his ultimate conflict with the newly-created Soviet government. Derived from the term usul-i jadid, which means "new method or principle," Jadidism was a movement that initially concerned itself with educational reform, and only later branched out to address

issues of political reform.¹² Founded upon the ideals of Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, a Crimean Tatar, this school of thought advanced a Western approach to education. Instead of strict recitation and memorization of Koranic verse, the Jadidists stressed such subjects as foreign languages, mathematics, the sciences, and literature. Their goal was not only to prepare students to work within the Russian realm (specifically in commerce), but also to loosen the religious schools' monopoly on education in Bukhara. In sum, most Jadidists felt that in order to become a successful modern nation, Bukhara would have to adopt modern ways. Traditionally, these views were expressed in numerous short-lived journals and publications, published primarily in Russian-controlled Tashkent. Within the Emirate of Bukhara, however, opposition was formidable and the number of "new method" schools increased at a very slow rate. The Jadidists, who had experienced greater success in the Russian-controlled areas of Central Asia, found the traditional Islamic community of Bukhara to be the primary opponent.¹³

¹²Comprehensive accounts of the Jadidist movement include Carrere d'Encausse, Reform and Revolution, Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia, Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), and Faizulla Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent: Uzbekskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1926).

¹³Carrere d'Encausse writes that: "By its religious fundamentalism, by its conservatism and even at times by its fanatical stance, Bukhara's ruling caste -- which was largely made up of qadimi clerics -- could think it was defending the

The push for educational reforms was only the minimum demand of the Jadidist circle. Soon, Bukharan intellectuals and businessmen such as Abdulla Khodzhaev (Faizulla's father) and Abdul Rauf Fitrat began calling for political change. The latter left for Ottoman Turkey to complete his education, where he studied the contemporary Young Turk movement.¹⁴ His political tract written at this time, entitled Munazira, is considered to be the manifesto of the future Young Bukharans movement. In it, Fitrat expresses the belief that Islam was the cause of cultural stagnation and ignorance in the region of Turkestan.¹⁵ The Emir's despotic and corrupt government had to be overthrown. The Young Bukharan movement was formed to do just this, but members went underground or into exile due to the predominantly conservative nature of Bukharan society and the government's repressive measures.

Faizulla Khodzhaev began his political career in this setting. Born in 1896 to the family of Abdulla Khodzhaev, a wealthy merchant in Bukhara, Faizulla Khodzhaev was afforded

integrity of a Muslim Turkestan." Carrere d'Encausse, Reform and Revolution, p.115. Simply put, the Jadids were seen as a foreign (Russian) imposition on existing indigenous power structures.

¹⁴Ernest Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁵Briefly, Turkestan refers to the general geographical area known as Central Asia. At this time, there existed two quasi-independent khanates, Bukhara and Khiva, that were wedged among the Russian holdings.

all the opportunities available to the growing educated class in this Muslim emirate.¹⁶ In 1907, Faizulla Khodzhaev travelled to Moscow to continue his education in a Western environment. He remained there for the next five years. In 1912, he returned to Bukhara after receiving the unexpected news of his father's death. At this time, the Jadidists, in an effort to emulate the Young Turk movement of 1908, founded the Young Bukharans. The intent of this clandestine organization was the implementation of social reforms as outlined above. Faizulla Khodzhaev joined the Young Bukharans in February of 1917 and, despite his youth, quickly became a leading figure in the movement.¹⁷

Events were to thrust this organization to the forefront of regional politics. In October 1917, the Bolsheviks, in addition to seizing power in Petrograd and Moscow, took control of Tashkent. The Young Bukharans initially supported the newly-created Tashkent Soviet with the belief that it would aid in their own immediate political objective, the takeover of the Bukharan Emirate. The Young Bukharans, with only marginal help from the Tashkent Soviet, attempted to overthrow the Emir. They were

¹⁶The biographical material is derived primarily from Ishanov's introduction to Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, pp.1-68, and A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972).

¹⁷At this time, a large percentage of the Jadidists were in their late teens and twenties. It was not uncommon to have these children of the merchant class burdened with organizational responsibilities.

defeated and fled to Tashkent, vowing to continue their struggle in exile.¹⁸ Khodzhaev was sentenced to death in absentia along with the other leaders. From 1917 to 1920, the Emirate of Bukhara maintained strained relations with the Tashkent Soviet who, in the meantime, had granted the Young Bukharans sanctuary.

Because the Tashkent Soviet was heavily involved in combatting White Army forces and the Basmachi rebels, it did not actively support the Young Bukharan movement.¹⁹ Only after the White threat had been defeated did the Bolshevik officials in Tashkent turn their attention to the issue of the independent khanates. At this time, these Bolshevik officials were convinced that the local Muslims were not capable of leading or even participating in the proletariat revolution. The Socialists considered the local population to be too reactionary, and feared that they would numerically dominate the Tashkent Soviet if admitted. The Bolshevik government supported this position and, for these reasons, the Tashkent Soviet under F. Kolesov, a Russian

¹⁸Carrere d'Encausse, Reform and Revolution. For a discussion of the "advantages" gained by the Bolsheviks for having the Young Bukharan forced depleted, see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union; Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1980).

¹⁹The Basmachi, or basmachestvo as it is called in the Russian literature, was an armed opposition to not only the Bolshevik takeover of Tashkent, but eventually to the newly-created Bukharan state. Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi," Central Asian Survey 6/1 (1987):1-73 and 6/2 (1987):7-42.

Bolshevik who was temporarily in charge of the Tashkent Soviet, decreed that:

At the present time one cannot permit the admission of Moslems into the higher organs of the regional revolutionary authority, because the attitude of the local population toward the Soviet of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies is quite uncertain, and because the native population lacks proletarian organizations, which the (Bolshevik) faction could welcome into the organs of higher regional government.²⁰

This decision was a serious blow to the Muslims intellectuals in the area who had been generally supportive of the Bolshevik program. Out of frustration, the delegates at the Extraordinary Congress of Turkestan Muslims held in November, 1917, in the city of Qoqand, declared a separate government. This government was to remain incorporated into the larger, Soviet-structured system, hence the name of the "Qoqand Autonomy."²¹ In February 1918, the Red forces under Kolesov advanced on the city of Qoqand and defeated the Autonomy. A three-day slaughter followed, resulting in an estimated 14,000 casualties. The survivors either emigrated to the West, or joined the Basmachi resistance.²² To

²⁰Pipes, Formation, p.91.

²¹The objective was to be recognized as an equal power source by the Tashkent Soviet. This, however, would contradict the exclusionary policy as dictated by Stalin. See Alexander Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).

²²Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan," Asiatic Review 24/78 (April, 1928):278-9.

rectify the policy errors of the Turksovnarkom, a Turkestan Commission (called the Turkkommissiia) was formed by the Bolshevik leadership on October 8, 1919, headed by Shalva Eliava, and included Kuibyshev, a client of Stalin, and Frunze, the commander of the Turkestan Front.²³ By September, Frunze had routed Dutov's army, and on February 22, 1920, entered Tashkent to relieve the Red units of the Turksovnarkom. Immediately the Turkkommissiia set about re-organizing the Bolshevik hold over Turkestan, including a large-scale purge of the Party apparatus and reversing numerous policy decisions of the previous administration.²⁴

The Turkkommissiia completed its survey, and in June 1920 declared that the party should be purged of "colonial" elements and that the previous policy of excluding Muslims from the administration of the government as well as the Party itself should be eliminated.²⁵ This revised policy allowed individuals such as Faizulla Khodzhaev to get their start in Soviet politics by becoming the first indigenous members of the Communist Party in Turkestan. The Turkkommissiia's intent was to formulate a general policy of incorporating as many local political leaders into the power structure in order to pacify the general population on the

²³"The Turkestan Commission, 1919-1920," Central Asian Review 12/1 (1964):5-25.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid, p.11.

question of native representation. Furthermore, it restored the waqf lands and the shari'at courts that Kolesov's government had banned, and formed numerous native military units, training them for combat against the Basmachi. They concluded that unless the new Bolshevik government could successfully prove to the indigenous population that their rights and customs would be protected, the unrest would not cease. As it turned out, this conciliatory policy was to greatly affect the course of the violence, and ultimately facilitated in the Turkkommissiia's objective of regional pacification.²⁶

One of the major consequences of this policy was that with its control of the Turkestan region reinforced, the Soviet government could now focus its attention on the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara. In 1920, a second attempt to overthrow the Emir succeeded, and in early October, the Bukhara Peoples' Soviet Republic was created.²⁷ The extent of Soviet control was of great concern to the Young Bukharans who had renamed themselves the Bukharan Communist Party. This name change reflected the increased

²⁶A positive account of these measures is found in Istoriia kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Srednei Azii (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan, 1967). Pipes, on the other hand, views these as measures as being simply strategic ploys to placate the masses. Pipes, Formation. This perspective is supported in Mustafa Chokaev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 18/3 (July, 1931):403-20.

²⁷Carrere d'Encausse, Reform and Revolution, Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy vol.1.

involvement of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia. To guarantee continued support from the Red Army, the Young Bukharans agreed to include a significant number of Communists in their ranks. The Young Bukharans were divided on this issue of allying with the Communists from Tashkent. The more conservative members, such as 'Usman Khodzhaev, fought for a pure Pan-Turkic organization. The majority, led by Faizulla Khodzhaev, believed that this alliance was necessary to gain logistical and military support in their coming to power, and would only be a temporary arrangement.²⁸

The BPSR existed under conditions of economic and military dependency on the Bolshevik government. As the Basmachi rebellion reached its climax, the Red Army took control of the Bukharans' national security. Furthermore, the November 1921 defection of a number of BCP officials to the Basmachi, including Mukhiddin Maksum and 'Usman Khodzhaev (the nazir, or minister, of finance and Faizulla's uncle), created an atmosphere of skepticism regarding the continued loyalty of the Bukharans to the Russian Communist Party (bolshevik). According to Becker:

For most of them the choice was the lesser of two evils, and they still hoped to be able to pursue an independent, liberal nationalist policy; only Khodzhaev seems sincerely to have adopted the

²⁸This rationale is not given in Khodzhaev, K istorii, but is seen as plausible in Carrere d'Encausse, Reform and Revolution, and in Donald Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy," Kritika VIII/1 (Fall, 1971).

Marxist faith of Russia's new masters.²⁹

In spite of this "adoption," Khodzhaev maintained a belief that limited political and total economic and cultural autonomy would be granted to the Central Asian region. Towards this end, he guided the short-lived BPSR. In May of 1922, the BCP (and the Khorezmian Communist Party) were incorporated into the RCP(b). A Central Asian Bureau was created in the RCP(b) and placed under the leadership of Stalin's ally Kuibyshev. While the Moscow government claimed that this move was to unify the socialist efforts underway in Central Asia and consolidate local political power, the true objective was the "bolshevization" of all potential power bases in the region. To this end, the Central Asian Bureau immediately began purging the membership of the BCP, replacing questionable individuals with those deemed loyal to the Russian leadership.³⁰

By 1924, there was little resistance to the national delimitation program which effectively dissolved the BPSR. The delimitation of 1924 was a re-drawing of the boundaries in Central Asia. Instead of the regions of Turkestan, Transcaspia, and the Peoples' Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm, there now existed the Republics of Uzbekistan and

²⁹Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia, p.305.

³⁰See Carlisle, p.171, and "Re-evaluation of Bourgeois Nationalism," Central Asian Review IV/4 (1956):341-51.

Turkmenistan, and the autonomous regions of Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, and Tadzhikistan.³¹

After the territorial consolidation, the Central Asian elite that had hitherto supported the Bolshevik cause and had, at the same time, received military assistance from the Red Army, now found themselves in conflict with the new central government. Many, such as the members of the former Bukharan Central Executive Committee, found refuge in the growing forces of the Basmachi rebellion. Another segment simply emigrate to the West, and left for Istanbul at the earliest possible moment.³²

The remaining individuals, Faizulla Khodzhaev among them, opted to work out their differences with their Russian superiors on the political battlefield. During the years of 1924-38, Soviet policy focused on training a new cadre of Central Asian leaders who would be more cooperative with their own ideals. After the debacles of the BPSR experiment and the Basmachi uprising, the new Soviet leadership began a campaign of centralizing the political and economic institutions, and laid the groundwork for the inevitable incorporation of the Central Asian republics into the Soviet system. To achieve this goal, the Soviet government implemented a policy of korenizatsiia (nativization) in the

³¹For a discussion of the delimitation's significance, see Pipes, Formation.

³²Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, and Fraser.

late 1920s and early 1930s.³³ Ideally, the aim was to promote Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and other ethnic minorities throughout the system in hopes of cultivating local elites sympathetic to the Soviet cause.

In Uzbekistan, numerous key positions were filled by writers and political figures who had been at least partially supportive of the Bolsheviks, the most prominent being Khodzhaev and Akmal Ikramov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, in the Uzbek SSR. This project, however, backfired as the "natives" that were recruited soon expressed views contrary to the existing Soviet policy. On issues of land reform, educational policy, language primacy (Russian versus Uzbek), and religious freedom, the Soviet leadership and the Central Asians became divided. The former repeatedly supported the views of the nation as a whole, advocating a policy of internal colonialization (especially with respect to the cotton industry). The latter, on the other hand, insisted on enacting reform policies identical to those of the 1920-24 period. The basic assumption held by the Uzbek leaders was that with significant financial support from the Soviet government,

³³The policy of korenizatsiia and the impact of incorporating the indigenous elite is discussed in Yaacov Ro'i, The USSR and the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), and Donald Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-1983)," Central Asian Survey 5/3-4 (1986):91-132.

these measures would be successful.³⁴ Khodzhaev, for one, remained loyal to the Soviet leadership during this period, and was one of the few Bukharans to remain in office for this entire period. In 1924 he was named head of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR, holding this position until 1937.³⁵

Within a few years, Khodzhaev had become disillusioned with the Soviet government and his support for it. On issues such as education, economic development, and religious freedom, it gradually became evident that the opinions and views of the indigenous leaders were not being considered in Moscow. As petitions and debates ensued, it was clear that a new variation of socialism was developing in Central Asia, one which was not to be looked on favorably by the Soviet regime. Driving this move was the desire to incorporate the needs and gain the support of the Uzbek peasants, as well as achieve their own national goals. Socialism, as practiced by the Bolshevik government, was simply inapplicable to the nationalist elites.

Khodzhaev appears to have taken an interest in the ideals of Mir Sa'id Sultangaliev, a Tatar National

³⁴Park, pp.184-90.

³⁵Khodzhaev's position as head of the government was paralleled by Akmal Ikramov's position as First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party (1925-1937).

Communist.³⁶ Based on the notion of fusing Marxism with nationalism, Sultangaliev's National Communism was a belief that stressed the notion of proletariat nations and political independence for ethnic groups. Marxism was thus a means to achieve national aspirations. This clearly contradicted the ideological guidelines of national self-determination set out by Lenin and modified by Stalin, and became a justification for the purging of the Central Asian elite once again in the 1930s. The nationalists sought to cooperate with the rising Bolshevik movement as a means to their own nationalist ends. For the national communists, socialism was viewed as a viable political ideology for several reasons. First of all, the Bolsheviks offered a strategy of revolutionary change. Socialism as a political movement offered a technique for mass action, specifically, strikes, protests, and boycotts. The inability to sway and influence the masses was a severe shortcoming of the intelligentsia, who sought any option to correct this deficiency. There was also the advantage in the possibility for outside support. As the nationalist elite numbered several hundred at most, assistance from the Red Army and Bolshevik Party was deemed essential in at least initiating the anticipated revolution. Finally, the possibility of

³⁶For a detailed account of Sultangaliev, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).

independence and national equality, which at least was given lip-service by the Bolshevik's call for "national self-determination," further drew the nationalists into the socialist camp.

It should be noted that the nationalist intelligentsia was not unanimously in favor of the socialist alternative. Factions within the elite emerged because of this issue, and how best to employ the socialist tactics once sought. In spite of a vocal minority that firmly believed in the tenets of socialist doctrine as interpreted by the various Russian parties, most felt that socialist strategies could be adopted without fundamentally altering their own nationalist stance. In short, Stalin's ideal of "socialist in content and nationalist in form" was to be turned on its head.³⁷ The Bolshevik leadership permitted such opinions in the short run as it accelerated their overall policy of territorial consolidation. In the long run, it was clear that the national communists contradicted the basic ideological guidelines of nationality policy set out by Lenin and modified by Stalin. Bennigsen and Wimbush conclude that:

Like their modernist reformer Muslim predecessors, who insisted on ijtihad --their right to interpret the Koran in their own way -- and who rejected taglid, or blind submission to traditional authority, the Muslim national communists claimed for themselves the right to

³⁷Bennigsen and Wimbush, p.15.

interpret Marx in light of their own national conditions.³⁸

Charges of "Sultangalievism" (extreme nationalism) were levelled against the national communists and many were expelled from the Party. Seen as a threat to the continued Soviet hegemony over the Central Asian peoples, Khodzhaev and the vast majority of Central Asian leaders were removed from power in 1937-38.³⁹ In 1938, Khodzhaev was tried along with Bukharin and Rykov in the trial of the "Rightists and Trotskyites." Khodzhaev was convicted of the crime of extreme nationalism, and executed on March 15th of that year.⁴⁰

³⁸Ibid, p.49.

³⁹Jane P. Shapiro, "Political Rehabilitation in Soviet Central Asian Party Organizations," Central Asian Review XIV/3 (1966):199-209.

⁴⁰An excellent account of the Great Purge Trial is Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., The Great Purge Trial (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1965). The transcripts of the trial, which include the full testimony of Faizulla Khodzhaev, are published in the volume Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of the Rights and Trotskyites," Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, March 2-13, 1938 (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938).

III. STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

In spite of the Jadids' failure to create a sense of national identity among the Bukharan peoples, I argue that they created the conditions that eventually fostered a more permanent and mass-based nationalism. Drawing on the theories of nationalism and nation-building, I take a position stating that only through mass-oriented policies, such as universal education, can elite-based ideas be transmitted to the general population.⁴¹ In addition, a secularization of the power structure, and what are perceived to be power bases, is essential for this process to succeed.⁴² In the case of the Uzbek population, the cultural, economic, and political policies and debates of the 1930s created such a situation. The end result of this process is a rather sophisticated notion of national identity in Uzbekistan today, represented in literary, environmental, and political movements that receive broad support from the Uzbek population. Part of this process, according to William Fierman, "...is a reassessment of the lives of a whole generation of artists, scholars, political figures, and other luminaries as previously unpublished details about their tragic biographies emerge."⁴³ In a

⁴¹Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).

⁴²This will be the topic of chapter two.

⁴³William Fierman, "Glasnost' in Practice: The Uzbek Experience," Central Asian Survey 8/2 (1989):12.

sense, nationalism has come full circle in Uzbekistan, for the contemporary nationalist are beginning to understand and appreciate the foundations and histories of their first-generation predecessors.

In this research, I consider several key works to be essential in not only setting the historical parameters of my study, but for offering contrasting perspectives. With respect to the original sources used, Khodzhaev's works can be put into two categories: a three-volume set of collected works, and individually published pamphlets and articles. The collected works volumes contain a number of pamphlets and articles, and are well indexed and organized. Included in the collected works is a 68-page biography. In 1972, Ishanov wrote a more detailed biography of over 100 pages. Not surprisingly, both Soviet government-approved biographies ends in the year 1937 -- the year prior to Khodzhaev's arrest and execution on Stalin's orders. And, being consistent with the partial rehabilitation of Khodzhaev, are vague on events prior to 1920. Nevertheless, the three-volume set is helpful in that it includes a chronology of events in Khodzhaev's life and a listing of his speeches and journal articles. This has been a great aid in my research.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy 3 vols. (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970-73).

The published pamphlets and books are all from the post-1924 period with a noticeable pro-Soviet slant in the writing. Two works in particular, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare (On the History of the Revolution in Bukhara) and "O mlado-bukhartsakh" ("About the Young Bukharans"), are detailed accounts of the events surrounding the period of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic (1920-1924).⁴⁵ The remaining works emphasize the period after the national delimitation. In each instance, I have been able to obtain the original edition. The revisions of the 1930s editions are in and of themselves an interesting topic of discussion and will be explored later in the dissertation.

As for secondary sources, I have consulted the major works and list them in the bibliography. Suffice it to say that most focus on the process of the Soviet incorporation of Central Asia and rely heavily upon the Russian perspective. There are a few exceptions, Carrere d'Encausse in particular, but the literature remains traditional in their approach, giving valuable historical information. They do not, however, explain why the nationalist movements developed, and subsequently failed, in their effort to create an autonomous nation-state in Central Asia. Outside of the very real issue of Soviet military and organizational

⁴⁵In my research, I have found that the 1930s re-publications are substantially "corrected." Thus, I have acquired original editions of Khodzhaev's publications whenever possible.

superiority, the issues of nationalism and ethnic identification are rarely addressed.

Soviet scholarship, as noted above with respect to the rehabilitation of Khodzhaev, is substantial in volume, but not very useful in a discussion of the role of indigenous leaders. These include the standard histories of the Uzbek SSR and the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The exception to this rule is A.I. Ishanov's 1969 study, Bukharskaia Narodnaia Sovetskaia Respublika. This work is a revised version of a 1955 study, that places greater emphasis on the roles of indigenous leaders. Prior to this publication, works on the subject of early Soviet Central Asian history were discussions of Lenin, Stalin, Frunze and the Red Army, but never of such figures as Khodzhaev, Ikramov, or Fitrat. Indeed, of the hundreds of pages written on the subject, only a handful of references to the local figures are made, and these are simply condemnations of "bourgeois-nationalists." The 1971 study, Istoriia Bukharskoi i Khorezmskoi Narodnykh Sovetskikh Respublik, has also been helpful. As with Ishanov's work, this publication of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences offers a more neutral perspective of this period. Granted, while both remain silent on the conflict between the local leaders and Moscow, there is greater discussion of the historical evolution of the BPSR, with particular focus placed on the anti-Basmachi stance of the Bukharan leadership. I have found the collection of

official documents published in 1976 entitled Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki (1920-1924gg.): sbornik dokumentov, to be useful in understanding the Soviet government's role in the development and eventual elimination of the BPSR.⁴⁶ And finally, during the past several years, short articles about, or references to Khodzhaev have appeared in both Russian and Uzbek. These will be of particular importance for chapter eight, when I discuss the current role of the re-examination of the early Soviet past in Central Asia.

With these works laying the foundation for the my inquiry into Khodzhaev's actions and policies, I plan to address the questions raised earlier in this introduction. To repeat, the basic objective of this dissertation will be to lay out a theoretical framework of emerging nationalism with special emphasis placed on the role of the elites. In most case studies of modernizing nations, the elite play the primary role in transmitting nationalist ideals, and Bukhara and Uzbekistan are no exceptions. Afterwards, I will examine the issues that confronted the nationalist elite and Khodzhaev in particular. I will present these in a rough chronological sequence for the sake of organization, although it will be evident that the issues did not rise and fall in any convenient fashion. Finally, I will study the

⁴⁶I also list works written in the 1950s in the bibliography, but in my research, the more contemporary works remain the most useful.

impact of this period on the contemporary Uzbek political scene, especially as it relates to the developing nationalist movement today. The push for greater rehabilitation and recognition of the first generation of Uzbek leaders has been a "battle cry" for some of the Uzbek nationalists in recent years.

In chapter two, I outline a theoretical framework within which to place the historical account of Khodzhaev. Specifically, I define and discuss the concepts of national identity and nationalism, focusing on the issue of elite-mass cooperation. I will discuss the significance of nationalist movements, addressing the actors and issues that can create conditions for a successful nationalist program. In this analysis, I focus on the Jadidist (reformist) tradition that developed among the Bukharan intelligentsia prior to the First World War, and contrast it to the emerging power of the Bolshevik party and the nationalities policy gradually formulated by Lenin and Stalin. I define and signify the importance of such terms as "nation," "nationalism," and "intelligentsia." By laying out definitional guidelines, a framework will be set within which to place the events covered in the dissertation. Finally, I review the Marxist-Leninist perception of nationalism. I specifically focus on the original works of Marx and Engels and the debates that developed in the initial application of the Marxist paradigm to questions of

nationality. Then, I detail the Leninist application of these ideals to the multi-ethnic Russian state. In theory and in the policy application subsequently after the Revolution, it is clear that the Soviet regime and the Jadids of Bukhara fundamentally at odds with each other, in spite of an initial cooperative effort.

The split between the local elite and the Soviet government and the resulting exacerbation of tensions are the subjects of chapters three through seven. In chapter three, I lay out the historical background of Khodzhaev's early life. The central theme of this section is to explore and define the critical features of Bukharan society that shaped Khodzhaev's formative years. Chapter four centers around the formation of the Bukharan Communist Party and the emergence of Faizulla Khodzhaev as the political leader of the Bukharan intelligentsia. At this early state (1917-1920), divisions within the group are already forming and will be the subject of greater discussion in the subsequent chapters. In chapter five, I examine the "Jadidist experiment" of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic (1920-24) and the attempted creation of a Bukharan nationality. It was during these four years that the Jadids had the greatest opportunity to implement their reform measures. As will be seen, pressures from within the Republic, specifically the armed Basmachi movement and fiscal crises, and from without create an unbearable

situation for the Bukharan leadership. Khodzhaev had to deal with crises on both the domestic and foreign fronts, and never really had the chance to address any one issue fully. In chapters six and seven, I address the social/cultural, economic, and political conflicts between the local elites and the regime in Moscow during the early Soviet period (1924-38). In each area of policy formation, the clash between the national government and Communist Party in Moscow and the local leaders dictates the events of the period. Khodzhaev, at this point, becomes an expendable power to the Soviet government, and in the later years, is almost always overruled. It is also during this period, and in large part as a result of Soviet nationality policy, that a viable ethnic identity begins to emerge in Uzbekistan. The significance of this nationalism will also be addressed in the two chapters.

Finally, in chapter eight, I discuss the political rehabilitation of Khodzhaev and the relevance that this first generation of Uzbek elite has on the process and formation of a national identity in Uzbekistan today. The questions and assumptions discussed at the beginning of this chapter will be evaluated in light of the biographical analysis of Faizulla Khodzhaev's career.

CHAPTER TWO -- NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM

I. INTRODUCTION

A study of Faizulla Khodzhaev and the Jadidist movement not only offers a better understanding of Soviet nationality policy in the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, but also contributes to our perception of nationalism and national movements in general. In this discussion, a central question appears: how do national movements develop and what contributes to their success or failure? Before answering these questions, we must first define the term "nationalism." In reviewing the literature on nationalism, there is no consensus as to the term's definition and significance. Accounts range from historical idealism to materialist determinism. Factors such as language, environment, political order, education, and economics have all been the basis of various theories.¹ One can loosely divide theories of nationalism into two major groupings: (a) those that emphasize the historical and cultural qualities of group-identification, and (b) those that attribute the rise of nationalist tendencies to some other causal factor.

In this chapter, I will address the problems surrounding "nationalities theory," and bring to light the issues regarding nationalist elites. As Khodzhaev was

¹Louis L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976).

inextricably involved with the Bolshevik Party, later becoming a government official in the Soviet Union, it is essential that the Soviet position on nationalities policy also be addressed. In approaching this second issue, I will first outline the basic arguments and debates within the Marxist paradigm and then discuss their application in the Soviet case study. If Khodzhaev is to be classified as a national communist, then it is important that I discuss the tension between nationalism and communism, as well as the appeal of communism to nationalists.

II. DISSENTING VIEWS ON NATIONALISM

In an early discussion of nationalism, Johann Herder defined national groups on the basis of language, inclination, and character. Herder argued that although national identity is historically-conditioned, it is not necessarily permanent. Nations develop in random patterns and, under certain circumstances, could just as easily disappear. When nations exist, they should be respected and acknowledged by others. Herder's nationalism advocated that: "every nation had the right and even the duty to develop its language, poetry and national institutions. Each had its own happiness."² In sum, this description of nationalism implies an organic character that can develop

²Aria Kemilainen, Nationalism, Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification (Helsinki: Yvaskyla, 1964), p.79.

independent of others. There is no singular typology or definition. Nations and nationalism simply exist and should not be attributed to any specific phenomenon.

This perspective was typical of the scholarship and writing on nationalism up through the mid-20th century. The various explanations of its origins include environmental conditions, group relations, and historical phenomena.³ A common conclusion of the historical nationalists was that national identity was an innate quality existing in all people. Simply stated, one has a national identity because one says so.

The advocates of these generalizations include Kohn, Hayes, Kedourie, and Snyder. In each case, nationalism and national identity are viewed as subjective attachments to a people, a Volk. Forces such as economic development, modernization, and colonialization are not directly a part of the ethnic condition, although, in some cases, they may intensify such feelings. For example, Kohn views nationalism as an outcome of a long and tortuous process of unification. He argues that ethnic groups form the basis of nations and are instrumental in the transformation of mass loyalty from kinship relationships to the nation-state during this process. He defines nationalism as "a state of

³Louis Snyder (ed), The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in Its Meanings and Development (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964).

mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state."⁴

Similar to Kohn, Carleton Hayes writes that:

Nationalism is a proud and boastful habit of mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hostile attitude toward other nations; it admits that the individual citizens of one's country may do wrong, but it insists that one's nationality or national state is always right.⁵

Hayes defines nationalism by indicating that there are several "shades" of national identity. In addition to the standard assumption of group identification, he remarks that nationalism can "mean a condition of mind among the members of a nationality in which loyalty to the ideal of, or to the fact of, one's own national state becomes dominant over all other attachments, and in which pride is shown in the intrinsic excellence of, and in the mission of, the national state."⁶ This interpretation addresses the issue of the politicization of national groups that usually include political parties or movements that arise from these groups. In sum, Hayes focuses more on the national movement as a political force more so than national sentiment.

In contrast to Kohn and Hayes, Kedourie applies his views on nationalism to nations outside of the European

⁴Louis Snyder, The New Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.9.

⁵Carleton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: MacMillan, 1926), p.275.

⁶Snyder, The New Nationalism, pp.18-19.

continent. However, he still attributes non-European nationalism to European influences. In his study of nationalism in Africa, Kedourie accepts the argument that rising nationalism was the result of the white man's exploitation and imperialist drive for profit. Going beyond this "colonialist" stance, he also states that nationalism in general is a racial phenomenon that originated from Europe and "brought unsettlement and violence to the traditional societies of Africa and Asia."⁷ Kedourie argues that nationalism spreading from Europe to the rest of the world explains why nationalist movements in Third World countries often resemble such movements in Europe. The secularization and westernization of the non-European world is repeated ad infinitum, and is the root of the burgeoning nationalist character of these countries. This is especially true for the intelligentsia, or intellectual elites of the affected nations. These individuals often base their claims on national grounds, contrasting the traditional foundations of family, clan, or tribe.⁸

⁷Snyder, The New Nationalism, p.169.

⁸Kedourie also notes that the fostering of a new intelligentsia is implied by the names that they bestowed upon themselves. "(These movements) are seen to satisfy a need, to fulfill a want. Put at its simplest, the need is to belong together in a coherent and stable community. Such a need is normally satisfied by the family, the neighborhood, the religious community." Now, it is up to the nationalists to illuminate the future development of the "nation" on quite different bases. See Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p.101.

In reviewing the historical perspective, we should not come to the conclusion that these are mere mental exercises. In the various discussions, certain key factors emerge. Nationalism is seen as a force that possesses a permanent quality. However, by simplifying nationalism into fixed typologies, the complex nature of nationalism is not fully appreciated.

Whereas the historicists tend to relegate issues such as secularization, elite movements, and the structure of the nation-state to a secondary position, other theorists have elevated them to a central plateau. These modern theories of nationalism stress the reactive role of nationalism (generally seen as a reaction to uneven economic development and colonial exploitation). The materialist position is a response to the universality of the cultural/historical view, and attempts to place the notion of ethnic identity in a dependent and not an independent capacity. For example, although Hobsawm believes that national identity is based on some form of cultural or past experience, he furthers it by noting that outside forces trigger or exacerbate nationalist sentiment. This is primarily in the form of the nation-state. He remarks that: "Nations are not so much invented as composed and developed out of pre-existing historical materials, generally with quite different socio-political

functions."⁹ His concern is not to define nationalism but to discover the origins and development of nationalist movements.¹⁰ The conclusions revolve around the notion that nationalism does not have to be defined itself, as it is a by-product of other phenomena. The focus shifts, then, to these other phenomena and which ones are crucial in the development of nationalism.

A fundamental problem arises in that the "Western model" is once again presented as the end-product. For example, Deutsch claims that communication is an important element that should warrant serious consideration in the study of the rise of nationalism. However, he does not present a defined connection between an intensified communication and the development of states.¹¹ Another criticism is that: "Exposure to mass communications systems

⁹Eric Hobsawm, "Some Reflections on Nationalism," in Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences, edited by T.J. Nossiter et al., (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), pp.389-390.

¹⁰Hobsawm justifies this position by noting that: "The social, economic, even the ideological, analysis of the pioneers and early cadres and supporters of such movements has hardly been begun for Europe; and there has been almost no comparative study in this field. Even greater darkness encompasses mass nationalism, especially when this meant the change of meaning of an existing term rather than the formulation of a new one. So long as this is the case, much about nationalism must remain a matter for speculation rather than analysis." Ibid., p.397.

¹¹Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.214; and Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962).

does not automatically carry with it the desire for "modernity" and its benefits. It does not necessarily implant a "mobile sensibility," or "empathy," even where there has been physical mobility."¹² Above all, modernization is based upon a fundamental belief in the inevitability of this process.

Other variations of the modern interpretation of nationalism takes into account the concept of the state. For example, Gellner attempts to go beyond simple description and determinism in his study of nationalism and presents a state-centered view of nationalism. He remarks that: "Not only is our definition of nationalism parasitic on a prior and assumed definition of the state: it also seems to be the case that nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted."¹³ Gellner sums up this definition by noting that nations, like states, are contingent elements -- they are not universal. A "nationalist," however, believes that the two are permanent aspects of human existence and, as seen in the discussion of historical accounts, must be accepted as such.

Gellner's model is based on the concept of uneven modernization, in which a wave of industrialization creates

¹²Smith, p.101.

¹³Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.4.

the conditions for ethnic revivalism. With the challenge from outside, the local population will coalesce around its own elite intelligentsia and will either collapse and disappear in defeat, or create a secessionist movement worthy of challenging the oppressive colonial power. It is at this point, Gellner remarks, that nationalism is created:

Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist -- but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even as indicated, these are purely negative (i.e. consist of disqualifying marks from entry to privilege, without any positive similarity between those who share the disqualification and who are destined to form a new "nation")¹⁴

By analyzing the various stages of social and economic development, especially the transition from agrarian to industrial society, Gellner argues that nationalism is an artifice of human society. With the break-up of traditional ties, access to education increases, resulting in a more active general population. This creates, in the mind of the author, a homogenization of the population, and makes culture a unifying element -- a common experience. Gellner is quick to point out that:

...nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization,

¹⁴Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p.168.

based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state.¹⁵

The "artificiality of nationalism" argument is repeated by Anderson and Nairn. In their studies, the former focuses on the perception of nationalism as created by the educated classes and the latter stresses the economically determined nature of nationalism.¹⁶ Nairn, in particular, focuses on the economic factors that lead to a nation's "discovery of itself." When oppression or subjugation create situations wherein groups unify, myths of national identity arise.

Nairn writes that:

In short, the theory of nationalism has been inordinately influenced by nationalism itself. This is scarcely surprising. Nationalism is amongst other things a name for the general conditions of the modern body politic, more like the climate of political and social thought than just another doctrine. It is correspondingly difficult to avoid being unconsciously influenced by it.¹⁷

In Nairn's discussion, nationalism has shifted completely to the position of effect. Giddens, however, notes that Nairn's discussion of nationalism really only applies to colonial and oppressed ethnic groups. In attempting to move

¹⁵Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.48. Note that in this sense, "education-dependent" means that the culture also possesses a literary tradition, one that does not have to be "modern," or "western."

¹⁶Thomas Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, 2nd edition, (London: Verso, 1981), and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

¹⁷Nairn, p.94.

away from the "Great Power" focus of the historicists, Nairn has eliminated them entirely.¹⁸ This criticism can be levied against the modernists in general, for unlike the historians, there is now a shift in focus and concern for the developing nations and not so much for the capitalist ones. All agree that the concept of nationalism is a product of economic development and is spurred on by an active intelligentsia. The intelligentsia, or educated class, is the linchpin in this process. Without this vocal leadership, ethnic consciousness will remain dormant.

The modernist approaches offer important contributions to the understanding of the mechanisms that create, or at least instigate, a sense of national identity. While going beyond a conceptualization of "innate qualities," the modernists unfortunately fall into traps as well. By looking only at causal factors and ignoring historical precedent, nationalism is seen in a very narrow perspective. Industrialization and the modern nation-state are considered to be essential elements in the formation of a national identity. Pre-modern nationalists and contemporary traditionalists are minimized for the sake of model conformity and, as a result, the usefulness and universality of the school is lessened. Again, we are confronted with a limited framework that fails to create the conditions for an overall theory.

¹⁸Giddens, p.213.

III. A WORKING MODEL OF NATIONALISM

From this point, we can begin to develop a more adequate model of nationalism and national formation. Indeed, merging the historical foundation with the modernization stimuli might produce a more complex and universal view of the nationalist phenomenon. In addressing this concern, Anthony Smith presents a compromise model that I find extremely useful in better understanding the formation of national movements. He argues that material factors can create conditions for national movements and sentiments, but the base root of national identity lies in the historical and ethnic (ethnie) conditions of the people in question. He writes that:

[Historicism] aims to establish through detailed research the origins and laws of growth of a particular entity. From the cultural standpoint, nationalism must be viewed as a particular version of evolutionary historicism, one which applies the historicist schema of primordial origins, laws of growth and sequences of events to a certain kind of community. And one of the main cultural preconditions of the rise of nationalism is the appearance of an historicist outlook.¹⁹

However, if we define nationalism historically, can we consider modernist approaches? I believe so, for by combining elements of both trends, what emerges is a psychological account of nationalism as stimulated by

¹⁹Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed., (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), p.64.

external forces.²⁰ These forces can include the issues discussed above and in the process, exacerbate existing feelings of ethnicity. Ethnicity affected by outside factors, be they ideological or material, creates the condition of full-fledged nationalism.

In distinguishing the various gradients of nationalism, a split can be made between "national sentiment," what the historicists would consider to be sufficient conditions for nationalism, and true "nationalism," a more politicized version. The former is defined as a devotion to one's nation-group and a support for that nation's unity. In contrast, nationalism is a more politically charged national sentiment that includes an aspiration for independence, a political program or party advocating such, and a belief that there exists a collection of nations throughout the world that the nationalists in question hope to emulate. This may or may not be western in scope, colonial in origin, or modernizing. It is simply sufficient to have a politically-charged sentiment powerful enough to garner support, or at least have an impact on, the local political setting. According to Smith, "(w)e may now define "nationalism" as an ideological movement, for the attainment

²⁰This is also expressed by Giddens, who writes that: "Nationalism not only offers a basis of group identity, it does so in the context of showing this identity to be the result of distinct and precious achievements...Nationalism engenders a spirit of solidarity and collective commitment which is energetically mobilized in circumstances of cultural decay." Giddens, p.215.

and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation like others."²¹

By understanding the conditions for emerging nationalism, we can better evaluate the role that the bearers of national identity have in the movement itself. With respect to the individuals who initiate and cultivate national identity, we must again return to the intelligentsia, the educated elite. Kautsky notes that during this period of modernization, the various social classes are affected in different ways. The aristocracy, for example, is challenged and often limited in power. As it represents the old order of society, it is often targeted by the modernizers. In addition, a working class evolves from the displaced peasantry. It is from this groups that one can find the potential rank and file for a nationalist movement. Most importantly, as the society modernizes, a group of educated intellectuals develops which associates with the changing trends in that society. They, in effect,

²¹Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p.171. This attempt to formulate a more complex and less deterministic definition of nationalism is evident in other writings as well, especially in those that employ a rational choice construct. For further evidence, see Ernst B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?," International Organizations 40:3 (Summer 1986):707-744; Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," Ethnic and Racial Studies 10:4 (October 1987):415-426; and Alexander Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), chapters 1-5.

become the advocates of modernization. Kautsky writes that this group is one that:

...embraces persons with advanced standing in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences. However, it also includes all those natives in underdeveloped countries, most likely to be found among the aristocracy and the businessmen, who have, through the contacts afforded by colonialism become aware of the world beyond their own culture area, and have obtained an advanced education appropriate to an industrial country, or who are at present students obtaining such an education.²²

The paradox is that despite the modernity of the intelligentsia, these individuals continue to possess a close affinity with the nation to which they return. Educated abroad, they return with visions of changing society only to find society unwilling to accept their ideals. The values of the educated are from the adopted, "modernized" society that they want to spread, and inherently contradict the traditionalism of the homeland.²³ This is evident by the initial rejection of their ideas by the masses. They are seen as attempting to change too much for the rural/traditional society. However, as the society becomes unstable, particularly as outside (often colonial) forces exert greater influence, the social relationships begin to change. The old ruling classes begin to lose legitimacy and power as it is clear that they can not curtail the impact of outside pressures.

²²Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p.45.

²³Ibid., pp.46-47.

It is in this situation that the newly-created intelligentsia emerges. Educated, politically savvy, and knowledgeable of the ways of the colonial power, the intelligentsia becomes a focal group for the nation's rights and interests. They are both knowledgeable of the "modern" world, and yet do not completely discard the mores and customs of the old, traditional order. This is especially true in the area of languages and literature. The now-revolutionary intelligentsia often makes it a point to express their ideas in the local vernacular to obtain even greater support. The masses act in a reactive manner are not viewed as crucial in the formation of a national identity. Gellner furthers this definition by adding that the intelligentsia is an historically specific group or class "which is alienated from its own society by the very fact of its education."²⁴ Although this is generally true, the tendencies within the intelligentsia can be as complex and diverse as the groups in society as a whole.

Whereas most modernists see the battle of national control as being one of traditionalist versus modernist, with one side, usually the latter, gaining a final advantage, it is probably more correct to note that there are three general trends within the intelligentsia -- the assimilationist, the traditionalist, and the reformist. The assimilationist is the closest to being an internationally-

²⁴Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.134.

mind individual; a cosmopolitan. Ethnic identities and differences are of little importance to the assimilationist who envisions the elimination of such tendencies. This perspective is most similar to the modernization position discussed above. In contrast, the traditionalist consciously rejects modernizing trends and technical innovation for the sake of maintaining ties with the past. He might support limited political reform, but usually in the realm of social and moral education. Furthermore, the reforms usually suggest a return to older standards for the sake of order and "higher moral principles."

The third strand, the reformist, attempts to fuse the concerns of both groups -- to address positively the issue of modernization, and at the same time, maintain some linkage with the past. The striving for universal objectives and practical solutions can create conflicts for the reformist, who is torn between tradition and modernity. While the initial tendency is to reject the traditional modes as being counterproductive to reformist efforts, this often pulls the elite away from the general population. Eventually, there is a re-acceptance of traditional tenets, mainly to garner support from the masses, and a subsequent tempering of the elite's call for change.

The reformist often holds the key to the success of a nationalist movement, for he is the linchpin between the

forces of tradition and culture, and of modernity.²⁵ Furthermore, the reformist is beset with the problem of obtaining support from the masses through some form of common identification. If the reformist can connect with the masses, then the movement can build a strong base from which to expand and develop. If, on the other hand, he alienates the general population, the latter will either remain passive, or will sway to one of the extremes, more often to the traditionalist side. This dilemma plagued the first generation of Uzbek nationalists and was a critical factor in its inability to create a stable nationalist base.

With a defined perception of nationalism, nationalists, and national movements, we can reach a greater understanding of the period in question. Other writings stress the primacy of the State in national-formation, or the need to examine myths and cultural practices in their determination of "what nationalism is."²⁶ For the most part, the

²⁵A general discussion of elite behavior is in J.H. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (Huntington: Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Co., 1976). The problem of elite reformist behavior in Central Asia is described in Steven Burg, "Central Asian Elite Mobility and Political Change in the Soviet Union, Central Asian Survey 5/3-4 (1986):77-89.

²⁶For alternative discussions of nationalism, see Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985); Colin H. Williams and Eleonore Kofman (eds), Community, Conflict, Partition and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1989); Roy E.H. Mellor, Nation, State, and Territory: A Political Geography (London: Routledge, 1989). For a case study outside of the Soviet Union that addresses these

fundamental differences revolve around the issue of national origin and development, and whether a "nationalism" is organic or artificial.

In all of these, however, the role of the elite agent is recognized. As noted in chapter one, it is critical for the elite agent to be able to formulate a coherent national agenda and transmit it to the general population of the region. An examination of Khodzhaev's career will illustrate these points. I argue that as a classic example of a "reformist," Khodzhaev attempted to initiate a modernization program in his native Bukhara. However, with a recalcitrant Emir and a passive population, the efforts of the Jadidists, of which Khodzhaev was a member, failed. It was only after the acquisition of outside assistance in the form of the Bolshevik Red Army that the modernist nationalists succeeded in obtaining power. For the next two decades, Khodzhaev and the other nationalists attempted to create the conditions for a modern nation-state. Their efforts, as well as the obstacles that they had to confront, will anchor this case-study. Equally important to Khodzhaev's development as a nationalist was his introduction to Marxist-Leninist theories of nationalism. It is to these that I will now turn.

questions, see Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981).

IV. MARX ON NATIONALISM

Marx's view of national movements originates from his definition of "nation" and "nationalism." Marx periodically refers to the bourgeois concepts of nationalism and nation (the latter to be distinguished from "state"), but no single consistent definition of his view is readily available.

Marx was never clear as to what he meant by these terms, and used them interchangeably throughout his writings. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels wrote that:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in condition of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.²⁷

The question arises as to whether what is described above in reference to "national" is to be defined as ethnic or state characteristics. On occasion, one sees nation referring to a political unit (state) and at other times, to distinct ethnic groups such as the Germans and Poles. In addition, nationality does not always signify adherence towards an ethnic group, but sometimes is synonymous with the "legal

²⁷Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p.36.

status of citizenship" -- patriotism.²⁸ Marx suggests this interpretation in The German Ideology:

Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organize itself as State.²⁹

Nationality is defined here as a product of material forces and something to be "asserted," but is couched in terms of devotion to a political entity. The bourgeoisie structures this entity and makes it uniform within the state. In explaining this problem, Walker Connor notes that: "since to Marx it was the economic force-field that defined the limits of significant sociopolitical units, the state, nation, and the citizenry all became blurred."³⁰

Marx's colleague, Engels, directly relates nationality to linguistic differences in The Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State. This initially develops with kinship and tribal orders and eventually broadens out to larger social organizations. "National identity" in and of

²⁸Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.9.

²⁹Karl Marx, The German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), p.127.

³⁰Connor, p.9.

itself is not sufficient to create a nation-state. Engels explains this when he writes of the American Indians:

...we see how an originally homogeneous tribe gradually spreads over a huge continent; how through division tribes become nations, entire groups of tribes; how the languages must change until they not only become unintelligible to other tribes, but also lose almost every trace of their original identity.³¹

These wandering tribes create their own languages and their own identities due to their inability to unite. In this instance, a sense of national identity does not exist. The likelihood of one ever developing is negligible unless a crucial element is added -- a revolutionary bourgeois class. If a universalizing bourgeois class forms from within a societal arrangement, it can lay the foundation for a national identity.

This discussion suggests that national groups may not always form. Marx himself called these entities "nations without histories," noting that they tended to be unprogressive and destined to disappear in the future, as larger national units assimilate them. By looking at these "nations without history," we see that Marx further defines "nationality" as a territorial or a linguistic group without an historical project. Accordingly, a given "nationality" can evolve into a full-fledged nation only:

³¹Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p.85.

- a) If it has a strong autonomous popular movement;
- b) If it is linked with the Western European movement which is about to conquer power, in other words if the two movements are in the same historical sequence and;
- c) If it weakens the main enemy of the Western European revolution, i.e. Russia.

These conclusions are drawn by several commentators, who support the notion that in spite of his ambiguity on the status of nationalism, Marx did adhere to a Eurocentric classification of nations.³² In sum, the openness of the definition is advantageous for Marx, as it allows for changes in the face of new historical situations. On the other hand, this definitional flexibility on the part of Marx is also a cause for differences in interpretations.

By studying Germany and Italy, Marx concludes that national movements are "acceptable" if they ally with a particular class, the proletariat. This typifies Marx's later writing regarding the peripheral nations of Europe, such as Poland, Spain, and Ireland. These nations, according to Marx, can have their own socialist revolutions, but generally in conjunction with that of a major nation. The movement can be independent, but more than likely will be in agreement with other proletarian movements. This

³²See Eric Cahm and Vladimir Claude Fisera (eds), Socialism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1848-1945), volume 1 (Nottingham: Spokeman, 1980), p.7; and Charles C. Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

strategic view of nationalism shapes Marx's writings on specific national cases.

Referring to the Irish question as "not merely a simple economic question but at the same time a national question," he indicates some recognition of the national factor. Walker Connor goes so far as to state that:

What is significant about these inconsistencies and ambiguities is that they illustrate the basic incompatibility between classical Marxist assumptions and national realities, and also illustrate the manner in which the founders of Marxism, despite their conviction that they could manipulate national sentiments to serve their movement, came themselves to be influenced more substantively by national concepts than they were probably aware.³³

As Marx studied nationalism, surely strategic and practical considerations must have influenced his decisions to support or argue against a particular national movement.

Marx exemplifies this concern for keeping the nationalist subordinate to the international interests in his examination of the Irish question. Early in their careers, Marx and Engels believed that the best course of action for the Irish to take would be to support the labor movement in England. Through the 1840s, at least, they believed that the Chartist Movement was on the verge of radically changing English politics and the position of the working class. Engels wrote that:

There can be no doubt that henceforth the mass of the Irish people will unite ever more

³³Connor, p.19.

closely with the English Chartists and will act with them according to a common plan. As a result the victory of the English democrats, and hence the liberation of Ireland, will be hastened by many years.³⁴

Unfortunately, the Chartist movement collapsed after marginal gains. Consequently, Marx and Engels changed their opinion on the Irish question. Disappointed with the progress of the English working class, Marx now supported Irish independence. In a letter to Engels, Marx writes:

...it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working classes to get rid of their present connection with Ireland. And this is my most complete conviction...For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy... Deeper study has convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland.³⁵

As Irish independence will weaken Imperial England's power (and "liberate" the Irish working class), all workers should support this political move. If this "nationalist" movement is successful, British working class interests and strength will also increase. The Irish working class will rise up, but mainly in conjunction with the English working class.

The Irish Question exemplifies Marx's position on the strategic value of certain nationalist movements. A national movement is progressive when it challenges the rule

³⁴Frederick Engels, "Feargus O'Connor and the Irish People (January 1848)," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, volume 6 (New York: International Publishers, 1976).

³⁵Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Correspondence (New York: International Publishers, 1934), pp.280-281.

and structure of the bourgeois capitalist system. In the case of Ireland, Marx concludes that "What Ireland needs is: 1) Self-government and independence from England. 2) An agrarian revolution. 3) Protective tariffs against England. As an independent and industrial nation defended by tariffs, Ireland could come to be a new basis for socialist revolutionary development."³⁶ The force of nationalism will aid in the development of the Irish economy and working class conditions which would otherwise be stunted by the British "colonial" rule.

In contrast, Marx wrote that a national movement is reactionary if it attempts to either tear apart the cooperative international efforts of the proletariat, or supports an aggressive semi-feudal claim on various peoples or territories. Examples of reactionary nationalism include Prussian nationalism vis-a-vis the French after the 1870 war and during the period of the Paris Commune, and the Pan-Slav movement of the 1870s. In his writings, Marx referred to these groups as "this ethnic trash" and "the most fanatic carrier of counterrevolution, since its entire existence is nothing more than a protest against a great historical revolution."³⁷ Boersner sees this distinction as being theoretically consistent:

³⁶Ibid., p.229.

³⁷Karl Marx, "Hungary and Panslavism," in The Russian Menace to Europe, edited by Paul Blackstock and Bert Hoselitz (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), p.63.

National revolution could be justified only if it had a social content. This social content could lie in the interests of a national bourgeoisie (as in the case of Poland and Hungary), and especially in the objective stimulation which the revolution would give to social movements in other countries. Marx refused to look at any nation as anything but a basis for a certain progressive social transformation, or as an auxiliary agent in a social upheaval taking place in another country.³⁸

Thus, Marx advocates supporting nationalist movements that advance history, especially by defeating feudal structures and developing capitalist frameworks as they are progressive. He also refuses to support those that resist and retard the continual move toward socialism, for they are reactionary.³⁹

A problem with Marx's views on nationalism and nationalist movements is that they pertain primarily to the European political scene. Marx considered the colonial world to be an extension of the capitalist development that was going on in Europe. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels state that:

Just as it [the bourgeoisie] has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent

³⁸Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917-1928) (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1957), p.8.

³⁹See Ian Cummins, Marx, Engels and National Movements (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), and Horace B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on
nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.⁴⁰

The East, in Marx's view, is typified by the Asiatic Mode of Production -- a stagnant, hierarchical system that does not emphasize private property and that continues in a cyclical fashion.⁴¹ Avineri concludes in his analysis of Marx's view on colonialism that:

Consequently, the only impetus of change has to come from the outside, and European bourgeois civilization is thus the external agent of change in non-European societies.⁴²

With the exception of marginal remarks about India and China, Marx does not really include the non-European in his discussion. Marx's justification is based on his general view of society's evolution. Nationalism is a bourgeois-created ideal that exists only in the most advanced, European nations, and any "loyalties" or affinities that exist in the "colonials" are strictly tribal or primitive.⁴³

For the most part, Marx approves of colonialization as it forces resisting feudal or Asiatic nations into the "modern world." Modernization, in fact, is a necessary evil

⁴⁰Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, p.37.

⁴¹Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp.333, 596.

⁴²Shlomo Avineri (ed), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), p.18.

⁴³Boersner, pp.26-27 and Cummins, pp.58-59, 176.

in the world development. In 1852-3, Marx wrote several articles on the conditions in India and concluded that although colonial oppression can be a brutal phenomenon, it is still far better than the stagnant Asiatic despotism that the sub-continent would have to endure in the absence of British domination. In an article in the New York Tribune, Marx writes that:

Now, sickening as it must be to human feelings to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations, disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.⁴⁴

India, as with other colonial regions, will remain trapped in the cyclical Asiatic mode of production unless an external force is applied, no matter how painful it may be. This is important to note, for although Marx has a relatively negative view of colonial peoples as he centers his discussion on the European nations, he does not exclude them entirely. Engels himself wrote on the role of the colonial people in the future revolution:

The countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated, India, Algiers, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish

⁴⁴Karl Marx, from the New York Tribune June 25, 1853, p.5.

possessions, must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence....But as to what social and political phases these countries will have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organization, we today can only advance rather idle hypotheses, I think.⁴⁵

It is evident that nationalism played a significant role in Marx's discussions, and that as the nationalist movements became more active, he modified his position to make room for an acceptance of them. Unfortunately, Marx's changes had an effect on the subsequent interpretations of his position on the national question.

V. LENIN ON NATIONALISM

In the decades following Marx's death, socialists in Europe began to evaluate his views on the national question. As a result of the nature of Marx's interpretations, as well as the specific country settings within which the theory was to be applied, sharply contrasting schools of thought emerged. The first "revisionist" Marxist position on nationalism developed in the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire. In The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, Otto Bauer applied a Marxist interpretation to the situation in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In this analysis written in 1907, Bauer does not exclusively focus on the primacy of economic forces, but instead, begins with a search for common national characters. He commences his

⁴⁵Engels, Correspondences, p.339.

discussion with a definition of "nation." Bauer writes that: "The nation is the totality of men bound together through a common destiny into a community of character."⁴⁶ He argues that the world is made up of numerous communities, each differentiated by historical experiences. Along the lines of the historicist view of nationalism, Bauer writes:

The history of society does not only decide which given characteristics of the members of the nation are to constitute the national character; the form in which the historically effective forces produce a common character is also historically conditioned.⁴⁷

Ultimately, the members of the nation defined for themselves their "national character." In essence, a nation is nation because it declares itself as such.⁴⁸ The question arises: who can rightfully declare that they exhibit such a will? Bauer answers by stating that only "advanced, historical nations" will possess such an ability, and thus there will not be a case of non-historical nations declaring themselves independent and historical. In this analysis, Bauer defines historical nations as those that have an established past which includes common beliefs, values, customs, and

⁴⁶Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1907), pp.130-138 as quoted in Austro-Marxism, translated and edited by Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p.107.

⁴⁷Ibid., p.109.

⁴⁸Mark Blum, The Austro-Marxists, 1890-1918: A Psychobiographical Study (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p.94.

language. Bauer then applies this logic to his division of peoples into three national typologies: nations that dominate; nations that can be assimilated; and nations that will not be assimilated, but are too small for independence and thus will "willfully" attach themselves to larger national bodies.

Nations can retain their distinctive cultural characteristics and the "principle of nationality" will prevail in the future socialist economic framework. This principle states that all nations will possess certain features -- language, mores, customs -- that will continue well after the means of production have passed into the hands of the international proletarian movement. Educational and political institutions that transcend the economic realm and that allow each group to fully express itself will sustain these features. When possible, an international division of labor divided along "national" lines will also exist. This is indicative of Bauer's notion of "cultural autonomy." Bauer notes:

We have seen that socialism leads necessarily to the realization of the principle of nationality. But while socialist society gradually constructs above the national community a federal state in which the communities of the individual nations are once again incorporated, the principle of nationality changes into that of national autonomy, from a rule for the formation of states into a rule of the state constitution. The socialist principle of nationality expresses a

higher unity of the principle of nationality and national autonomy.⁴⁹

Bauer's definitions of nationality and national autonomy, although perhaps going against the principles of orthodox Marxism in their elevation of national goals to a position near that of class, made sense in the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire. National movements must be supported as they will aid in the advance of socialism.⁵⁰ Rosa Luxemburg represents the extreme anti-nationalist and cosmopolitan wing in this debate on the national question. Whereas Bauer stresses the autonomy of national character, Luxemburg supported the position that nationalism was a temporary phenomenon. In an essay published in 1895, Luxemburg refutes the primacy of national factors, noting that nationalist and socialist aspirations are incompatible. In addition, the whole idea of national self-determination should be subordinate to socialist goals. Even on this last point, Luxemburg is anti-nationalist. She is wary of the concept of national self-determination (a concept that was being used more frequently in socialist debates over the rights of national minorities), and generally finds those who support national self-determination to be "socialist

⁴⁹Ibid., p.116.

⁵⁰Peter Zwick, National Communism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp.39-40.

opportunists." In The National Question and Autonomy, she writes that:

What is especially striking about this formula [for national self-determination] is the fact that it doesn't represent anything specifically connected with socialism nor with the politics of the working class. "The right of nations to self-determination" is at first glance a paraphrase of the old slogan of bourgeois nationalism put forth in all countries at all times: "the right of nations to freedom and independence."⁵¹

She argues that it is absurd to think that nationalist goals can coexist with socialist goals and aid in the latter's development. One should not take time and effort from the socialist movement in addressing such issues. The notion of numerous "socialist states" arising from former capitalist states is unrealistic -- "the days when national self-determination was indeed progressive had long since passed."⁵² Instead, the emphasis should be on the development of the international workers' movement and the creation of larger political structures.

Responding to Bauer's and Luxemburg's positions, V.I. Lenin outlines what he considers to be the true Marxist interpretation of nationalism. Lenin's introduction to the nationalities debate came early in his career. In the RSDLP

⁵¹Rosa Luxemburg, The National Question and Autonomy, in The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, edited with an Introduction by Horace B. Davis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp.102-103.

⁵²J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, volume II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.846.

(Russian Social Democratic Labor Party) debates on nationalism and later in his works of 1913-16, a clear view of Lenin's understanding of the theoretical question of nationalism is formed. It is only during his years as head of the newly-formed Bolshevik government, from 1917 to 1924, that circumstances would force a reconsideration of some of his views.

Lenin distinguished the rise and development of nationalist movements into two phases: 1789-1871 was the era of progressive nationalism; and 1871-1917 as the era of imperialism. Regarding the first phase, Lenin states that:

This was precisely the period of national movements and the creation of national states. When this period drew to a close, Western Europe had been transformed into a settled system of bourgeois states, which, as a general rule, were nationally uniform states.⁵³

In both cases, "nation" is defined along the lines later noted by Stalin -- common history, language, economic development, territory, and culture. Again, nationalism is seen as potentially beneficial, primarily because it aids in the development of the capitalist world and the destruction of the obsolete feudal system. This is especially true for the first period, when bourgeois-national movements are

⁵³V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Selected Works, volume I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p.576. Lenin distinguishes between the European and non-European nationalist movements. The latter did not begin until 1905, with the various movements in Persia, Turkey, and China. While these national movements can be considered progressive, those in industrial Europe are viewed as reactionary and imperialistic. Ibid., pp.576-577.

instrumental in the reshaping of Europe along lines more conducive to capitalist development. On this point, Lenin is adamant:

To the workers the important thing is to distinguish the principles of the two trends. Insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always, in every case, and more strongly than anyone else, in favour, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression. But insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for its own bourgeois nationalism, we stand against. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation.⁵⁴

Lenin reiterates Marx's discussion of the Franco-Prussian War and the Irish Question. On the latter, he notes that Marx was correct in changing his mind in the 1860s. Lenin endorses this reversal on the grounds:

(1) that the expected social revolution in England, which would have rendered a bourgeois-democratic and general national movement in Ireland superfluous, had not materialized; and (2) that a general national movement had by the 1860's developed in Ireland, and the British workers had the duty of supporting it, or at the very least of supporting what was progressive in it.⁵⁵

Lenin believes that Marx was not simply changing with the times, but pursuing a consistent proletarian policy. This reading, which is more of a reflection of Lenin's views than Marx's, suggests a belief that the proletariat of an advanced nation (England) should always support an

⁵⁴Ibid., p.581.

⁵⁵Davis, p.189.

independence movement in a colony (Ireland). As a movement did not exist prior to the 1860s (at least a viable independence movement), the view that the workers of both countries should remain united was the only logical position.⁵⁶

Likewise, Lenin used this reasoning to reverse Marx's position on the Polish Question. For Lenin, the fundamental conditions in Poland had changed since the time of Marx, and he believed that the bourgeois-nationalists were now reactionary. In the mid- to late-1800s, the Polish aristocracy authentically struggled for Polish independence for the sake of the Poles as a nation. By the early-1900s, they supported the respective ruling nations (Germany, Russia, and Austria) as these nations made it advantageous for the Polish aristocracy to maintain the status quo through financial reward. Thus, it is only through the international proletarian revolution that Poland can become a truly liberated nation. He still favors Polish independence, but quickly adds that:

Class antagonism has now [1903] undoubtedly relegated national questions far into the background, but ... it cannot be categorically asserted that some particular national question cannot appear temporarily in the foreground of the political drama.... We subordinate to the

⁵⁶Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," p.604.

interests of the proletarian struggle our support of the demand for national independence.⁵⁷

Lenin's paralleling of the "strategic" interpretation of Marxism leads to further revision of his theory of national self-determination as it is put into practice in the 1917-1924 period. For now, we see the continued primacy of economic factors over the national.

Lenin, despite his support for national liberation movements, was still wary of the dominating effect of nationalism. He often found it contrary to Marxist aims and, on occasion, considered it to be a "fetish" and a nuisance. Lenin's reasoning is that national interests often split what should otherwise be unified parties. A key example of this is his disagreement with the Jewish Bund. Whereas the Bund supported the notion of national--based political parties, Lenin firmly opposed national factions within the RSDLP and noted that the best and most progressive Jewish spokesmen did not fear an inevitable assimilation.⁵⁸ Centralism is a key factor in the success of any revolutionary party and national divisions will lead to a reduced effectiveness. Lenin expresses this view in a 1903 article in Iskra, in which he writes:

⁵⁷V.I. Lenin, "The National Question in Our Program," Collected Works, volume VI (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1941), p.454.

⁵⁸Stanley W. Paige, "Lenin and Self-Determination," Slavonic and East European Review XXVIII/71 (April 1950):344-346.

We must always and unconditionally strive for the closest unity of the proletariat of all nationalities, and only in separate and exceptional cases can we express and actively support the demand leading toward the creation of a new class (i.e. bourgeois) state or to substitute for a full political unity of the state the weaker federal unity.⁵⁹

This support for a centralized system is consistent with his views on the Party, where he believed that a highly-centralized structure would enhance the possibility for success.

Lenin's major contribution to the Marxist interpretation of nationalism is ultimately this theory of national self-determination. As alluded to above, this theory becomes a justification for supporting national liberation movements and, more importantly, gaining support for the Bolshevik cause in the multinational Russian empire. The RSDLP first addressed the issue of national self-determination at the 1903 Congress, after it had been raised in previous discussions.⁶⁰ In the summer of 1913, he took up the task of defining "Point 9" of the RSDLP platform ("the right of all nations in the state to self-determination"). For Lenin:

⁵⁹V.I. Lenin, Iskra 44 (July 15, 1903), translated in Paige, p.346.

⁶⁰The history of this debate is outlined in Mary Holdsworth, "Lenin and the Nationalities Question," in Lenin: The Man, the Theorist, the Leader, a reappraisal, edited by Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), pp.268-273.

The paragraph of our program [dealing with national self-determination] cannot be interpreted in any other way, but in the sense of political self-determination, that is, as the right to separation and creation of an independent government.⁶¹

Lenin rejects the notion of cultural autonomy as it simply perpetuates the existing multinational states. It is only when the large empires break up that individual peoples can form states, create progressive economic conditions, and telescope the advance toward socialism.

In spite of the rhetorical value of national self-determination, Lenin's conceptualization possessed qualifications. The centrifugal force of nationalism was more psychological than historical, and once the fear of national domination and oppression vanished (with the right of political self-determination), the need for separation would disappear as well. Put another way, the economic forces of capitalism tend towards centralization and unification as larger economic units are more productive in an advanced capitalist condition. In light of this, it should be emphasized that Lenin does not imply that advancing the right to separation necessitates support for the actual process of separation.⁶²

⁶¹Lenin, "Self-Determination," p.607.

⁶²Pipes sums up this point by noting that, "Whenever the interests of the nationality and the proletariat conflicted, the former had to yield to the latter, and the right to separation had to go overboard....The duty of the socialists of the oppressed ethnic groups was to agitate for a union with the democratic elements of the oppressing nation, whereas the

This strategic consideration is consistent with Lenin's discussion of sliyanie, or merging of nations. This would be a progressive and inevitable phenomenon that would take place as nations developed into higher, socialist states. What "national characteristics" would be chosen in this future arrangement? According to Lenin, "only its democratic and socialist elements." As noted in his "Critical Remarks on the National Question," each nation has two cultures: bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism. The latter is the only logical recourse for the international socialist revolution as the former suggests a continued state of national struggles and the domination of one nation over another. Again, the final objective of eventual merging is not lost, and the right to national self-determination in this framework will actually speed up the process.

Remaining consistent with the Marxist priority of class interests over national ones, Lenin sees the unification of minorities and the assimilation of languages and national identity that occur in the course of historical progress as positive developments. In the meantime, it is advantageous to profess a deep support for nationalist movements because they will reciprocate and support the Bolshevik cause. The

socialists of the oppressor nation must guarantee the minorities the right to self-determination." Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1980), p.45.

belief that Lenin advocated national self-determination only for strategic reasons, is supported by what ultimately occurred in the Soviet Union. Because Lenin's theory, like that of Marx, is open for interpretation and circumstantial consideration, its implementation is largely based upon the actions of his successor, in this case Stalin. The Soviet government curtailed the rules of self-determination and took advantage of the national groups that had initially allied with them. It will also be seen that the Young Bukharans, as representative of one of these national groups, used the force of the Bolsheviks troops, the Red Army, to attain their own goal of controlling the Bukharan government. Bolshevism was a means of national liberation and an aid to oppressed nationalist groups.

VI. STALIN'S APPLICATION OF LENIN'S THEORETICAL AND STRATEGIC POSITIONS ON NATIONALISM

Lenin's preoccupation with the Civil War and restructuring of the economic system, as well as his health problems that resulted in an early death in 1924 all meant that the "nationalities question" would be delegated to another person. In this case, the person who took up the task of resolving the issue was J.V. Stalin. As Lenin's Commissar for Nationalities and someone who had written on the subject, Stalin was a logical choice for this duty. Stalin applied Lenin's theory of national self-determination to the various republics in the newly-formed country in a

manner that best suited his own strategic objectives. The tactics of re-unification and the desire to create an expanding, monolithic Soviet state, territorially stable in spite of the failed socialist revolutions in Europe, can be attributed to Stalin.⁶³

Stalin first addressed the national question in 1904.⁶⁴ His most complete work on the subject was Marxism and the National Question, written nine years later. Written with the support of Lenin, Stalin defines the concept of the nation and proceeds to discuss the role of nationalist movement in the greater scheme of the socialist revolution. Part one is devoted to defining the nation. In this case, it is an "historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture."⁶⁵ All of these elements are necessary for a nation to be considered as such. For Stalin, it is relatively simple to distinguish what is and is not a nation. The Swiss, for example, are

⁶³Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Bolsheviks and the National Question (1903-1929)," in Socialism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1848-1945), volume three, edited by Eric Cahm and Vladimir Claude Fisera (Nottingham, England: Spokeman, 1980), pp.120-122.

⁶⁴V.I. Stalin, "Kak ponimaet sotsial-demokratiia natsional'ni vopros," Sochineniia, vol.I (1901-1907), (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1951), pp.32-55.

⁶⁵J.V. Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question (1913)," in Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p.12.

not one but three nations as they have three languages. The Jews also do not constitute a nation, for they are "economically disunited, territorially scattered, possess no single common language nor common psychology. Thus they form not one but many small groups, and are frequently absorbed by the larger nations in whose midst they live."⁶⁶ This relates to what Stalin calls the "epochal nature" of a nation's existence. The epoch referred to is, in line with Lenin's definitions, the Capitalist period.⁶⁷

In the second part of Marxism and the National Question, Stalin addresses the relationship between nationalist and socialist movements. Stalin argues that the majority of national movements are bourgeois in nature. The leadership of nationalist movements comes from the educated bourgeoisie. The principles of national identity rests with these individuals. The masses simply follow the dictates of the elite. Stalin is quick to note that this does not necessitate a rejection of nationalist movements. Like Lenin, Stalin sees merit in supporting the national bourgeoisie. He writes:

While combating the exercise of violence against any nation, they (Social Democrats) will only support the right of the nation to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against the noxious customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata

⁶⁶Boersner, p.37.

⁶⁷Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question," p.17.

of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.⁶⁸

The necessary course of action is to accept and encourage the nation's right to self-determination. As long as the national movement is viewed as progressive in nature from the perspective of the working class, that movement's objectives should be supported. From this point, Stalin criticizes the Austro-Marxists and their support for cultural autonomy. According to Stalin:

For there is no doubt (a) that national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination transcends this integrity and (b) that self-determination endows a nation with sovereign rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with "cultural" rights...he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this "new" aim (the creation of permanent nations as opposed to the organization of the proletariat-RK); but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position and to adopt the path of nationalism.⁶⁹

In the remainder of the work, Stalin stresses the implications of following such nationalists. Along with the Austrians, he also is critical of the Jewish Bund and the Caucasian Socialists under Jordaniia. In each case, the contrast between "culturalism" and "regionalism" is laid out. The latter position, which emphasizes territorial rights over ethnic ones, is seen as the best possible solution to the national problem. Regionalism, for Stalin, has the advantages of (1) dealing with defined territories;

⁶⁸Ibid., p.23.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp.35-36, 37.

(2) breaking down national antagonisms in order to strengthen class differences; and (3) providing the opportunity to utilize and develop the natural economic resources in given areas.⁷⁰ If national minorities are placated, then antagonisms based on national differences will subside. With the diminution of national conflict, the working class can focus on the more important issue of class conflict.

Stalin repeats much of the earlier stands of the RSDLP and consistently refutes the arguments of Bauer. He writes: "The socialists should fight for the right to territorial self-determination and at the same time stand for international proletarian solidarity in opposition to a reactionary type of cultural autonomy which meant the perpetuation of archaic customs."⁷¹ It is interesting that throughout the essay and in later treatments of the national question, Stalin refers to "national culture" and "national psychology" -- two concepts attacked by Lenin as being akin to Bauer's position. It appears that for Stalin, the nation was, is, and will be, a permanent and important element in human history. Ironically, in spite of Lenin's disagreement with these views, Stalin's discussion of the national question will be the most influential in Soviet history.⁷²

⁷⁰Ibid., p.64.

⁷¹Ibid., p.40.

⁷²Carrere d'Encausse, p.117.

Evident in Stalin's practical treatment of the nationalities question is the reincorporation of ethnic minorities into a greater Soviet Union. In addition, a federated state with a dominant centralized party is seen as a possible solution to the question -- placate the minority groups with marginal state autonomy, but ultimately retain a monolithic political structure via the CPSU. Stalin later writes that:

The demand for the secession of the border regions from Russia as a form of relations between the center and the border regions must be excluded...even if we do not mention that the secession of the border regions would undermine the revolutionary might of Central Russia...the very border regions would fall into bondage of international imperialism...

Naturally the border regions of Russia and the nations and tribes living in these regions...have the inalienable right to secede...but the interests of the toiling masses pronounce the demand for the secession of the border regions to be profoundly counterrevolutionary.⁷³

In a few years, the Bolshevik leadership was forced to apply its theory of national self-determination to actual conditions. As will be seen in the following chapters, the events of 1917 necessitated the formulation of a definite policy position on the nationalities question. As early as the VIIth All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (April-May

⁷³J.V. Stalin, "Politika sovetskoi vlasti po natsional'nomu voprosu v Rosii," Collected Works, volume IV, 1947, pp.352-354, quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Sovietization of Uzbekistan: The First Generation," in Russian Thought and Politics, edited by Hugh McLean et al., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.500-501.

1917), Stalin summarized the Party's view on the national question:

Thus, our views on the national question reduce themselves to the following propositions: (a) the recognition of the right of peoples to secession; (b) regional autonomy for peoples which remain within the given state; (c) specific laws guaranteeing freedom of development for national minorities; (d) a single, indivisible proletarian collective body, a single party, for proletarians of all the nationalities in the given state.⁷⁴

This was only the initial step in the development of the nationality theory-in-practice.

VII. CONCLUSION

From Marx to Stalin, there existed a variety of perceptions and attitudes towards the national question. The nationalities question was an important one for the Marxists, especially in the Russian Empire, because of the preponderance of ethnic groups in these Eastern European nations. As the Bolsheviks emerged as a major political force themselves, it was a viable course of action for the nationalist groups such as the Young Bukharans to request Bolshevik help. Specifically, the Bolshevik position on national self-determination can also be seen as a contributing factor to this future alliance. According to

⁷⁴J.V. Stalin, "Report on the National Question," in Marxism and the National Question, p.73.

Zwick, this sort of "appeal" is not unexpected.⁷⁵

Nationalists see the communist movement and discussions on nationalism to be appealing and viable.

If the previous discussion of nationalist elite behavior is true, then such a program as Lenin's might be appealing to a reformist or an assimilationist figure. In examining Khodzhaev's career, this appeal of communism that addresses the issue of nationalism will be of critical importance. As Khodzhaev had personal contact with the Bolshevik leaders as early as 1918, this theoretical relationship is even more significant. The fact that he openly courted Bolshevik support at this early stage in his career is certain. His knowledge of Marxism as a theory, however, can be questioned. In only a few instances, as will be seen, did Khodzhaev cite Marx or Lenin in any measure. Indeed, it appears as if Khodzhaev was more concerned with the strategic implications of this potential ally. This dichotomy between Khodzhaev's role as an elite actor and the implications of Soviet nationalities policy would dictate much of Khodzhaev's actions throughout his career. It is to this career that I will now turn.

⁷⁵Peter Zwick, National Communism, (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp.11-12. This is also suggested in Edmund Demaitre, "The Origins of National Communism," Studies in Comparative Communism 2/1 (January 1969):1-20.

CHAPTER THREE -- THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV (1896-1917)

I. INTRODUCTION: SOURCE MATERIALS REGARDING PERIOD

The key nationalist organization in Bukhara, and later Soviet Uzbekistan, grew out of the Jadidist movement of the early 1900s. Faizulla Khodzhaev was closely involved with the Jadidists and, in 1917, became one of this movement's key figures. In fact, almost all of the Bukharan intellectuals and revolutionaries considered themselves Jadidists. By the 1930s, the Soviet government condemned individuals who had associated with the Jadidist circles, declaring the group's objectives to be "bourgeois" and "nationalistic." To a degree, both "charges" were true, for the Jadidists of Bukhara represented an elite organization that attempted to not only gain political power, but to foster a sense of national identity. They aspired to create an identity apart from the traditional structures that existed in the Emirate. For some, this meant advocating a modern nation-state patterned along the lines of the European states regarding economic development and political structures. In order to do this, they first had to obtain the support of the Bukharan population and create among them a sense of loyalty to the state itself, instead of the Islamic community of which they were a part.

In addressing the formative period of the Bukharan Jadidists, several questions arise. What were the general conditions present in the Emirate of Bukhara at this time?

How and why did the Jadidist movement emerge, and what was its general goal and policies prior to the revolutionary period of 1917-1920? And finally, what impact did the Jadidist movement have on the Bukharan population as a whole? These issues are important in a discussion of Faizulla Khodzhaev, as they shaped and directed his outlook on Bukharan and later Soviet politics.

The source materials for the period of Khodzhaev's early years, 1896 to 1917, are limited. Soviet scholars spend very little time addressing the pre-Revolutionary period except to set the stage for the oncoming changes. Of particular importance are travel accounts, and eye-witness surveys of Bukhara by Russian officials and Bukharan intellectuals. The former includes Vambéry's Travels in Central Asia and Schuyler's Turkestan. The latter includes Logofet's Bukharskoe khanstvo pod russkim protectoratom, Pahlen's Mission to Turkestan, and Sadriddin 'Ayni's Bukhara. In addition, Pierce, Krader, and Berliner all wrote bibliographic surveys of general importance regarding pre-Revolutionary Central Asia, although in each of these, there is limited attention given to the specific Emirate of Bukhara.

Faizulla Khodzhaev's own writings on this period are few in number. In his first-hand accounts, such as K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, there are only passing references to his pre-Revolutionary past. Likewise, his

biographers spend little time evaluating these formative years. This is, in part, a result of the Soviet government's prohibiting access to the revolutionary pamphlets and newspaper accounts of this period that are known to exist, or at least had existed at one time. For the most part, detailed descriptions and documentation does not really appear until the 1920s.

II. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BUKHARA

Bukhara, in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, was a society in transition. Except through travel accounts and memoirs of the Bukharan intelligentsia, we know very little of the day to day life in the Emirate.¹ The Emirate never conducted an official census, so exact population figures are not available. Russian accounts put the total population figure of Bukhara between two and three million, with most tending towards the higher number. Extrapolating from the 1920 figure of about two million and taking into account that roughly one million died as a result of violence and famine

¹A good account is Faizulla Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh," Istorik marksist 1 (1926):123-41 and K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent: Uzbekscoe Gosudarsvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1926). For a description of pre-revolutionary Bukhara, see Sadriddin Ayni, Bukhara, translated from the Tadzhik by Sergei Borodin (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), Eugene Schuyler, Turkestan, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1876) and Arminius Vambery, Travels in Central Asia (London: John Murray, 1864).

in the 1917-1920 period, I take these to be acceptable figures.² The population was divided as follows: Uzbeks 45.1%, Tadzhiks 40%, Turkmen 7.5%, Russians 1.5%, and other minorities 5.9%. Generally speaking, the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks were sedentary, agricultural peoples, while the Turkmen retained their customary nomadic lifestyle.³ This sedentary-nomadic split was a pronounced division in Bukharan society. Lacking exact figures, Russian sources suggest that 65% of the Bukharan population was settled, 15% was semi-nomadic, and the remaining 20% nomadic. Of these, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks dominated the villages and towns. Conversely, the Turkmen and Kazakhs remained predominantly nomadic.⁴ Both social groups were dispersed throughout the Emirate and maintained regional loyalties. The end result was that local affiliation, especially towards clans and tribes, was the major "secular" identifier in Bukharan

²For a discussion the demographic issue in pre-revolutionary Bukhara, see Ian M. Matley, "Ethnic Groups of the Bukharan State ca.1920 and the Question of Nationality," The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Praeger publishers, 1973), pp.134-5; Alexander Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p.99; and D.N. Logofet, Bukharskoe khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom, vol.1. (St. Petersburg: V. Berezovskii, 1911), p.187.

³Note that the term "Sart" was often used to classify the sedentary population in Central Asia. M.A. Nemchenko, "Natsional'noe razmezhevanie Srednei Azii," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 4-5 (1924):86.

⁴Matley, pp.139-140, who relies on the figures of D.N. Logofet cited above; and A.I. Dmitriev-Mamonov, Putevoditel' po Turkestanu i srednei-aziatskoi zheleznnoi doroze (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo Voennoe Puti Soobshcheniia, 1903).

society. There was no known loyalty to, or recognition of, a "Bukharan people" among the general population.

The Bukharan political structure at the turn of the century was a traditional autocratic regime that perpetuated this lack of a national identity. Politically, there existed numerous regional beys who carved out holdings throughout the Emirate. They had considerable power to direct their own internal affairs, but were ultimately responsible to the Emir.⁵ The Emir was the supreme ruler, who could impose taxes and call on the feudal beys for military support in times of crisis. Bureaucratic hierarchies existed for political, financial, religious, and judicial organizations, although all, to an extent, overlapped and culminated in the power of the Emir.

Association with the Dar al-Islam, the Islamic community, was also of great importance to the Emirate, which supported its dominant position in society.⁶ In particular, the Qur'an and shari'at were key elements in

⁵The Emirate was divided into regions dominated by individual political and religious leaders, as well as tax representatives appointed by the Emir. Ishanov lists the regions as follows: Chardzhoi, Khatyrchin, Kitab, Shakhrisabz, Chirakchin, Yakkabag, Ghuzar, Baisun, Karategin, Denau, Gissar, Darvaz, Bal'dzhuyan, Shugnano-Rushan, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tiubin, Kabadian, Shirabad, Kelef, Kerkin, Burdalik, Kabaklin, Karshin, and Norazim. A.I. Ishanov, Bukharskaia narodnaia sovetskaia respublika (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan." 1969), pp.50-2, 63, (hereafter, referred to as BNSR).

⁶Seymour Becker, "National Consciousness and the Politics of the Bukhara People's Counciliar Republic," The Nationality Question, p.159-60.

regulating Bukharan life and laws. Khodzhaev remarks that the "Bukharan Emir considered himself to be second after the Turkish Caliph's government in the Muslim world." Consequently, he "surrounded himself with powerful theologians."⁷ Due to geographical and historical circumstances, Bukhara was not closely associated with the rest of the Muslim world. As it developed independently during the previous centuries, changes that took place in the other parts of the world did not affect the Emirate. Thus, the reform movements that emerged in the Middle East and North Africa during the previous century had little bearing on the Emirate. Carrere d'Encausse writes that:

...the clergy of Bukhara could take most pride in its past, its traditions, and the power that it represented.

Fanatical in the extreme, doctrinely rigid, proud of Bukhara's religious position in the world of Islam, the clergy had great influence both on mass consciousness and on the secular authorities. Independent of these authorities (even though the emir did have the right to oversee certain offices), it had available an enormously powerful means of pressure upon them: its influence over students, whose agitation and whose demands it orchestrated.⁸

It was only the newly-emerging intelligentsia that exhibited any sense of a national awareness in the Western sense of the term, caused mainly by their exposure to Western notions of the nation-state and the Young Turk movement in the

⁷Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.8.

⁸Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p.33.

Ottoman Empire. The problem for this elite group in its drive for reform was that the ethnic and religious divisions in Bukhara were more significant than any "national awareness."⁹

One can draw three significant conclusions from this discussion: the Emir and the religious leaders were the most important influences on legal, social, and political codes of conduct; they carefully regulated the educational system and thus the formal transmission of ideas; and if necessary, they could rally mass support for their position and consequently oppose threats or movements for change. The consequence of this was that as the Jadidist movement developed in Bukhara, it faced a strong and well-organized opposition.

It was into this social setting that Faizulla Khodzhaev was born in 1896. His father, Abdulla Khodzhaev¹⁰, was a wealthy karakul and textile merchant in the Emirate, who traded frequently with outside peoples, including the Russians. Abdulla and Raihon Saidmurad(ovna), Faizulla's mother, were typical of the growing merchant class in Bukhara. Although they were wealthy by the standards of the day, they did not belong to the families that controlled the various principalities in Bukhara and were excluded from the

⁹William L. Hanaway Jr., "Farsi, the Vatan, and the Millat in Bukhara," The Nationality Question, pp.149-50.

¹⁰In some sources, Abdulla's full name, Ubaidulla Khodzha Kasim Khodzhaev, is used.

court's inner circle. Indeed, Ishanov remarks that Raihon Saidmurad(ovna) was actually from a peasant family.¹¹

Adrift between the traditional classes of the nobility and the dehqons (peasants), they felt little allegiance to the standard social order. This is not to say that the Khodzhaev family renounced Islam.

Khodzhaev himself remarks that he was brought up in a religious household and spent several years in a traditional Muslim mekteb (school) when he was nine or ten years of age. What it does suggest is that the Khodzhaev family had fewer inhibitions in dealing with outsiders and non-Muslims, which is exactly what Abdulla did. Along with the other financial families of Bukhara, the Mansurovs in particular, the Khodzhaevs became one of the more powerful families in the Emirate. As a result of his father's financial and social position, Khodzhaev was able to receive an education which included several years abroad in a Moscow school, something that was not available to the vast majority of Bukharan children.¹²

The impact that this would have on the young Faizulla will be discussed later in this chapter. It is important to note that by breaking the restrictions of traditional Bukharan society, the Khodzhaev family was to become one of

¹¹A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (ocherk zhizni i deatel'nosti) (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), pp.5-6.

¹²Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1 (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970), p.11.

the leading families in the slowly-emerging reformist movement. Having seen and experienced the "outside world," such individuals could not help but observe possible alternative world-views to the Bukharan state.

From the above description, it is possible to assume that Khodzhaev would be critical of the traditional Bukharan state. In his work on the Young Bukharan movement, entitled K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, Khodzhaev spends the first several pages discussing in detail the corrupt nature of the Emir's regime. He states that:

Bukhara was a living anachronism. A land situated in the depths of Central Asia, away from the communication routes of the modern world, but at the hub of the great routes of Antiquity; with an illiterate population, but one which was everywhere confronted by traces of the prestigious Arabo-Persian civilization that was now only a memory; anachronistic too were the despotism of the Emir and all the structures of tyranny artificially preserved and protected by Russian bayonets. That was the Emirate of Bukhara for you.¹³

Khodzhaev's remark concerning the "Russian bayonets" is indicative of yet another factor of Bukharan life: the Emirate of Bukhara was a Protectorate of the Russian Empire. In 1873, Russia forced the Emir to sign a Treaty of Friendship that underscored the Russian domination in the area.¹⁴ The borders were redrawn to take into account the

¹³Faizulla Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.7.

¹⁴The treaty's eighteen articles set guidelines for trade and political exchanges, as well as limitations on the Emirates activities. Specifically, the treaty outlaws

territories that Russia acquired from Bukhara, which included the Zarafshan region as well as travel rights on the Amu-Darya River.

The Russo-Bukharan treaty also established trade agreements and an office for a Russian political agent in Bukhara whose responsibility it was to oversee the rights of Russians working within and businesses associating with the Emirate.¹⁵ During the next several decades, the Russians made inroads into the Emirate by developing economic ventures in the Emirate and, in the process, creating several Russian "colonies" on the Emir's land. Usually, these Russian communities supplied the laborers for the factories and railroad in Bukhara that were under Russian control. The Russian census of 1897 listed 12,150 Russians living in Bukhara. This number increased to almost 28,000 by 1910 and 50,000 by 1914.¹⁶ The Russian were almost

slavery (article 17), and allows for Russians to settle in the Emirate and remain under Russian jurisdiction. For a full text of the treaty, see Appendix Three in Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

¹⁵Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917; a study in colonial rule (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp.22-8, 58-9; A.I. Ishanov, BNSR, pp.19-22; and Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), chapter 1.

¹⁶Becker, p.170; Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.13. Ishanov breaks down the Russian population by the following cities: Chardzhui -- 14,000; New Bukhara -- 12,000; Kerki -- 8,000; Termez and Sarai -- 6,000 each. From Ishanov, BNSR, p.22.

entirely factory and railroad workers, who later formed the nucleus for Bolshevik operations in the area. In addition, trade between the countries increased, from about twenty-three million rubles in 1868 to over sixty-seven million on the eve of the First World War. Twenty Russian merchants, nine firms, and five transport companies all established offices in the Russian settlements by the turn of the century.¹⁷ A result of this increased Russian activity was a proportionate decline in Bukharan trade with other countries, particularly England. Becker estimates that during this period, Russia controlled 83% of Bukharan exports and 63% of the imports.¹⁸ Thus, in spite of Bukhara's political independence, Russian influence was substantial enough to make Bukhara a vassal state.

The increased economic activity in the Emirate, in turn, enhanced the power of the top class of merchants and bankers, among them the Mansurov and Khodzhaev families. It appears that they viewed association with Russia as being a positive boost for their own country and, not surprisingly, numerous merchant families were either active members or at least substantial financial supporters of the Jadidist movement.¹⁹ While it was probably true that the Russians

¹⁷Ishanov, BNSR, pp.77f.

¹⁸Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia, pp.170-6.

¹⁹Ishanov, BNSR, pp.77-88.

remained separated from the local populations, they did interact with this merchant class. Contact, minimal as it might have been, at least exposed the future reformists to customs and a world-view that was not familiar to the Central Asians.²⁰ This "external stimulus" not only increased the Bukharan elite's awareness of the West, but was instrumental in laying the foundation for the organized reformist movement in Bukhara -- the Jadidists.

III. JADIDISM AND THE JADIDISTS

It was this interaction with the outside world that prompted the intelligentsia to question and challenge the traditional order in Bukharan society. Reformist tendencies in the form of pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements were present in the Muslim regions of the Russian Empire at this time.²¹ By the turn of the century, newspapers and modernist schools were already in operation. And it was to these modernists that the Bukharan intellectuals turned.

²⁰Dov B. Yaroshevski, "Russian Regionalism in Turkestan," Slavonic and East European Review 65/1 (January 1987):78-79.

²¹Bennigsen and Lemerquier-Quelquejay explain that the reformist tendencies among Muslims in the Russian Empire can be seen as a reaction to Russian pressure. They write that: "This reaction was analogous to the crisis which, throughout the nineteenth century, gripped in a more or less acute form the whole Muslim world when that world became aware of its weakness and backwardness in relation to the 'infidel' but materially powerful West." Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerquier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.31.

The Bukharan new school reformers based their policies on the ideas and activities of the Tatar reformer, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii.²² Bennigsen notes three major issues that Gasprinskii deemed important:

...(the) modernization of the Muslim community through educational reform; the spiritual and political unity of the Muslim Turks of the Russian Empire; and the degree of cooperation which should be sought between Russia's Muslims and the West, represented primarily by Russia.²³

Gasprinskii addressed the first issue, educational reform, by creating and advocating the Jadidist schools. From the term "usul-i jadid," which literally means "new method or principle," these new schools represented an alternative to the traditional usul-i qadim ("old method") schools of the

²²There were a number of reform-minded individuals in the Muslim world by the 1800s, including Sir Sayyid Ahmad, Shaikh Muhammad Abduh, Namik Kemal, Jamaledin al-Afghani, and Shihabeddin Marjani to name a few. Gasprinskii is often considered to be the primary figure in the reformist movement in Russia for his efforts at transmitting reformist ideals to others via the press and schools. Edward Lazzerini writes that: "For Gasprinskii, writing and publishing were fundamentally tools with which to propagandize ideas, and these works constituted a body of knowledge which he obviously felt should be imparted to the Muslim people as an aid to achieving progress." Edward J. Lazzerini, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within," Cahiers du Monde russe et sovietique XVI/2 (April-June, 1975):246.

²³Alexandre A. Bennigsen, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski (Gaspraly) and the Origins of the Jadid Movement in Russia," in Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russian Islam, Reprints series No.6 (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1985), p.10.

mektebs.²⁴ In the traditional schools, rote memorization, Qur'anic studies, and an exclusivity of the Arabic language typified the educational process. Gasprinskii proposed that new subjects, such as the Russian language, geography, mathematics, and history become the core curriculum. He declared that:

I believe that in the future the Russian Moslems shall be more civilized than any other Moslem nations. We are a steady nation, give us the possibility to learn. You, great brother, give us knowledge. The sciences should be admitted to the Tatar schools, and in the Tatar language. New schools should be erected in Baku, Tashkent, Kazan, etc. The teachers should be graduated from an especially organized Russian Eastern University, in the same way as in India, where the pupils are educated in Indian schools, and in the Indian language. The Russian and Moslems shall come to an understanding in this way.²⁵

Gasprinskii argued that the Crimean Tatars, as well as the rest of the Turks in Russia, would remain secondary citizens unless they adopted educational methods that would allow them to compete with the Russians. This position became

²⁴Because of this initial emphasis on education reform, activists who supported modernization called themselves Jadids, or Jadidists. As will be seen, Jadid is a generic term for the Turkic reformers. One specific group of Jadidists will be the Young Bukharans. Simply stated, a Young Bukharan is a Jadidist, but a Jadidist is not necessarily a Young Bukharan.

²⁵Quoted in Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the world and their political objectives (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), p.126. The original Turkish language quotation can be found in Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugunku Turkili (Turkestan) ve Yakin Tarihi (Modern Turkestan and its Current History) (Istanbul: Arkadas Ibrahim Horoz ve Guven Basimevleri, 1947), p.361.

influential in the Muslim areas of the Russian empire, and from the early 1880s until the First World War, the number of Jadid schools increased from about a dozen to more than 5,000. Such schools existed in almost all of the Turkic regions of the Empire, which included the Volga, the Caucasus, Turkestan and Kazakhstan.²⁶ In an article published in 1901 entitled "Mebadi-yi temeddun-i Islamiyan-i Rus" ("First Steps Toward Civilizing the Russian Muslims"), Gasprinskii comments on the success of these schools:

At the present time, despite the fact that the Muslim subjects of Russia lag far behind [other peoples], and that they share in so little of modern life, this great [Muslim] society is not all that incognizant [of what is happening around it]; and one cannot deny that within it a revival is taking place.²⁷

Gasprinskii's educational ideas also translated into political activism. Through his journal, Terjuman, Gasprinskii advocated the unification of the Turks throughout Russia by stressing their common heritage.²⁸ It was important to combine the traditional ways of the Turks

²⁶Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, p.39.

²⁷I. Gasprinskii, "First Steps Toward Civilizing the Russian Muslim," in Lazzerini, p.250.

²⁸Gasprinskii, p.13. According to Richard Pipes, by 1913, there were 16 periodicals in the Turkish language, including 5 dailies. All but three were in the Tatar-Turkic language indicating not only the domination of Tatars in the reformist movement, but the acceptance of that language by the other Turkic peoples. Richard Pipes, USSR: The Formation of the Soviet Union, revised edition, (New York: Atheneum, 1980), p.14.

with the modern techniques of the West -- in a sense, to have the best of both worlds.²⁹

Gasprinskii's ideas were adopted by a number of Turkish intellectuals throughout the Empire and inspired them to discuss the issues of social reform. In addition to the liberal views of these reformers, there also emerged among the Central Asians during the decades bracketing the turn of the century, Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic movements. Pan-Turkism was and is the belief in the unity of the Turkish peoples of the world. The goals ranged from the recognition of cultural similarities to more radical desires of political unity. This movement, it should be noted was largely limited to the intelligentsia and never really expressed itself as a mass movement.³⁰

²⁹Kuttner describes Gasprinski's views as the following:

Gasprinski defined the West as comprising Europe and America, and in both, two principal features characterized their societies: modernization and enlightened statecraft. Because of the first, they had come to be reckoned the teachers of the entire world in science and technology. The second was a direct result of the "lofty ideals" and "outstanding social principles" upon which their societies were based...The West represented for him the basis to be emulated without exception. Thomas Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinski in Cairo, 1908," Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique XVI/3-4 (July-December, 1975):396.

³⁰Kemal Karpat, cite source, pp.123-125.

The Pan-Islam movement is similar in its aim to unify a particular social group, in this case, the Islamic community, the unification of the world Muslim community. These movements often had similar objectives, especially when dealing with the Turkish population in the Russian Empire, and later in the Soviet Union.³¹ As was often the case, Soviet sources of this period usually attributed the Pan-movements to the general phenomenon of bourgeois-nationalism in Central Asia. For example, Arsharuni and Gabidullin write that:

Pan-Islamists do not have a strictly definite program. Their actual aim is political struggle with the existing regime of the (Russian) Empire. This regime, according to their view, is the chief obstacle in their attempts toward national self-determination of the Moslems.³²

I mention these movements because intellectuals that participated in the Jadidist movement in Bukhara were sympathetic to them. I would not classify Khodzhaev as either, for he maintained his support of "secular" answers to Bukhara's and later Uzbekistan's problems. Nevertheless, in his later years, he was accused of being a "closet" Pan-Turk and Pan-Islam supporter as a result of his support for Uzbek cultural and economic autonomy. This Russian

³¹For discussions of both movements, see Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Hostler, op cit.

³²A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizma i pan-turkizma v Rossii (Moscow: "Bezbozhnik," 1931), p.3 as quoted in Hostler, p.118.

interpretation was common during the 1920s and 1930s when there was a conscious effort to eliminate all "nationalist" opposition; liberal, socialist, or traditional. One last point should be noted at this time: in all of his available writings, Faizulla Khodzhaev does not discuss or refer to the movements above. Although it is likely that Khodzhaev was acquainted with Gasprinskii and his works, there is no mention of them. As will be discussed in chapter eight, this noticeable absence can be explained by the rehabilitation measures after Khodzhaev's death.

Gasprinskii's call to create a progressive Turkic population found followers in the traditional Emirate. The reformers attempted to emulate Gasprinskii's tactics of using a popular press, and began publishing various liberal newspapers, such as Taraqqi (Progress), Khurshid (The Sun), Shuhrat (Glory), and Asiya (Asia). Wary of the effect that these journals might have on the local population, Nicholas II ordered that they be shut down, usually within a year of their initial circulation. In the following decades, these journals often re-appeared under new titles and, up until the outbreak of the First World War, widely circulated.³³

These newspapers, published primarily in the city of Tashkent, secretly circulated throughout the Muslim

³³An account of the reformist press prior to 1917 is Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La Presse et le Mouvement National; chez les musulmans de russie avant 1920 (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp.156-171, 262-275.

territories of the Russian Empire and even into the Emirate of Bukhara. This exposed the Bukharan elite to the ideas of the Muslims in the Russian Empire.³⁴ Small in number, never more than two hundred, the Bukharan Jadidists began to organize in the early 1900s along the lines of the other Jadidist circles.³⁵

The first Bukharan to adopt the teachings of Gasprinskii and apply them to the Emirate was Ahmad Mahdum Donish. Khodzhaev notes that in spite of 'Ayni's prominence in the early Soviet period, it was actually Donish who should be credited with bringing the Jadidist ideals to Bukhara. He writes that:

the Jadidist ideas were brought forth in the thoughts of Akhmada Kali [Donish], and we consider it necessary to begin [our discussion] at this point, especially regarding the economic, cultural, and political premises which formed the basis out of which evolved Jadidism [in Bukhara].³⁶

As an admirer of the Russian educational system, Donish believed that Bukhara must adopt modern techniques if it should ever attempt to become a progressive nation. As noted, the traditional qadimi schools had absolute control

³⁴Pierce, p.259; Carrere d'Encausse, p.78-9. Both list the journals and Pierce notes the number of issues per journal.

³⁵Ishanov, BNSR, pp.88f.

³⁶Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.7. In the collected works, a footnote is added that explains the "reformist illusions" of Donish in his efforts to introduce Jadidism to Bukhara. Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.454.

of the educational system in Bukhara. Thus, it was typical of a Russian observer to remark that in Bukhara:

The pupils squat on the floor, swaying to and fro and shouting their lessons at the top of their lungs. The main object is to learn the suras of the Koran (sic) by heart, even if their exact meaning in Arabic is not clearly understood³⁷

Donish believed that these traditional methods of education were only indicative of a greater social and political corruption in Bukhara. He comments that:

The Mangit [dynasty's] leaders have seized everything which their wickedness has inspired them to take. From the widow they have snatched away her hearth, from charitable institutions their resources....Amongst the rulers and the propertied classes reign drunkenness and games of chance, revelry, and debauchery, while the poor people are at their wits' end. Whether the poor wretches are from the country or the city, they cannot utter a single word nor escape the constant levies.³⁸

The only way to rectify this abysmal condition was to begin educating the masses and creating a more responsible government. For Donish, Bukhara could only regain its former grandeur by eliminating ignorance and corruption. Thus began the push for reformist schools in the Emirate.

Although legal in Russian Turkestan for some time, the Jadid schools did not appear in Bukhara until 1900, when

³⁷A. Polovstovff, The Land of Timur (London: Hutchinson, 1932), p.97.

³⁸Ahmad Mahdum Donish, Navadir-ul vaqaye, as quoted by Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeling," Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.172-3.

Mulla Jora Bey briefly opened one that closed within the year due to a lack of students. In 1907, under the guidance of Mullas Niyaz Sabitov and Burnashev, a reformed school was opened in the city of New Bukhara. The first students were the children of local merchants and Jadids themselves. As with the other Jadid schools, the study of mathematics, languages, literature, and history replaced the traditional subjects. With pressure from the Russian political agent, the Emir consented to opening a second school in 1908 under the guidance of Mirza Vahidov. As the enrollment increased, so did the official debate surrounding the legitimacy of the Jadid schools.³⁹

Faizulla Khodzhaev himself attended a mekteb school and for at least two years was a student in a Qur'anic medresse that was run by his uncle, 'Usman Khodzhaev.⁴⁰ Although not going into much detail regarding his life at the medresse, Khodzhaev writes that while he was there:

The main arguments, of course, were the following: the subjugation of Bukhara by Tsarist Russia, backwardness, unculturedness, spiritual emptiness, the depravity and luxuriousness of the Emir's court, despotic power, the weighty burden of taxes, and many others.⁴¹

³⁹Carrere d'Encausse, pp.82-6.

⁴⁰Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.15; also see Donald Carlisle, "review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy (selected works) vol. I in Kritika: a review of current soviet books on russian history VIII/1 (Fall 1971):56.

⁴¹Ibid.

At an early age, Khodzhaev was already exposed to the ideals of the Jadidists and developed a bitter attitude towards the Emir's government. However, because the number of schools was limited and the future of them remaining open uncertain, Abdulla Khodzhaev sent Faizulla to Moscow in 1907 to continue his education. He was to remain in Russia for the next five years. Unfortunately, not much is known about this period in Khodzhaev's life. Biographical accounts severely limit discussion on his activities prior to the events of 1917. Furthermore, Khodzhaev himself only offers scant remarks about his youth.

During this period, significant changes took place in Bukhara. Abdulla Khodzhaev's uncertainty about the Jadidist's future was supported by the fact that innovative as they were, the Jadid schools still represented a small percentage of the intelligentsia in Bukhara. For the most part, the schools were run by Tatars with minimal opportunity for the Bukharans to participate. This changed in 1910, when a members of the Bukharan intelligentsia and merchant community formed the Union of Bukhara the Noble (Shirkat-i Bukhara-yi Sharif). Members included 'Usman Khodzhaev, Mirza Vahidov, Sadriddin 'Ayni, Mansurov, Mahmud Khodzha Behbudi, and Fazl al-Din Makhdum.⁴² The

⁴²Carrere d'Encausse, p.87; Khodzhaev Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, pp.451-2. Most of these individuals were to form the leadership of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic and the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. A notable exception was Behbudi, who was imprisoned and killed by the

organization simply aimed to increase the influence of Jadidist schools in Bukhara, and to establish contacts abroad. At the least, they could acquire materials necessary for the schools, and at best, create a network of reformist schools throughout the Muslim world that included Bukhara. The Jadidists travelled to the Crimea to visit Gasprinskii's school, to various new schools in Russia, and to Turkey.⁴³ In short, Jadidism had now spread to Bukhara and was becoming an influential force among its intelligentsia. However, the traditional state and religious hierarchy was opposed to these views and made it difficult for the Jadidists to open and maintain their schools. It was this constant government opposition that eventually drove the reformers into a greater political activism.

IV. THE POLITICIZATION OF THE JADIDISTS: 1912-1917

Events initially unrelated to the Jadidist movement soon forced government action against them. In January 1910, groups of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims rioted in the city

Emir of Bukhara in 1919. This will be discussed in Chapter Five.

⁴³The Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire developed from a literary movement that sought to force the Sultan Abdul Hamid into radical political reforms in 1908. For an account of the Young Turk movement, see Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). This parallel is noted in Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.6.

of Kagan. The violence began when a group of Sunni Muslims ridiculed the Shi'ite ceremony commemorating the death of 'Ali. Russian troops stations in Bukhara were called to quell the violence.⁴⁴ The Governor-General of Turkestan, Samsonov, declared that the only way to improve the economic and social conditions in Bukhara would be for the Russian Empire to openly annex the protectorate. The government in St. Petersburg eventually decided on applying more pressure on the Emirate to stop the violence or face a necessary Russian intervention. Officially, the Tsar's policy remained one of non-intervention and, as late as June 20, 1913, it was stated that:

The Khanate of Bukhara, autonomous in its internal affairs, is in a very special position...and requires very prudent handling in view of the absolute necessity for us not to undermine the emir's authority in his subjects' eyes and carefully to avoid anything that might bear the character of direct interference on our part in the internal affairs of the khanate.⁴⁵

The appeal for intervention was soon lost with the start of the First World War, although pressure for such action, or at least reform on the part of the Emir, existed from 1910 onward.

The events noted above coincided with the accession of Emir Sa'id Mir Alim in 1910. Although viewed as a more liberal leader than his father, the new Emir maintained that

⁴⁴For an account of the 1910 violence, see Carrere d'Encausse, p.89f; and Becker, p.218f.

⁴⁵Quoted in Becker, p.223.

he would defend the traditional political and religious structures of the state. He continued to rely on the qadimi (traditionalists) mullas for advice. Due to the pressures from the inter-religious strife and the political concerns of Russia, the Emir finally addressed the issue of reform. To satisfy the Russian representatives he signed a manifesto outlining the problems in his country and the possible solutions to them. The conditions included:

(1) an end to the corruption prevalent at all levels of the hierarchy; (2) the forbidding of lower officials from imposing taxes; (3) forbidding the qazis from charging legal fees indiscriminantly; and (4) promising real salaries to officials to eliminate the need for corruption.⁴⁶

The Russians viewed this latest outbreak of violence as a result of the poor economic and governmental situation in Bukhara. If corrected, the violence would cease. However, the Emir did not implement these reforms. Indeed, during his first year on the throne, the new Emir ordered the closing down of all Jadidist schools on the grounds that the reformist movement was the actual cause of the recent unrest. The Emirate at the end of 1910 had become less conducive to reform than it had been in previous years.

Consequently, merchants, reformist mullas, and intellectuals frustrated with the lack of progress on the part of the Emir formed secret organizations that later developed in to the Young Bukharan Party and ultimately the

⁴⁶Carrere d'Encausse, p.90.

Bukharan Communist Party. On December 2, 1910, the Jadids created the Jam'iyat-i Tarbiyat-i Atfal (Society for the Education of Youth.)⁴⁷ The Jadidist advocates of the Society proposed the following objectives: (1) disseminating all types of literature and education among the Bukharan population; (2) struggling against wastefulness and bad habits; and (3) protesting governmental corruption.⁴⁸ This program, however, instigated a conservative backlash in the Emir's court. Sensing that the Jadidists were now attempting to reform the political structure, various high-ranking officials, the most notable being Damulla Abdu-Rafiq, began questioning the legitimacy of the Jadidist schools. They were not, after all, in accordance with Islamic custom in form or substance. The end-result of such education would be the disruption of the power of Islam.

During its first year, the secret society increased its membership and began formulating policy objectives. By the end of the year, the Society announced an "official program" that contained the following five points:

1. To educate the population and, in order to do so, to create schools and a press and procure books for the masses.
2. To struggle against clerical reaction, first, through a reform of the madrasas, a reform of the Muslim mind.

⁴⁷For a discussion of the activities of the organization, as well as membership requirements and duties, see Carrere d'Encausse, p.92f.

⁴⁸Edward Allworth, Uzbek Literary Politics (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), p.33.

3. To struggle against corruption in the administration.
4. To contribute towards the transformation of Bukhara into a modern state. In these terms, its first concern was to transform the state's financial system, by securing a clear separation between the public exchequer and the ruler's private coffers.
5. To put an end to the hostility between the religious communities, which meant defeating the fanaticism of the Sunni religious authorities in the emirate.⁴⁹

If there existed any question of the political nature of Bukharan Jadidists, it was dispelled from this point onward. It is interesting to note that this is really the first time that a modern political opposition force existed in the Emirate. For reasons of security, the Society remained secret and did not allow mass participation. An unfortunate result of this strategy was that it never was able to obtain a broader support base beyond the several score that comprised it.

The call for educational reform had developed into one for political change. The Jadidists remained committed to the retention of the Emir, but not with the same unlimited powers. In a sense, this evolutionary process signified a transformation of the group's own composition. Previously, the members were liberal mullas who supported the reforms of Gasprinskii. Although they remained an influential faction of the Jadidist movement, members more politically active began to participate. This new faction was comprised mainly

⁴⁹Quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.94.

of wealthy merchants who saw the Emir's government as limiting and financially disadvantageous to their own position in addition to the economic status of the Emirate.⁵⁰ As previously noted, merchants such as Faizulla's father had been involved with the Jadidists in the past, particularly in the capacity of financial backers. This change is noted by Faizulla Khodzhaev, who states that:

The Association was recruited essentially in the urban milieu. Most of its members came from the petty bourgeoisie of the towns, averagely endowed in material terms and even frequently very poorly endowed. But this petty bourgeoisie, in intellectual terms, was the richest part of the emirate's population: students from the religious schools, petty merchants anxious to know better the world they were entering, minor officials.⁵¹

As the organization went underground, so did the presses and schools. Members of the society secretly operated schools throughout Bukhara, and frequently published journals that often lasted long enough to issue only several issues. Among the journals were Bukhara-i sharif, Turan, and Bukharo akhbori.⁵² From 1910 to 1914, these journals conveyed the protests and ideas of the Bukharan Jadidists.⁵³

In 1912, Faizulla's father, Abdulla, unexpectedly died. Being the eldest son (although only sixteen at the time),

⁵⁰Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.13-14.

⁵¹Faizulla Khodzhaev, "O mlado-Bukhartsakh, p.128.

⁵²Ishanov, BNSR, p.94.

⁵³Samoilovich, A., "Pervoetainoe obshchestvo mlado-bukhartsev," Vostok 1 (1922):34-6.

Faizulla returned to take over his father's business and, as it turned out, his father's support for the Jadidist movement.⁵⁴ While in Russia, Khodzhaev associated freely with Kadet party members, was into contact with upper class, liberal families, and acquired a "Russian-oriented" bourgeois mentality. It is probable that this made him more receptive later on to requesting Russian aid, as compared to the more traditional Pan-Turks such as Fitrat.⁵⁵ It should also be noted that Khodzhaev probably did not associate with the Socialist parties in Moscow, although there is no firm proof supporting or refuting this opinion. As will be seen in the next chapter, Khodzhaev remarks that his first contacts with Bolshevik Party members did not take place until 1917.

The situation in Bukhara when Khodzhaev returned in 1912 was more hostile and potentially explosive than it had been for many years. Economically, the Emirate was in trouble. The balance of payments with respect to Russian trade was precarious at best, and the wasteful spending of the Emir left the country in further debt. Exact figures are not available regarding the Emirate's debt crisis, but the accounts of Khodzhaev and other writers note that the trade with Russia operated on a continual loss. This was

⁵⁴Khodzhaev, "O Mlado-bukhartsakh," p.126.

⁵⁵G. Dimov, "On vyros v bor'be," Pravda vostoka, May 27, 1966.

partially due to the Emir's habit of re-allocating revenues away from the industrial and agricultural sectors and using them to build palaces and monuments for himself. Besides his residence in the city of Bukhara, the Emir had palaces in several other Bukharan cities and in the Russian Crimea, all financed by state funds.⁵⁶

In addition, the Emir began to harden his position vis-a-vis the Jadidists. In a manifesto dated July 18, 1914, the Emir called for the closure of all reformist schools and the deportation of anyone considered to be detrimental to the security and stability of the Emirate.⁵⁷ This group included the Jadidist teachers and members of the secret societies. Many, such as Sadriddin 'Ayni, fled to the Russian-controlled Turkestan province. Others, among them the merchant families Mansurov and Khodzhaev, as well as Fitrat and Behbudi, opted to remain in Bukhara and work through clandestine organizations. Khodzhaev later reflected that this experience benefitted the Jadidist movement. He writes that this episode "served as a forge from which was molded the future workers' revolution."⁵⁸ During this crisis of leadership, certain key figures began

⁵⁶Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, pp.83f, for example, gives an account of the Emir's spending habits and disregard for the welfare of the state's economy.

⁵⁷Khodzhaev, "Dzhadidy," in Faizulla Khodzhaev et al., Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Srednei Azii i sbornik statei Feizuly Khodzhaeva (Moscow: Novye izd., 1926), p.9.

⁵⁸Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.15.

to emerge. In cultural matters, 'Ayni, Behbudi an Fitrat took leadership roles. In general, these three could be classified as intellectuals or scholars, who were sympathetic to the Islamic community, yet felt that it was being corrupted by the Emir and his advisors.

A division, however, did exist between the older, more traditional Jadidists and the younger, more political members. The older figures emphasized the cultural and educational aspects of reform. Represented in the person of Abdul Vahid Burhanov, the "Old Jadids" resented the political radicalism of the other members.⁵⁹ These other members focused on what they considered to be the root of the problem in the Emirate -- corruption in the political and religious leadership. They sought an active reform program of the political system, parallel to the demands expressed by the liberal parties in Russia.

Abdul Ra'uf Fitrat, considered by many to be the spiritual leader of the secret society, best expressed these objectives. In brief, Fitrat believed that the most pressing problem of the Emirate was not the rule of Islam, but the corruption of Islam. Because of a serious spiritual decline in the state, Bukhara was in a secondary position with respect to her neighboring countries. Because of a corrupt bureaucracy and an ineffective clergy, Islam in Bukhara had slipped dramatically in the past centuries.

⁵⁹Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.16.

These, in turn, were exemplified by the breakdown in trade routes, schools, and influence over the Islamic world -- all of which Bukhara once had a powerful control over. He writes of Bukhara:

I must unhappily concede that this bright star of learning, this paradise of the human world, this center of the world's learning, this center of knowledge for the entire world, has become a country surrounded by mountains of stupidity and fettered by chains of contempt. This source of life for all the Orient, knowing so many paths to the other world, has allowed death to seize it by the throat. What is so astonishing? These happy lands endowed with vast resources have become the refuge for a handful of usurpers who know not God; who have brought the pot of duplicity and rottenness (sic) of a little company of gluttons to boil...⁶⁰

Fitrat advocated the removal of corrupt officials and a closer following of the Qur'an. This reform would include not only the elite, but the masses as well, for the latter were guilty of acting like a flock of sheep. After all, if the peasants do not care about the abuses of the ruling circles, who would initiate the change?

This return to Islam does not indicate a traditional view of society, for the Islamic community, like other religious organizations throughout the world, possessed various interpretations and positions on the question of reform and change. For example, Fitrat was firmly in favor of such things as granting greater rights and privileges to

⁶⁰A.R. Fitrat, Spor bukharskogo mudarrisa s evropeitsemy Indii o novometodnykh shkolakh, translated from Persian into Russian by Colonel Jagello (Tashkent: Gosizdat, 1911), pp.25-26, as quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.107.

women, especially the right to an education. In addition, his ardent support for modern educational and business techniques indicates an openness on Fitrat's part. This view greatly paralleled Donish's ideals of several decades earlier, for Fitrat combined the rejuvenation of Islam with the progressive learning of modern science. He writes that:

Science is the means which made the British masters of India, Egypt, Baluchistan and parts of Arabia and the Russians the rulers of Tatars, Kirghiz, Turkestan and Caucasian Moslems...

If you study contemporary science, you will be in a position to construct telegraphs, build railroads, transport hundreds of thousands of troops from one end of the earth to the other in twenty days,...to comprehend the secret meaning of the Koran, to prepare rifles and cannon for the defense of Islam, to liberate the fatherland from the hands of the foreigners...to free our nation from the yoke of the infidel and to restore Islam to its earlier heights.⁶¹

By combining the traditional concepts of Islam with the modern concept of developing a nation-state, the Jadidists began to see themselves differently. This was especially true as the movement itself shifted from one focusing on educational reform to one advocating a more secular political program. At this early stage, Fitrat was a key figure in the formation of the Bukharan Jadidist movement. Khodzhaev credits Fitrat with working out the details the of

⁶¹Fitrat, quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Sovietization of Uzbekistan: The First Generation," in Russian Thought and Politics, edited by Hugh McLean et al., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.503.

the Young Bukharan's reform plan.⁶² According to Carrere d'Encausse:

What was original in Fitrat was the revolutionary tone of his reformism and pan-Islamism, and his refusal to compromise with the West, even temporarily....He also went far beyond the other Jadids of Turkestan, who scarcely expressed any aspiration towards a fundamental overturn of the social and political order. Yet no one in Bukhara seems to have disowned Fitrat's extremism; and men whose destiny diverged as totally as Fayzullah Khodzhaev and 'Ayni both asserted in their memoirs that Fitrat was truly the thinker who had proved capable of formulating a theory of the emirate's situation and their aspirations.⁶³

Thus, in a matter of a few years, the Young Bukharans possessed not only a core following, but a political program as well. However, the conditions in Bukhara, especially those relating to the Emir's power base, effectively prohibited the Jadids from ever forging ties with the general population.

V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF THE EARLY JADIDS

The Jadids, by 1916, went a step further in their development as a political organization. With the First World War in progress, the Russian control over Central Asia diminished. Consequently, uprisings in the Russian provinces of Turkestan and Transcaspia increased. The culminating event was the Rebellion of 1916, which was

⁶²Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, pp.124-125.

⁶³Carrere d'Encausse, p.113.

triggered by the Russian attempt to call up Muslims for military service. Despite the Russian insistence that the Muslims would only be used for rearguard duties, violence ensued.⁶⁴ The end result, in addition to much bloodshed, was the gradual disintegration of Russian power in Central Asia. The Bukharan Jadidists believed that this would also destabilize the Emirate. On that hope, the Jadidists formed the Young Bukharan organization, a political society that would carry the torch of reform and change in the Emirate.⁶⁵ The major obstacle was that the Jadidists, now the Young Bukharans, did not have any mass support to speak of. Khodzhaev later remarked that the Jadidists of pre-1917 were "a little group of intellectuals and petty bourgeois which initially managed only very limited layers of the population."⁶⁶ This problem of being unable to connect with the general population of Bukhara was to haunt the Young Bukharans through not only the revolutionary period, but also during the years of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic. The masses remained under the influence of traditional Islam, and saw the Jadidists as almost foreign

⁶⁴For an account of the 1916 rebellion, see Pierce, chapters XVII and XVIII.

⁶⁵As previously indicated, the Bukharan Jadidists wanted to emulate the Young Turk movement of 1908 and took on the political name of the "Young Bukharans." Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejey, p.47.

⁶⁶Khodzhaev, "O mlado-Bukhartsakh, p.130.

elements in their own society.⁶⁷ Zenkovsky sums this up when he states that:

The Jadids' initial successes were largely due to the Tatars' assistance and were limited to regions controlled by the Russian administration, where imperial authorities, intentionally or not, protected liberals from the wrath of Moslem fanatics. When and where it was exposed to an open struggle with traditionalists, the progressive national movement in Central Asia proved itself still too weak to overcome the structure and spirit of Central Asian society.⁶⁸

Soviet scholarship concurs with this conclusion, often arguing that these movements were indicative of national-bourgeois ideals. Vakhobov, in his study of Jadidism, remarks that:

As an ideological and political trend it [Jadidism] received more or less definite form in the Uzbek and Tadzhik areas. Uzbek Jadid literature is mainly used to describe Jadidism here. Jadidism was the way devised by the nascent national bourgeoisie to make use of the cultural awakening of the people to enslave the masses spiritually. It was divorced from the masses and became an ally of Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie.⁶⁹

Pejorative remarks aside, there is some truth to these statements. The Jadidists by the mid 1910s were still without a central theoretical foundation. Interests within the group varied from the desire to rid the Emirate of corruption and permitting the opening of reformists schools,

⁶⁷Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh," p.126.

⁶⁸Zenkovsky, p.91.

⁶⁹"Jadidism: A Current Soviet Assessment," Central Asian Review 12/1 (1964):33.

to the actual creation of a modern nation-state. This is illustrated by the divisions within the Khodzhaev family itself. Whereas Abdulla Khodzhaev supported political liberalization, his brother 'Usman still retained a strong adherence to Islam. This was a common issue in Bukhara, where the influence of Islam was significantly greater than in other Turkic areas of the Russian Empire, such as Bashkiria and the Tatar region.

The first major challenge was to occur with the February Revolution and sudden abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. Revolutionary activity in Turkestan signalled the beginning of Bukharan activity. The Young Bukharan leadership⁷⁰ began to organize their own forces, and develop ties with the revolutionary groups in Russia. At this juncture, the Young Bukharans possessed rather clear objectives, yet lacked a means by which to accomplish them. The eventual answer was to come from the Bolshevik wing of the RSDLP. By 1917, the Bolsheviks had drawn up a program regarding national self-determination that would be attractive to the non-Russian peoples in the Empire.

Although not technically part of the Russian Empire, the Emirate of Bukhara was sufficiently tied to Russia to

⁷⁰The leadership, according to Khodzhaev, was as follows: Abdul-Vakhid Burkhanov - chairman; Fitrat - secretary; 'Usman Khodzhaev - kaznachei; and members, Mukhitdin Rafat, Musa Saidzhanov, and Ata-Khodzhaev. Faizulla himself had just recently joined. However, he was soon to rise quickly through the ranks. Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh, p.131.

make such ideals appealing to the Young Bukharans.

Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay note that:

Incapable, by reason of their social origin and liberal education, of making their movement 'more radical' and of thus giving it a more revolutionary impetus, the nationalist leaders saw their influence waning. New forces, more dynamic and inspired by revolutionary currents, were making themselves felt. All the Muslim nationalist leaders began, therefore, to move towards socialism.⁷¹

This generalization is only partially correct, as not all of the reformers switched from liberalism to socialism overnight. Indeed, within the Young Bukharan movement, the emergence of the Bolshevik influence was to foster rifts within the party among the religious reformers, the liberals, and the socialists. These divisions revolved, to a large extent, around the means and objectives of reforming the Bukharan state. The next three years, 1917 to 1920, would be critical in defining them. These issues are the subject of the next chapter.

⁷¹Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, p.48.

CHAPTER FOUR -- THE MERGING OF REVOLUTIONS: KHODZHAEV'S ALLIANCE WITH THE BOLSHEVIK CAUSE AND THE BUKHARAN REVOLUTION OF 1920 (1917-1920)

I. INTRODUCTION

The events of the 1910s significantly influenced the Young Bukharans. Previously, the intelligentsia promoted educational and religious reforms with little discussion centered around political change. The Jadidists believed that the Emir would be an instrumental part of the "revived Bukhara" and consequently did not call for his ouster. The arbitrary closing down of presses and Jadid schools in 1914 compelled the Reformers to act in a more radical fashion.

Allworth writes that:

...such repression deprived [the Bukharan] people of open communication both among themselves and with and from the larger world....these deprivations influenced public opinion more powerfully than the modest Jadid institutions, unmolested, could have by themselves. For the Jadid leadership, the harsh measures and opposition from Russian, amirate, and khanate missionaries and highly placed religious officials helped them convert Jadid reform from a cultural effort into quasi-political resistance against dual repression.¹

This evolution of ideas was gradual, uneven, and exacerbated existing tensions and factions within the Young Bukharan movement. The older generation of Reformists retained their concern for cultural innovation within the existing political structure. On the other hand, the younger

¹Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present; a cultural history (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p.155.

reformers who were perhaps more receptive to ideas from the outside began to debate and seriously consider radical systemic change. At this time, the Russian populations of Tashkent and the enclaves inside the Emirate experienced a growth in liberal and socialist political organizations.

The Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party, later to be called the Russian Communist Party (bolshevik) was one such group. Although not all of the Young Bukharans advocated a socialist program, they recognized the importance of the Bolsheviks' political and military successes and their initial position of tolerating nationalism among the non-Russian peoples. In addition, mass education, economic modernization, and political reform were all common themes of the two organizations, thus creating at least temporarily, a common ground.²

Khodzhaev, reflecting on this alliance, writes that:

In '17 our one objective was to wipe out the 'Mir,' the big estates. But we were not strong enough alone, we had to link up with someone, and so we turned to the Russians. That was the first time the Emir passed sentence on me; the second time was after the uprising of '18. During the Civil War I was in Russia. At the time of the split in the Young-Bokhariot group in '17, the Emir had the British behind him...³

²Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Sovietization of Uzbekistan: The First Generation," in Russian Thought and Politics edited by Hugh McLean et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.503-504.

³From an interview with Faizulla Khodzhaev, in Ella Maillart, Turkestan Solo, translated by John Rodker (London: Century Publishing Company, 1985), p.196.

Thus, Khodzhaev concluded that it was out of political necessity that the Young Bukharans form an alliance with the Bolsheviks in the years immediately following the 1917 Revolutions. The issues and consequences of this cooperative effort will be the subject of much of this chapter.

I argue that the Young Bukharans who associated with the Bolsheviks did so out of a conviction that such an alliance would afford them the best opportunity to overthrow the Emir. The primary concern of 1917 was not global revolution or the elevation of man to a state of socialist egalitarianism, but rather the comparatively simple task of creating a nation-state capable of supporting a system of social and economic reforms at the most basic level. The Emir's power in 1917 vis-a-vis their own necessitated the seeking of outside sources of help. This, in part, explains why the Young Bukharans first turned to the Provisional Government. Only after this relationship failed did they turn to the Bolsheviks. This second alliance was also problematic. Nationalist sentiment among the Young Bukharans would be tested by the emergence of the Basmachi and the chauvinistic policies of the Tashkent Soviet which was the Bolshevik representative in Central Asia from 1917 to 1919. Through all of this, the Young Bukharans would gradually split into competing factions that threatened the force and structure of their own organization.

The Young Bukharans faced an even more significant challenge: how could they foster the development of a national identity among the general population of Bukhara? For the Young Bukharans to transcend the elite-mass barrier, they would have to inculcate loyalties to ethnic groupings as opposed to the traditional Dar al-Islam. This task, unfortunately, would remain the most daunting obstacle in national development, because such a consciousness simply did not exist among the Bukharan population. Indeed, with the exception of the intelligentsia in the various national groups such as the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tatar peoples, the concept of ethnic identification had little meaning.⁴

It is during the years 1917-1924 that the Bukharan elite first attempted to change this. We can divide this period into two sections: 1917-1920 in which the Young Bukharans rose to power and established the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic; and 1920-1924 in which they attempted to put their nationalist policies into practice. During both halves of the Bukharan national experiment, the Young Bukharans faced unique challenges to their policy of nation-state building. In each of the periods, Khodzhaev was in a position to address these challenges.

⁴Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islamic or Local Consciousness among Soviet Nationalities," in Soviet Nationality Problems, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.169.

This chapter will focus on the 1917-1920 period, analyzing the means through which the Young Bukharans achieved their goal of obtaining political power. In particular, I will focus on how the Young Bukharans, at Khodzhaev's insistence, formulated their alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks and how this particular alliance shaped the theoretical and political structure of the Young Bukharan Party (YBP). In the next chapter, I will study the results of this experiment: the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic.

II. THE YOUNG BUKHARANS AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The abdication of Tsar Nicholas II increased the hopes and accelerated the plans of the Young Bukharans. The Young Bukharans decided to contact the Provisional Government's administrative agent in Bukhara, A.Ia. Miller, believing that this new Russian government would support the reformist movement in the Emirate.⁵ In early March of 1917, they sent a cable to Miller requesting that the Provisional Government pressure the Emir into enacting political reforms such as creating a Bukharan parliament that would limit the authoritarian power of the Emir and oversee the activities of the local officials. According to Khodzhaev, the

⁵It is interesting to note that Miller was also the last Resident-Representative to Bukhara under Nicholas II! Faizulla Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent: Uzbekskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1926), p.18.

Provisional Government's response was sluggish at best.

Khodzhaev noted that:

We continued to see both the situation of the Young Bukharan movement becoming very much more difficult, and at the same time, the Russian resident, continued to cordially cooperate [with us] on the general political situation, while in practice, continued to occupy an extraordinarily ambiguous position regarding the Jadidist progressives.⁶

Khodzhaev further remarked that the Russian leaders only suggested to the Emir that he consider minimal reform measures to ensure order in the Emirate. There was no mention of military or economic threats on the part of the Russian government, and it was not likely that the Emir would comply with the "demands" presented.⁷ In sum, Khodzhaev found that dealing with Miller was a difficult means to obtain the Young Bukharan objectives.

As the Provisional Government focused its attention on the war with Germany, it spent little time or energy on the question of the nationalities in the former Empire. It did send investigative commissions to the outlying areas of the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Turkestan, but these had little, if any, power. The nine-member commission sent to Turkestan was instructed to listen to the local population's

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

complaints and report back to the central government.⁸ Partly because of the participants' complacent attitude and partly due to the brevity of the Provisional Government's tenure, the commission was a failure. The Provisional Government's "provisional status" prevented it from acting decisively in Central Asia until it addressed the major issue of the war with Germany.⁹

Simultaneous with the Provisional Government's inactivity was a gradual increase in Bolshevik activity in the area. Socialist Soviets emerged in Bukhara and Turkestan among the Russian industrial working population. Although these parallel institutions were relatively weak in the early part of 1917, they would form the base of future Bolshevik activity in the area.¹⁰

From the Young Bukharans' perspective, the change in the Russian national government renewed hopes of reform. In

⁸Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, revised edition, (New York: Atheneum, 1980), p.89. There were five Russians and four Muslims: Nikolai N. Shchepkin, Pavel I. Preobrazhinskii, Laipovskii, Elpatiev, Shkapskii, and the Muslims General Davletchin, Sadri Maksudov, Muhammed Tanishbasev, and Alikhan Bokaykhanov; noted in Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire," in Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.215-216.

⁹Jay C. Smith, Jr., "Miljukov and the Russian National Question," in Russian Thought and Politics, pp.415-417.

¹⁰Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.241.

the first week of March, Khodzhaev, Fitrat, and Musa (Mukhtar) Saidzhanov¹¹ signed and sent a second plea to Petrograd requesting that the Provisional Government define its relationship with Bukhara. In addition, 'Usman Khodzhaev and Fitrat left in person to meet with representatives from the Provisional Government to explain the Young Bukharan's position. Within a week, word arrived that the Russians were sending a mission to Bukhara. Khodzhaev and Fitrat (who quickly aborted his trip to Petrograd), travelled to Old Bukhara to attend these meetings. A.Ia. Miller, who was the appointed head of the Provisional Government delegation, presented the Emir with a list of concerns most needing of reform as early as March 17th. He argued that in the present unstable times, marginal reforms would benefit the Emir's rule and ensure its longevity. According to Khodzhaev, Miller's first proposals were as follows:

1. The establishment of a budget and a regular fiscal system.
2. Control over the local governors (beks).
3. Control over the Emir's civil service list.
4. The establishment of an autonomous administration of the capital and perhaps of other towns in the Emirate.
5. Improvements in education, especially in the medresses.

¹¹Twenty-four years old, Saidzhanov was an administrative figure in the Young Bukharan movement. Later, he held the offices of Internal Affairs and Governmental Affairs of the BPSR. He was purged from the party in the 1920s and executed in 1938. Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1 (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970), p.458.

6. Finally, with respect to the Russian institutions, an expansion of the postal and telegraphic network, the road system, and cultural institutions (theaters, museums, etc.,).¹²

The Russians hoped that by stabilizing the economy and limiting corruption, the Emirate would become a more trustworthy ally and protectorate.

Khodzhaev and other representatives of the Young Bukharan leadership (on record, we know of 'Usman Khodzhaev and Abdul Vahid Burkhanov¹³ attending) met with Miller on several occasions and noted that although the initial demands were exemplary, they did not go far enough. Bukhara could fully develop only if the Emir expanded the political rights of the citizenry. In fact, the main objective was to "create" a citizenry by allowing for more popular participation. The Young Bukharans spelled out these demands in a document entitled "Reform Program for Bukhara, drawn up by the Young Bukharan Party."¹⁴ Hoping to gain popular support, the Young Bukharans focused on specific issues that would be appealing to the peasant population.

¹²Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.20ff.

¹³A.I. Ishanov notes that Burkhanov was the official leader of the Young Bukharan Party in 1916. After emigrating to Tashkent in 1918, he became involved with the Bukharan Communist Party. I will discuss this organization later in the chapter. See Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, pp.455-456.

¹⁴Programmye dokumenty musul'manskikh politicheskikh partii, 1917-1920gg, reprint series no.2 (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1985), pp.55-69.

These included the re-evaluation of taxes on land-holdings, with particular attention to those of the clergy and the wealthy. In addition, all would share irrigation rights, normally the exclusive domain of the privileged. To assume fairness, a governmental body would control such rights. The document goes on to outline a tentative government structure that would include nazirates (ministries) of the interior, finance, the military, the judiciary, education, foreign affairs, police, and communications and mines, and clerical lands. The ten nazirates would make up the Council of Nazirs and, in essence, become the executive branch of the new political system. This Council of Nazirs would limit the power of the Emir. The details of this relationship, however, were not spelled out.

Perhaps in a move to pacify the intelligentsia, Miller added four additional demands specifically relating to the Young Bukharan objectives. These included:

1. Establishment of a bicameral popularly-elected representative body under the power of the Emir, whose purpose is to improve and control the central and local administrations.
2. The elimination of all taxes not authorized by the Shari'at.
3. The complete freedom of education, publishing, and the press.
4. The modification of the Emir's cabinet with the exclusion of all "fanatical and reactionary" ministers.¹⁵

On March 18th, Emir Abd al-Ahad conceded to the pressures

¹⁵Faizulla Khodzhaev, "O Mlado-bukhartsakh," Istorik marksist 1 (1926):132.

and drew up a reform manifesto that would be suitable to the Russian delegation. He signed the final copy on March 30th, and read the document aloud on the 7th of April.¹⁶ It began with the eloquent phrasing of:

In the name of the All-powerful, who displays his mercy to our subjects, We whose sole concern is the welfare and happiness of our people, have decided in accordance with their wishes to carry out extensive reforms in all spheres of our administration, suppressing all defects and injustices through the principles of election.¹⁷

In the brief text, the Emir promised to establish a more equitable system of taxation, a system of popularly-elected councils, and a State exchequer that would oversee and balance the Emirate's budget. It did not mention the means by which these measures were to be carried out and the specific timetable.

During the entire negotiation process, the Provisional Government's position was that if it had to choose between appeasing the Emir or the Young Bukharans, the former should receive preference.¹⁸ This was expressed by Miliukov, who, in a cable to the Russian delegation, stressed that: "The said reforms should be enacted only in so far as is felt to

¹⁶Becker, p.242.

¹⁷The full text of the March 30th Manifesto is found in Appendix 3 of Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution, translated by Quintin Hoare, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), and in Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.20-21.

¹⁸A.I. Ishanov, Bukharskaia narodnaia sovetskaia respublika (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1969), p.112.

be necessary."¹⁹ For the time being, the Provisional Government considered these promises to be sufficient for their drive towards stability in the southern borderlands.

Opposition to the Emir's manifesto registered from the conservative government and religious leaders, as well as the Young Bukharan activists. The former declared that the reforms were against the Shari'at and, being largely drafted by an infidel (Miller), were invalid in a Muslim state. The Young Bukharans, on the other hand, felt that the reforms did not go far enough and only addressed the concerns of the Old Jadids. Khodzhaev organized a meeting of the center-left leadership on April 7 to formulate a response to the Emir's manifesto.²⁰ The group decided to organize a public demonstration that would, in the words of Khodzhaev, allow the Young Bukharans to "count their troops, gain popular support, and rid the party of fainthearts and provocateurs."²¹ In actuality, Khodzhaev's actions further split the party. Prior to Khodzhaev's meeting, the general leadership of the group met at the house of Ahmed Nusratulla, a prominent "Old Jadid" to reach a consensus on the Miller resolution. Most of the Young Bukharans, such as

¹⁹L. Shek, "Iz istorii Bukhary v period fevral'skoi burzhuarno-democraticheskoi revoliutsii 1917 goda," Trudy SAGU 90 (1957):58.

²⁰Becker, p.246.

²¹Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Dzhadidy," in Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Srednei Azii i sbornik statei Feizuly Khodzhaeva (Moscow: Novyi izd., 1926), p.11.

Saidzhanov, 'Ayni, and Behbudi expressed the need for moderation. They believed that it was still possible to work with the Provisional Government and that the Emir could accept gradual reforms. Faizulla Khodzhaev, Fitrat, and 'Usman Khodzhaev disagreed, claiming that a show of force, or mass support, was necessary to pressure the Emir into acting. The only way that this could be accomplished was to organize a march on the Emir's palace. We can only conclude that the two sides did not come to an amicable agreement, for the demonstration took place the next day.²²

These debates exacerbated the existing divisions within the group. From this moment onward, the Jadidists were split between the Old Jadids, who opted for gradual change and an emphasis on cultural and educational reforms, and the "center-left" Young Bukharans, who saw direct political activism as the only recourse for change. While the former believed that a mass-following could be created through a systemic inclusion of the general population through a school network, the latter believed that one had to rally the masses in public.

In spite of this opposition from key members of the Bukharan leadership, the march took place as scheduled.

²²Allworth writes that: "Fayzullah Khoja deceived leaders of the Young Bukharan committee concerning these negative counsels [to not carry out the protest march] and actively proceeded to organize a street parade. In this he revealed an arbitrariness and inability to accept advice that promised to cloud his judgement in the situations to come." Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks, p.163.

According to Khodzhaev, the Young Bukharans had roughly 1,000 supporters in rank at the beginning, and by the time the column reached the Registan, it had over 5,000.²³ As the Young Bukharan demonstrators approaching the Registan, the Emirate's religious leaders gathered enough participants to form an effective counter-demonstration of roughly 8,000.²⁴ The groups confronted each other and, after a brief shouting match, turned to violence. Supporters of the Young Bukharans dispersed and many of the Young Bukharan leaders were captured.²⁵ Khodzhaev, in the confusion, successfully escaped to New Bukhara.²⁶

While in New Bukhara, Khodzhaev contacted the Russian Social Democrat (bolshevik) cells of the city's Russian working class population. As previously suggested, Khodzhaev was probably more receptive to the Russian population on account of his experiences in Moscow. Khodzhaev notes that after the April 8th debacle, he felt

²³Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.24ff.

²⁴Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh," p.135.

²⁵About thirty key figures were among those arrested. These included 'Ayni, Mirza Nasrulla, and Mirza Sakhbaabi. All three were tortured, and Nasrulla was executed, becoming the first "martyr" of the revolution. These episodes are noted in Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.24-7.

²⁶The leaders who escaped capture dispersed in an effort to avoid a mass arrest. While Khodzhaev went to New Bukhara, Kari Pulatov fled to Kerki, Burkhanov remained in Old Bukhara, and Fitrat, 'Usman Khodzhaev, and Abdul Saidov travelled to Russian-controlled Tashkent.

that the Russians would have to play a significant role in any effort to re-organize a demonstration in Old Bukhara against the Emir. Khodzhaev writes that:

For the Jadids and the Young Bukharans, who wanted to continue the struggle in the interests of the masses, it was important to come closer together with its most fundamental base: the deghons, the kustars, and the urban poor...²⁷

The way to do this, he added, was to begin forging outside alliances.

However, Khodzhaev's push to the left was tempered by the Young Bukharan's renewed moderation. Many in the party blamed the Radicals' excesses for the April 8th disaster and actively sought to eliminate or at least limit this particular faction. In addition, as the majority of the leftists were among the captured, the political composition of the Young Bukharan leadership changed.²⁸ The leaders, meeting underground, selected a new Central Committee that reflected this shift. Mukhitdin Mansurov was elected leader of the Committee that included Abdul Kadir Mukhitdinov, Mukhitdin Rafaat, Adbul-Vakhid Burkhanov, 'Usman Khodzhaev, Arif Karimov, Mirza Isam Bukhitdinov, Musa Saidzhanov, and Faizulla Khodzhaev. Although Fitrat and Ata Khodzhaev joined the Central Committee in the following months, the

²⁷Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.121. It is interesting to note that this section of K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare is not found in the original 1926 edition.

²⁸Becker, p.248.

domination of Mansurov tempered any calls for radical reform.²⁹ Indeed, Khodzhaev became despondent over his diminished influence, later calling this period the "victory of the Right."³⁰

Under the leadership of Mansurov, 'Usman Khodzhaev and Arifov, the Young Bukharans sought to re-open ties with the religious leaders of Bukhara. They argued that if the impetus for reform came from Bukharans and not from Russians, perhaps there would be greater room for negotiation. At the same time, the more radical members opposed this and contacted the Samargand Committee, which was the embryonic Bukharan Communist Party, for an alternative course of action.³¹

At this time, the Provisional Government's agent in Bukhara expressed great concern over the Young Bukharan's ability to successfully carry out reforms given its inability to reach a consensus on major issues. In light of these considerations, the Provisional Government decided to drop its support for the reformists. Miller justified this course of action by stating in a telegram dated April 10th,

²⁹Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh," pp.138-139.

³⁰He comments that, "when all the actions, associated with the burial and release of the arrested comrades, were complete, a group of rightist Jadidists in the organization called a general meeting in which they reorganized the party's leadership." Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.27-28.

³¹This group will be discussed later in the chapter.

that: "The adversaries of reform are, as I have already said, all classes of the Bukharan population; its only supporters are the Young Bukharans, of whom there are about 200."³² The Provisional Government was, for all intents and purposes, disassociating itself from the Bukharan revolutionaries.

The Young Bukharans were not aware of this decision and, consequently, did not realize their political isolation as they re-emerged to meet with the Emir on April 14th. When they arrived at the Registan, the Young Bukharans again met thousands of regime supporters who began harassing the delegation. Violence ensued and many Young Bukharans were arrested. The remainder, Khodzhaev among them, fled. This time, the survivors fled the country to the Russian-controlled city of Tashkent.³³ Thus, by mid-April, the Emir had successfully eliminated the Young Bukharan opposition and, in the process, rescinded the decrees on political liberalization.

Overall, the Young Bukharans not only failed to convince the Emir that reform was necessary, but failed to obtain any substantial mass support. As intellectuals who promoted alien ideas, the Young Bukharans could not create a common identity with the peasant population. Khodzhaev's

³²"Bukhara v 1917 godu," Krasnyi arkhiv 20, p.93, as quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.136.

³³Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.29-31.

demonstration of April 8 was disastrous not only because it failed to sway the population of Old Bukhara, but because it moved them in the opposite direction. The power of the traditionalists in Bukhara remained strong enough to ensure that the masses could remain distrustful of such "provocateurs" and thwart any efforts that would challenge the Emir's power. In addition, the lack of Russian cooperation doomed the Young Bukharan's efforts. Without substantial pressure from a "protector," it was unlikely that the Emir would ever seriously listen to the reformists.³⁴ The answer came in the form of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party.

III. FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV AND THE BOLSHEVIKS

Socialist organizations existed throughout Central Asia, primarily among the Russian settlements of laborers from the railroad company and political exiles from Central Russia who found their way to Tashkent. As with the socialists in the rest of Russia, those in Central Asia were divided between the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Social Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks eventually became the dominant socialist force in the area, with its key administrative unit being the Tashkent Soviet.³⁵

³⁴Becker, p.253.

³⁵Dov B. Yaroshevski, "Russian Regionalism in Turkestan," Slavonic and East European Review 65/1 (January, 1987):77-100.

In September of 1917, the Tashkent Soviet began to challenge the Provisional Government's power in the Turkestan province. The Bolsheviks of the Soviet furiously criticized the Provisional Government for reiterating the Tsarist policies towards the national minorities. The Soviet, the Bolsheviks wrote, was the only real progressive force for the minorities and would be the only one to uphold national rights as dictated in Article 9 of the Party Program. Lenin himself wrote in Pravda that:

For who are you, Kerensky, Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev? Are you not "bourgeois-tamed Socialists"? Did you not bring before the government of the "Russian bourgeoisie now in power" the question of the Russian Ireland and Russian Algeria, i.e., of Turkestan, Armenia, the Ukraine, Finland, etc.?...

Their customary "last" argument [for preventing secession] is: we are in the midst of a revolution. But this argument is false from beginning to end.³⁶

This criticism, combined with the poor relations between the Provisional Government representative in Bukhara and the Young Bukharans, made the Bolshevik position more appealing. Perhaps the Young Bukharans could find the support, that they so desperately needed, in the Bolshevik party.³⁷

The Young Bukharan Party leadership called a meeting to address with these issues and chart a new course of action.

³⁶V.I. Lenin, "Charity Begins at Home," Pravda 70 (June 14, 1917), as quoted in V.I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), pp.198-199.

³⁷In theory, as noted in chapter two, the Bolshevik position paralleled the Young Bukharans'.

Forty delegates met for nine days (May 1-9) to settle the divisions within the YBP.³⁸ The end result was not really a unification of the party, but a confirmation of the majority faction's position. Burkhanov, Fazil al-Din Makhdum and Muhyi al-Din Raafat called the meeting and, once again, appointed Muhitdin Mansurov as head of the Central Committee.³⁹ Mansurov's victorious faction advocated moderation and care in dealing with the Emir. It was even suggested that if the Party expelled the radical members, the Emir would listen to the demands for reform. The "official" goal of the Young Bukharan Party was the creation of a modern Islamic state that would retain much of the existing political institutions.

Because they were more familiar with the Russian political parties, the younger members of the Bukharan intelligentsia set out on their own. When it was evident that the YBP leadership was set in its decisions, Khodzhaev called a secret meeting of the dissenters. The participants drew up an alternative party program that included extensive

³⁸The delegates were from the following areas: 11 each from New Bukhara, Old Bukhara, and Chardzhui; 2 from Kerki; and 1 each from Termez, Karshi, Kermine, Ziiatdin, and Kizil Tepe. From Ishanov, BNSR, p.101.

³⁹The New Central Committee, like the one selected a month prior, was primarily conservative in nature. The new additions included Rakhmed Rafik, Fatkula Khodzhaev, Khodzha Mirbabaev and Muin Aminov. Khodzhaev remarks that these members reinforced the timid behavior of the Young Bukharans and prompted him to create an alternative leadership. See Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.32-33.

consideration of land reform, tax policy, and even the conscription laws pertaining to the military. Khodzhaev notes that Fitrat, recently released from the Emir's prison, was the key figure in the drafting of this program. The aim was to re-assert the revolutionary objectives of the Young Bukharans and simultaneously foster ties with the peasants. If the Young Bukharans could present themselves as advocates of the population's general interests, then perhaps they could create a more modern and democratic political and social environment. These goals, lofty as they might be, exemplified the nationalism of the leftist Young Bukharans. Khodzhaev wrote that in spite of the positive nature of these objectives:

The question [of implementation] was difficult and ticklish. Its solution demanded maximum caution, so that regardless of good or bad fortune, it depended upon, above all, the integrity of the Jadidist organization.⁴⁰

The "question of implementation" also hinged upon expanding the circle of participants, whether through coopting the other Jadidists or outside forces such as the Bolsheviks.

The latter option appeared more promising, and thus Khodzhaev resolved to open up relations with the soviets that were forming among the Russian workers. Through the soviets, the Young Bukharans could receive Bolshevik aid in pressuring the Emir to accept their demands. For the first

⁴⁰Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.35. The objectives of the leftists and the contribution of Fitrat are noted in pp.35-8.

time, there was even discussion of removing the Emir from power, although the active call for this did not occur until 1918. In a move to lessen support for the Emir within Bukhara, the leftists also decided to extend feelers to several disgruntled beks in the Emirate. A number of these regional clan leaders, although not necessarily reformists themselves, viewed the Emir as an opponent and supported any move that might curtail his power. For example, the Bek of Kerki donated an estimated 100,000 rubles to the leftist group.⁴¹ This plan was not very successful as by 1920, these same anti-Emir Beks would turn against the Young Bukharans in the Basmachi rebellion. Although they despised the Emir because of his power over them, the beks came to hate the Jadids even more for their secularist views. Thus, while the more conservative members hoped to regain the trust of the religious leaders, the leftists continued to push for more radical policies and, as noted, more desperate alliances.

The events of 1917 also revealed Khodzhaev's desire to win at any cost. Although only twenty-one years old, Khodzhaev actions suggest that he was willing to resort to

⁴¹Such behavior was anathema to the more rightist members of the Young Bukharans, who felt that ethical standards should be maintained. This "subversive" financial planning is interesting in that it resembles questionable policies of the Bolsheviks in the early 1910s. It appears that the success of organization is a greater priority than the means employed. "Bukhara v 1917 godu" op cit, p.107, as quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.143.

quick measures in order to achieve his objectives. The April demonstration and the May meeting were organized either against the wishes of the party leadership or without their knowledge altogether. Frustrated at what he considered to be a lack of revolutionary zeal on the part of his fellow Young Bukharans, Khodzhaev resorted to extreme actions. Such behavior was not going to endear him to his colleagues for long, and was the cause of future splits within the party. As will be seen, he never changed this personality trait in his dealings with other Uzbeks. Allworth, in particular, is critical of Khodzhaev for acting in a way that caused friction within the small core of reformists. He writes that:

His offhand attribution to social causes of consequences that he might have prevented, points to a callous split between ethical principles and public behavior that typified him and some other ideological politicians. Deceptiveness to colleagues, manipulative opportunism in dangerous circumstances, and lack of long-range vision would make him a Central Asian leader most suitable to the Russian authorities in Moscow.⁴²

In spite of this, Khodzhaev was able to acquire a close following and become the leader of the leftist faction. And, as events were to prove, he would have several opportunities to challenge the power of the dominant right-wing of the party.

⁴²Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks, p.166.

IV. THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO SEIZE POWER

The situation for the Young Bukharans remained static until the Bolshevik Revolution.⁴³ On November 15, 1917, the pro-Bolshevik Tashkent Soviet replaced the weak Provisional Government as the major Russian power-base in Central Asia. On November 2nd, the Bolsheviks published the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which called for free self-determination and the development of national minorities, which was a reversal of the nationality policy of the Tsar and the Provisional Government.⁴⁴

In the chaos created by the Revolution, the entire Central Asian region was cut off from the rest of Russia. Soon after the Bolshevik takeover, forces opposed to the Bolsheviks emerged to challenge them. The ensuing conflict, the Russian Civil War, was to have a devastating effect on Central Asia in addition to the rest of the former empire. For extended periods of time, Ataman Dutov's White forces held the territory north of Orenburg effectively elevating

⁴³Accounts of the Bolshevik Revolution in both Russia proper and Turkestan are numerous and detailed. The standard accounts are Allworth (ed), Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule; Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); Pipes op cit; and Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. (New York: Praeger, 1964). A typical Soviet interpretation of the revolution in Central Asia is found Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR (1917-1937), 3 vols, (Tashkent: Academy of Uzbekistan, Institute of History and Archeology, 1967); and Istoriia Uzbekistana v istochnikakh, sostavitel B.V. Lunin, (Tashkent: "Fan," 1984).

⁴⁴Serge Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p.161.

the Tashkent Soviet to a position of sole Bolshevik power in the region.⁴⁵ Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, the Peoples' Committee of the Turkestan Soviet (Turksovnarkom) began alienating the local population in a manner similar to that of the Provisional Government. One result was the tragedy of the Qoqand Autonomy. The military leader of the Tashkent Soviet, Kolesov, declared that there could only be one government in Turkestan and organized a military force against the Autonomy. However, the threat of Dutov's White Guard delayed any immediate action on the part of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁶

As the Tashkent Soviet had to deal with the immediate problem of the Qoqand Autonomy, peace on the southern border had now become essential. Because of this, the Bolsheviks

⁴⁵See G. Safarov, Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia (Opyt Turkestana) (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921). For a shorter account of the events surrounding the Civil War in Turkestan, see "The Red Army in Turkestan, 1917-1920," Central Asia Review XIII/1 (1965):31-43.

⁴⁶Another dilemma facing the Bolsheviks in Tashkent was the fact that a message from Stalin, of all people, could be viewed as a legitimate foundation for not only the Qoqand Autonomy's existence, but its potential domination over the Tashkent Soviet. Arguably, Stalin wrote this because he felt Kolesov was acquiring too much power in Tashkent. It read as follows:

"The Soviets are autonomous in their internal affairs and discharge their duties by leaning upon their own actual forces. The native Proletarians of Turkestan, therefore, should not appeal to the Central Soviet power with its request to dissolve the Turkestan Sovnarkom, which in their opinion is leaning upon the non-Muslim army elements, but should themselves dissolve it by force, if such force is available to the native proletarians and peasants." Quoted in Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi -- I," Central Asian Survey 6/1 (1987):22.

decided to negotiate with the Emir. On November 29, the Sovnarkom sent a message to the Emir stating that:

The Sovnarkom of Turkestan [the Tashkent Soviet], born of the will of the revolutionary people, confirms to your Highness that the Soviet will adhere strictly to the principles adopted by the Russian government for relations with smaller States. For its part, the Sovnarkom counts upon your loyalty and begs you to take all necessary measures for the maintenance of order and peace. Under these conditions Your Highness can count upon the benevolent attitude on Russia's part towards Bukhara.⁴⁷

According to Khodzhaev's account, the Emir used this respite to ready his troops and enlist aid from abroad. Sensing that the Bolshevik power in Tashkent was marginal at best, the Emir supposedly planned to go on the offensive. Meanwhile, in Bukhara, the Emir renewed his attacks on the Jadidists. Khodzhaev writes that:

Guarding itself on the border with the Russian power, the Emir began a furious persecution of the Young Bukharans....[In addition], the Emir's government actively developed its military strength by feverishly organizing its army and establishing ties with the counter-revolutionary organizations in Turkestan.⁴⁸

Khodzhaev's claims are supported by the fact that the Emir, in a move to strengthen his state, took in refugees from Dutov's defeated troops and enlisted aid from the Emir of

⁴⁷N. Arkhipov, "Bukharskaia narodnaia sovetskaia respublika," Sovetskoe pravo 1/4 (1923):135.

⁴⁸This is outlined in Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.41. Also noted is the Emir's military buildup.

Afghanistan and from Great Britain.⁴⁹ The latter came in the form of the Malleson mission which included marginal personnel, financial and weapon support.⁵⁰

The possibility of a Russo-Bukharan conflict increased when Kolesov marched on Qoqand, defeating the Autonomy on February 13, 1918.⁵¹ With the exception of Mustafa Chokaev and a few others, the majority of the Qoqand leadership perished in the attack.⁵² With the Autonomy crushed, the

⁴⁹Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), p.65.

⁵⁰For accounts of the British role in Central Asia, see: Major F.M. Bailey, "In Russian Turkestan under the Bolsheviks," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 8/1 (1921):49-69; Captain L.V.S. Blacker, "War and Travels in Turkestan, 1918-1919-1920," JCAS IX/pt.1 (1922):4-20; Major-General Sir Wilfred Malleson, "The British Military Mission to Turkestan, 1918-1920," JCAS IX/pt.2 (1922):96-110. These all downplay the significance of the British participation. More neutral observers such as Ellis limit the British role to the Transcaspian Province. Although there was an expressed desire to intervene, the Afghan crisis of 1919 and the need to protect India from the growing unrest effectively put an end to the British efforts. Ikbāl Ali Shah remarks that it was this threat to India that was the major aim of the British intervention. See "The Khanates of the Middle East," The Contemporary Review CXV (February 1919):187.

⁵¹Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.42.

⁵²Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan," Asiatic Review 24/78 (April 1928):278-279; and "The Red Army in Turkestan," pp.33-34. Blacker describes the event as follows:

"Koleso(v), the 'Anacharsis Klotz' of Turkestan, had massacred many thousands by machine-gun fire in Kokand alone, and had razed the city to the ground by shelling with high explosives. Those of you have seen the ruins of Ypres must multiply it by four to get an idea of what the Bolsheviks did to Kokand in February, 1918." (cited in Blacker, p.6).

Bolsheviks focus their attention on Bukhara. Kolesov, the victor of Qoqand, began negotiations with the Young Bukharan leaders. Khodzhaev repeatedly assured Kolesov that within the Emirate, there were tens of thousands of rebels waiting to rise up. On several occasions, he met with the Russian leader to persuade him to assist the Bukharans.⁵³ A positive response from the Russians living in the Emirate for such a move probably swayed Kolesov into his ultimate decision to intervene at the end of the month.

The negotiations between the Russians and Young Bukharans revealed a difference of opinion regarding the structure of post-revolutionary Bukhara.⁵⁴ From a series of communiques, it is clear that Kolesov and the Russian soviets preferred that the Emir be removed from power. The Young Bukharan Party, as it was still controlled by the more moderate faction, advocated that the Emir be retained on the condition that he enact all of the previously-cited reforms.⁵⁵ To this end, the Young Bukharans set up a revolutionary committee that would assume power if the Emir refused to comply.

⁵³Khodzhaev, K istorii v Bukhare, p.45; Becker, p.265.

⁵⁴Ishanov, BNSR, p.122. Ishanov cites a number of private letters to this effect.

⁵⁵Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.42. Khodzhaev notes that, if necessary, the Emir should be arrested and held until he meets the demands.

In mid-March, Kolesov led an expedition of about 700 Red Army troops and 200 Young Bukharans into the Emirate.⁵⁶ They had little trouble approaching the city of Old Bukhara and prepared for either a peaceful negotiation or the city's destruction. A peace delegation was formed that would negotiate the final conditions of the treaty. Going against Kolesov's advice, the Young Bukharans agreed to negotiate within the walls of the city. In spite of a series of delays brought on by the Emir's negotiators, the Young Bukharans presented the Emir with an ultimatum. The ultimatum demanded that the Emir accept unconditionally the proposal that his government would be overseen by the Executive Committee of the Young Bukharans. If he did not comply, the Emir would be held responsible for the "blood that is shed." In addition, "if any part of your answer contradicts our demands, I [Khodzhaev] will consider such to be a rejection of our demands."⁵⁷

The Young Bukharans, believing that the very presence of the Russian troops, along the Bukharan border and in Bukhara itself, would force the Emir to submit, sent a five-man delegation to hear the response. Unfortunately, they met with "a very different welcome from that which it was

⁵⁶M.G. Vakhobov, and A.I. Zevelev (eds), Revoliutsionery vozhaki mass (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1967), p.365.

⁵⁷The ultimatum is quoted in full in Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.46.

expecting."⁵⁸ A crowd supportive of the Emir surrounded the delegation and killed all but two of the thirty-man team (the five delegates and 25 guards). The ensuing anti-Russian sentiment in Bukhara was fertile ground for the Emir's declaration of a holy war against the Russians the Young Bukharans. Almost immediately, counter-uprisings erupted throughout the emirate, threatening the very existence of the Russian force present. With the destruction of the railroads and supply lines, Kolesov had no choice but to retreat first to Samarqand and, a week later, to Tashkent. A Young Bukharan observer, Sadriddin Ayni noted that during their retreat, the Russians took out and shot a number of Bukharan peasants. In retaliation, the Emir condemned to death any Young Bukharan participant; thus once again, Khodzhaev and the remnants of the Young Bukharans fled from their country.⁵⁹

In lieu of a second attack, Kolesov decided to cease hostilities. On March 25, 1918, a treaty was signed recognizing the mutual interests and political concerns of the new Bolshevik government and the Emirate. The Emir agreed to pay for the damages caused by the fighting in exchange for an agreement to release prisoners and maintain

⁵⁸Carrere d'Encausse, p.156.

⁵⁹Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX Jahrhundert (Darmstadt: C.W. Leske, 1956), p.129.

a policy of mutual non-interference.⁶⁰ Thus another Young Bukharan attempt to reform or change their country's political structure ended in failure.

Khodzhaev later wrote that the causes for this failure can be viewed as both external and internal. Externally, the Young Bukharans numbered about 200 and never gained the popular support in "Holy Bukhara," which was undergoing a "powerful explosion of nationalist feelings and religious fanaticism." The Young Bukharans were perceived as "defamers of the Islamic faith," and thus met with a hostile reception. In addition, Kolesov's unpreparedness was an important weakness in the operation. Internally, the Young Bukharans lacked political and ideological unity. Without a singularity of purpose, they would never be able to marshal full support. Khodzhaev writes:

So as to not give occasion to a misunderstanding, I must now directly say that I, as one of the leaders of the Central Committee, not less, but perhaps more than the others, am responsible for all of the consequences [of the failed revolution], for all mistakes, and for all assumptions of the Kolesov episode; I, not less than others, was carried away by our modesty, and as now I see, the necessity of relying on the success of military performance.⁶¹

⁶⁰Becker, p.268; A.I. Zevelev, Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v Uzbekistane (Tashkent: "Fan," 1959), p.76.

⁶¹Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.45. Khodzhaev lists the key casualties of the conflict as being Mirza Mustafa, Nasrulla Bek (and his family of 17), Mirza Akhmed Bek (and his son), Khodzha Sakura Azimov, Mirza Sakhba, Khodzhi Datkho, Islamkyl Toksaba, Qazi Abdusatar, and Qazi Saizhon. p.51.

With their leadership and organization decimated, the Young Bukharans embarked on what would be a two and a half year period of exile and structural re-organization. It was clear that a stable elite-mass relationship did not develop between the Young Bukharan Party and the population of the Emirate. The Bukharan population remained apathetic to the call for revolution and turned on the Young Bukharans. In a sense, the Young Bukharans remained aliens in their own lands. That they required the assistance of an outside force further accentuates this problem.

V. FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV IN EXILE

Faizulla Khodzhaev writes that the period between the failed 1918 revolution and 1920 was one of the most difficult to endure.⁶² The YBP had failed to foster a successful alliance with the peasants in their push for power and, if anything, became a more factionalized organization. Because of the increased importance of the Bolsheviks, the "left" became the focal group. The right, under the guidance of the Old Jadids, either remained as oppositional forces in the central committee or joined the Basmachi movement that was spreading after the Qogand disaster. The center-left, led by Khodzhaev, took control of the Young Bukharan Party's Central Committee and began to actively participate in bolshevik-sponsored functions,

⁶²Ibid., pp.54-55.

including the Fifth Congress of Soviets of Central Asia in April 1918.

Khodzhaev was named Chairman of the Central Committee of the significantly-reduced Young Bukharan Party in March 1918, and three months later, set out for Moscow to discuss co-operative efforts with Bolshevik party representatives. Again, Khodzhaev's familiarity with the Russians must have influenced his decision to meet with such foreigners. On the way to Moscow, Khodzhaev was captured by Dutov's forces near Orenburg and held for three months. Scheduled for execution, Khodzhaev made a daring escape (according to his own account) and eventually found his way to Moscow in October 1918. This interpretation is challenged by one account that states:

...in '18 he [Khodzhaev] was expelled by the Soviet Government of Turkestan. He took refuge in Orenburg, but there the Ataman Dutof, who was one of the White leaders, arrested him. However, he was liberated again after giving Dutof a lot of valuable information about Tashkent. At the end of July Faizulla left for Moscow in order to defend his caracul skins, worth half a million roubles. When he came back he was a fully pledged Bolshevik.⁶³

Given the inconsistency of this statement with Khodzhaev's association with the Bolsheviks, it is unlikely that he "bought" his release. However, the debate remains unresolved.

⁶³An unnamed source recounted this in Maillart, p.1191.

It is certain that Khodzhaev arrived in Moscow in October 1918 and stayed there until December 1919.⁶⁴ During this fifteen month period, Faizulla Khodzhaev met with the Bolshevik leadership. We can pinpoint this period as that in which Khodzhaev fully allied with the Bolsheviks at least as far as a joint political strategy in Central Asia.⁶⁵ Ishanov writes that:

Almost immediately after his arrival in Moscow, Faizulla Khodzhaev began to organize the Young Bukharans committee in the presence of the plenipotentiary representative of the Turkestan ASSR and the government of the RSFSR....[and cabled to Tashkent on November 30th that] the committee had been built and was functioning.⁶⁶

It is also the case that Khodzhaev was introduced to the basic writings of Lenin and the early Bolsheviks at this time. Although Khodzhaev does not list the works that he read, he does acknowledge the influence that they had on his political development and his views towards the Bukharan masses. He explains that:

[W]e must note that the peasantry, who at its foundation was a mass previously and insufficiently active, but remained, up until this time, a decisive strength of the revolution, and the merchants, who were prior to the October

⁶⁴Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I (Moscow: "Fan," 1970), p.17.

⁶⁵According to Vakhobov and Zevelev, it was during this period that Khodzhaev worked extensively on what would become the future program of the YBP. M.G. Vakhobov and A.I. Zevelev, Revoliutsii vozhaki mass (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1967), p.367-369.

⁶⁶A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (ocherki zhizni i deiatel'nosti) (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), p.15.

Revolution one of the factors in the struggle against the Emirate, have decisively crossed over to the camp of the reactionaries.⁶⁷

It appears that the difficulties encountered while in Bukhara, as well as the events of the previous year, had taken a toll on Khodzhaev's perception of the "revolutionary masses." Although Bolshevik success was by no means assured, for Khodzhaev, its political program, particularly regarding national self-determination, was deemed the most agreeable to the Young Bukharan objectives. In particular, he would adopt the notion of the vanguard elite leading the revolution. Lenin himself expressed interest in the problems of Central Asia, declaring at the Eighth Party Congress in March of 1919 that the right of national self-determination was of utmost importance to the Bolshevik leadership.⁶⁸

At the same time that Khodzhaev was reevaluating his political position, a new split developed among the Young Bukharans. The brief cooperative effort between the Bolsheviks and the Young Bukharans convinced a number of the latter that the only way to achieve their particular objectives would be to join into a political alliance with the former. Drawing its membership primarily from

⁶⁷Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.157.

⁶⁸V.I. Lenin, "Report on the Party Programme to the Eighth Congress, RCP(b), in V.I. Lenin, The National-Liberation Movement in the East (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), pp.211-217.

disgruntled Young Bukharans, a Bukharan Communist Party developed inside the Emirate while the more moderate Young Bukharans remained in exile.⁶⁹ Founded in early 1918, the BCP officially organized at its Second Congress, which began on September 25, 1918. The Congress took place in the city of Samarqand, physically and symbolically separated from the Young Bukharans in Tashkent.⁷⁰ It appears that at this Congress, there was an attempt to cooperate with the Young Bukharans. Khodzhaev, Muhkitdinov, and Pulatov are recorded as invited guests, according to the official history of the Uzbek SSR. It was possible for Khodzhaev to have attended this meeting, as he escaped from Dutov's forces in June and did not arrive in Moscow until October of that year. Khodzhaev's 1926 version of K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare does not mention this episode and, in fact, downplays the significance of the BCP. The "revised edition," however, spends several pages on the subject, noting that the invitation was from Azimzhan, Husainov, Aminov, and Saidzhanov.⁷¹ Working closely with Red Army units, these individuals cultivated a mass following among the emigrant

⁶⁹This "revolutionary resolve" was to become a point of contention later in Uzbek history. See A.I. Ishanov, Pobeda narodnoi sovetskoi revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent: Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1957), p.19.

⁷⁰Ishanov, BNSR, p.137.

⁷¹All were to become key actors in the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic government. The "added pages" can be found in "K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare," Izbrannye trudy, vol. I, pp.158-160.

Bukharan population in Russian Turkestan and within the Emirate itself. Unlike the 1920 meeting of the BCP, to be discussed shortly, we do not know for certain whether Khodzhaev ever attended the meeting. It is possible, as I will suggest in chapter eight, that in partially rehabilitating Khodzhaev, it was essential to prove his long-term commitment to the revolution.

As for the BCP itself, according to Soviet historiography, the membership increased to over 200 in Old Bukhara alone, with several hundred more in cells throughout the Emirate.⁷² Under the leadership of the little-known Communist, Azimdzhan Iakubov, the participants elected a Central Committee that began to formulate a program more radical than that of the Young Bukharans.⁷³ Having fully adopted the Bolshevik program and the support of the Communist Party of Turkestan, the BCP demanded the abolition of the Emirate and the creation of a Peoples' Republic. In addition, they wanted to exclude landholders and religious leaders in the future political framework.⁷⁴ Sensing that reconciliation with the Young Bukharans was unlikely, the BCP organized their own revolutionary cells within the Emirate. According to Mashitskii, by 1919 there were 43

⁷²Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi NSR, p.88.

⁷³For further details, see Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR, vol.I (Tashkent: "Fan," 1967), p.251. The volume lists the members of the Central Committee that were selected.

⁷⁴Park, p.46.

organizations with a "membership" of over 5,000.⁷⁵ More than likely, these figures are exaggerated, nevertheless, the BCP did exist as a rival to the YBP. Ishanov puts the number of cells at 37, with 24 designated as peasant-run and 13 for military units within the Emir's army.⁷⁶

Thus, by 1919, the Bukharan reformers were now in three distinct factions: the rightist Old Jadids that retained their commitment to moderate constitutional reform; the centrist Young Bukharans under Khodzhaev, that sought to change the political structure of Bukhara within the boundaries set in the 1917 Declaration; and the emerging Bukharan Communist Party that was directly under the guidance of the Bolsheviks.

VI. POLITICAL UNIFICATION AND REVOLUTION

Another challenge to the success of the YBP emerged at this time in the form of the Basmachi rebellion. After his victory over the Qoqand Autonomy in February, 1918, Kolesov sent a dispatch to Moscow which read: "The Autonomous Government of Kokand has been finally liquidated. The troops supporting the Kokand Autonomous Government have been partly disarmed. The fugitive elements are preparing a

⁷⁵A. Mashitskii, "K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare," Vestnik narodnogo komissariata inostrannykh del 5-6 (July, 1921):73-74, as cited in Park, p.46.

⁷⁶A.I. Ishanov, BNSR, p.156. The total membership is also lowered to about 2,500.

campaign of political banditism ("basmachestvo")."⁷⁷

Indeed, several of the leaders, including Chokaev, joined the ranks of the basmachi.

The Basmachestvo, or Basmachi rebellion, was an expression of local dissatisfaction with governmental control specifically the Russian colonial power.⁷⁸ The rebels, or bandits as they might be called, were generally ill-organized groups that randomly attacked their targets, such as Russian settlements and military outposts. However, with the onset of the Civil War, the Basmachi forces grew to an unprecedented level and for several years threatened Soviet power in Central Asia.⁷⁹ It was after Kolesov's failed venture into Bukhara that the Basmachi increased in strength, for during this period, the Tashkent Soviet

⁷⁷Chokaev 1928, p.280.

⁷⁸Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule," Central Asian Survey 2/2 (September 1983):19. For studies on previous cases of indigenous violence against the Russians, see: Ann Sheehy, "The Andizhan Uprising of 1898 and Soviet Historiography," Central Asian Review 14/2 (1966):139-150; Chapter XVII of Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

⁷⁹A word on the term "basmachi:" it is probably derived from the Turkic verb "basmaq" meaning "to press," "oppress," or "violate." In Uzbek, a "basmaji" is a robber, bandit, or violator. Martha Olcott prefers to equate it with "freeman," lessening the criminal flavor of the term. It comes as no surprise that the Soviet histories opt for the more derogatory meanings. See Martha B. Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freeman's Revolt in Turkestan, 1918-1924," Soviet Studies 33/3 (July, 1981):352-369.

embarked on a policy of regional terror under the heading of "war communism."

In an attempt to break the indigenous power bases, the Soviet attacked Muslim religious centers and practices. In addition, they began a policy of forced acquisition of grain and livestock, creating conditions for a devastating famine in the winter of 1918-1919.⁸⁰ Conditions worsened, especially in the Ferghana valley, where the Bolsheviks systematically destroyed stores of food to prevent them from falling into Basmachi hands. A critical result of this policy was the increased support for the Basmachi rebellion. Previously contained in the regions around Qoqand, it spread rapidly throughout the entire Ferghana valley and into parts of Bukhara. Furthermore, with an arms agreement between Madamin (a Basmachi leader) and the Bukharan Emir in 1918, the Bolsheviks now faced a dangerous force.⁸¹

The first signs of order being restored in the region came from Moscow. The Bolshevik leadership in Moscow concluded that the Tashkent Soviet had lost its legitimacy

⁸⁰See Mustafa Chokaev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 18/3 (July, 1931):410 and Asiatic Review XIX/60:605. The extent of this devastation on the regional economy is evident by looking at the livestock figures. During this brief period, the number of oxen fell from 4,311,100 to 561,531 and that of sheep and goats from 15,399,200 to 2,116,836. Even taking into account the number of herders that fled across to Chinese and Afghan borders, the losses are still extraordinary.

⁸¹Central Asian Review 7/3, p.238.

in Turkestan, and in order to rectify the situation, policy changes would have to be made. Intervention finally came in the form of the Turkestan Commission.⁸² The Turkkommissiia, as it was called, was sent by the Peoples' Commissariat of Nationalities and the Central Executive Committee (Moscow) in the Spring of 1920 to re-evaluate and re-structure the political framework in Turkestan.⁸³ Working closely with the newly-created Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the RCP(b), the Turkkommissiia sought to unify the revolutionary efforts of Central Asia with those of Russia proper.⁸⁴ In addition, special emphasis was placed on creating "conditions for revolution"

⁸²M.Kh. Nazarov, Kommunisticheskaia partiia Turkestana vo glave zashchity zavoevanii Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii (1918-1920gg) (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1969), p.362.

⁸³The role of the Narkomnats, according to Eudin and North, was the following: "Each national group had a corresponding national commissariat or section within the framework of the central commissariat. The national commissariats and sections, in turn, acted on instructions from their respective local communist parties, each of which was affiliated with and subordinated to the All-Russian Communist Party....Through these national commissariats and sections the People's Commissariat of Nationalities immediately took up the struggle against the antisoviet nationalist groups in the borderlands. Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East: 1920-1927, a documentary survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.23.

⁸⁴For a discussion of the institutional relationship between these political bodies, see Robert Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (London: The Bodley Head, 1967), pp.28, 32-35.

in Bukhara and Khiva, in the hope that they would become springboards for revolution in the East.⁸⁵

For two years, the Tashkent Soviet had been the sole Bolshevik power in the region and had exerted its influence to the point of challenging Moscow's rule in the region. Stalin, who ordered the Turkkommissiia's investigation, found this situation to be completely unacceptable. Headed by Kuibyshev and Frunze, the Turkkommissiia began an extensive purge of the Turkestan region. Khodzhaev returned to Central Asia with this Commission in 1919, and by some accounts, participated in its activities.⁸⁶ Khodzhaev himself favorably comments on the role that the Turkkommissiia played in the development of an indigenous support for the Bolshevik Revolution. He writes that:

It was positively the beginning of a widening of the "korenizatsiia" [literally: "nativization"] of all the soviets and peasant apparatuses in Soviet Turkestan. In viewing that the situation for the people in Turkestan was considerably improving...Bukharans and Khorezmians were beginning to get excited for they saw that Soviet power -- worker and peasant power -- was not going to speak with the mullas and beys. The bloody regimes of the Emir and Khan began to quiver.⁸⁷

Khodzhaev believed that the Turkkommissiia would pose a significant threat to the Bukharan Emir and would afford the Young Bukharans yet another opportunity to assume power.

⁸⁵Eudin and North, p.29.

⁸⁶Carlisle, p.57.

⁸⁷Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.161.

The perception that the Turkkommissiia was going to assert its authority in the region is supported by the mandate it carried. The Commission's mandate read as follows:

The self-determination of the peoples of Turkestan and the abolition of all national inequality and all privileges of one national group over another constitute the foundations of the entire policy of the Soviet government of Russia and serve as the guiding principle in all the work of its organs....It is only through such work that the mistrust of the native toiling masses of Turkestan for the workers and peasants of Russia, bred by many years' domination of Russian Tsarism, can finally be overcome.⁸⁸

The "mistrust" was in large part due to the insensitive policies and behavior of the Turkestan Soviet. The Turkkommissiia believed that in order to eliminate the potential for increased resistance on the part of the Basmachis, general policy guidelines would have to be changed. The end result was the elimination of numerous "adventurers" and "parasites" from the Party organization, and the complete subservience of the Turkestan Communist Party to the central party organs in Moscow.⁸⁹

⁸⁸Quoted in Park, pp.120-121.

⁸⁹Specifically, the Commission proposed the following measures:

1. Land which had been arbitrarily seized by settlers since the Revolution, and land earmarked for settlement by the former Settlement Administration, should be redistributed among the Kazakh and Dungan refugees, leaving the settlers no more than a working plot.
2. All former members of the Tsarist police and bureaucracy, speculators, managers of former large Russian firms, Party "hanger ons," etc. should be expelled from Turkestan.

The Turkkommissiia also restored the religious rights of the Muslims, including the shari'at courts and the vaqf. After two years of bitter fighting, the Turkkommissiia hoped that this about-face would convince the indigenous population that the Bolshevik Party could be a likely ally. By all accounts, this "softening" had an immediate positive effect in the area.⁹⁰ Frunze promised complete amnesty for those who surrendered.

In spite of the offer's appeal, not all gave in to this call to surrender. In particular, the Basmachi based in Eastern Bukhara under the leadership of Ibrahim Bek refused to negotiate with the Russians. As long as the Basmachi remained in the eastern territories of Bukhara and used it as a staging ground for attacks into Russian Turkestan, the threat would never be totally eradicated. As a result, the Bolsheviks once again considered a permanent resolution to the Bukharan problem.

The potential for action increased with the continual decline of the Bukharan domestic economy. Largely a result

3. All Party members who were "infected with a colonial mentality and Great Russian chauvinism" should be replaced by "several hundred" Party workers mobilized from the Centre.

4. "Several hundred workers on the Central Asian and Tashkent railways" should be replaced.

5. All opposition to these measures should be dealt with severely, and any objectors expelled. "The Turkestan Commission, 1919-1920," Central Asian Review XII/1 (1964):11.

⁹⁰Pipes, p.183.

of the war and the loss of trade, Bukhara's economy was almost completely destroyed. Grain harvests in 1919, for example, were only 18% of the 1913 total. The crucial cotton trade had dropped by an estimated 95% from 1917 to 1919. As a cash crop, cotton had become a useless commodity. This loss of foreign revenues meant that the Emir had to raise domestic taxes in order to minimally support its army. The resulting financial spiral spelled the end of the Bukharan economy. Khodzhaev records that in spite of these problems:

The economic ruin little affected them [the Emir's government]. Trading with Afghanistan...as was their custom, was profitable to the merchants, giving them possible gains for their vast fortunes.⁹¹

However, this hoarding of wealth did little to help the general economy. Popular dissatisfaction with the situation can be measured by the increase in domestic riots, the most significant being the July 2, 1919 riot in which over 60 participants were subsequently executed.⁹² With these considerations in mind, the Bolsheviks began their second attempt to overthrow the Emir, and resurrected the YBP.

During the years of 1919 and 1920, Faizulla Khodzhaev emerged as a political leader among the ranks of the intelligentsia. As indicated by his contacts with the Bolsheviks, it is also possible to conclude that Khodzhaev

⁹¹Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.58.

⁹²Becker, pp.282-283.

became an acceptable figure for the leadership in Moscow. After the disastrous "Qoqand Autonomy" episode and the rise of the Basmachi, the Turkkommissiia correctly indicated that relations would have to improve in the region if the Bolsheviks were to assume control over Turkestan. The incorporation of indigenous elites was a step in this direction, and Khodzhaev's inclusion into the Turkkommissiia's activities support this change. Both groups, the Bolsheviks and the Jadids, supported political revolution in Bukhara, and because of this, could form a temporary alliance. Individuals like Khodzhaev were ideal for the Bolsheviks who hoped to bring stability and control to Central Asia. The history of the Jadids/Young Bukharans lead them to believe that this group could be instrumental in this process. However, because their objectives were fundamentally at odds, this marriage of convenience could quickly lead to conflict. This first hint of trouble arose almost immediately in the Revolution of 1920.

The Bolsheviks faced the immediate question of who they should support in 1920. Although in principle, the Bukharan Communist Party agreed more closely with the Bolshevik organization, the Bolsheviks considered the YBP to be a potentially more advantageous group as it was better organized, had a longer history, and would be more acceptable to the Bukharan population. The Turkkommissiia viewed the Old Jadids as too traditional for their own

designs. For lack of a more suitable alternative, the Bolsheviks began courting the Young Bukharans in a serious manner. Perhaps in the future, a cadre of devout indigenous Communists with an established party system would exist. Until that time, the nationalist elite would have to do.⁹³

In January 1920, the Bolsheviks sent a mission to Bukhara to negotiate conditions for (1) allowing the BCP to return to the Emirate and as a legal political entity; (2) the Bolshevik military units to have permission to enter the Emirate on the grounds that Basmachi units were based in it; and (3) furthering of economic agreements between the parties.⁹⁴ It was no surprise that the Emir rejected these conditions. With the only recourse being the overthrow of the Emir, the Bolsheviks renewed their interest in the Young Bukharans. With the approval of the RCP(b), the YBP began publishing copies of "Uchkun" ("The Spark") in April 1920.⁹⁵ This revolutionary newspaper repeated the

⁹³Carlisle remarks that with the ensuing modernization policies, this embryonic cadre of Uzbek Communists did emerge. He writes that: "It was on them that the main long-term gamble was to be made for successors to the suspect native "bourgeois" intelligentsia." In short, the YBP and BCP members were considered temporary "fellow travellers." In Donald S. Carlisle, "Modernization, Generations, and the Uzbek Soviet Intelligentsia," in The Dynamics of Soviet Politics, edited by Paul Cocks et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp.242-244.

⁹⁴Fraser, "Basmachi -- I," p.46.

⁹⁵The journal's focus indicated the shift in Khodzhaev's thinking towards a more pro-Soviet stance. According to Ishanov, the primary targets of verbal attacks were the Emir and the imperialistic British military

Bolshevik position that the Emir be overthrown and that a new, more progressive government be installed. Khodzhaev writes that:

Another part of the emigre population, who were not united with the communist group and not attached to the other Young Bukharan group that was later formed, organized themselves around the newspaper "Uch-kun," out of which came numerous political works...in the service of soviet institutions and as an organ of popular education, etc.,⁹⁶

The emigre group referred to was none other than Khodzhaev's faction. A letter from L.M. Karakhan, a member of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to Lenin dated May 21 further emphasized the drastic need for change. It stated that:

Our policy...up to now has not produced any results---Bukhara is not with us but against us. Therefore in full agreement with the Turk Commission, our representatives in Tashkent, we propose to liquidate the Emirate and to establish in Bukhara a democratic republic, putting at its head the Young Bukharans (now Communists).⁹⁷

To begin this process, Khodzhaev called to order the Revolutionary Committee of the YBP shortly after his return from Moscow.⁹⁸ In July of 1920, Izvestiia ran an article

involvement in Central Asia. See Ishanov, BNSR, p.175.

⁹⁶Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.59. Khodzhaev later identifies the Young Bukharan group that later developed as being the conservative faction in the YBP, under the leadership of Mukhitdinov.

⁹⁷Quoted in Ishanov, BNSR, p.165.

⁹⁸Khodzhaev discusses this in K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.58ff.

"On the BCP difficulty in participating among the Bukharan people," which remarked that the restrictive environment of the Emirate prevented any social progress and opportunities for reform.⁹⁹ The "political education" of the YBP was complete: they were now advocating a radical stance quite different from the more moderate 1917 manifesto or the earlier calls for educational reforms. For several months, this newspaper rivalled the BCP's paper, "Kutulush" ("Liberation"), which supported full unity with the RSFSR.¹⁰⁰

In light of this established division, the RCP(b) made one last attempt at unifying the parties. On June 14, the Revolutionary Committee of the YBP published a reform manifesto. Two weeks later, the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the RCP(b) Central Committee rejected the Young Bukharan position on the grounds that it was based too heavily upon the Shari'at.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the RCP(b) did recommend that this program was a viable foundation upon which to construct a unified revolutionary party. Khodzhaev was strongly encouraged to join the BCP and effectively

⁹⁹Izvestiia 165 (July 25, 1920).

¹⁰⁰Nazarov, p.363.

¹⁰¹Donald Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy (selected works), volume I," Kritika VIII/1 (Fall 1971):58.

merge the entire YBP with the Communists.¹⁰² Throughout the Summer months, the unification process began. On August 1, the YBP and the BCP formally met to lay the foundations for merger.¹⁰³

The Bolsheviks argued that in the best interests of the progressive forces in Bukhara the factions should submit to one leadership. This did not take place without a struggle. The BCP, knowing full well that their numbers would be dwarfed by the influx of Young Bukharans, protested to Moscow but to no avail.¹⁰⁴ At the Congress, the Communists shouted down Khodzhaev as he tried to speak, and attempted as much as possible to delay the merger.¹⁰⁵ By the 10th of August, under the watchful eye of the Russian representatives, the groups united in the newly-revised Bukharan Communist Party (the name change was primarily to appease the Bolshevik leadership). Although the name change favored the old Communists, the leadership composition favored the Jadids. Khodzhaev was appointed head of the new

¹⁰²Vakhabov and Zevelev note that although Khodzhaev "willingly joined" the BCP, he retained his bourgeois tendencies and sympathies. pp.372-373.

¹⁰³Fifty-three delegates attended, with two-thirds being YBP members. Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi NSR, p.118.

¹⁰⁴Realistically, among the active members, the Young Bukharans outnumbered the Bukharan Communists by about four to one. This, in spite of the fact that the BCP claimed to have 1500 active members in its ranks. Istoriia bukhary, p.203.

¹⁰⁵Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, p.70.

"Revolutionary Committee (Revkom)" and an August 16th, opened the First Congress of the BCP (actually the Fourth for the older faction).¹⁰⁶ Two weeks later, on the eve of the Bukharan Revolution, a declaration of unity was published.¹⁰⁷ Khodzhaev observes that this unification was inevitable and positive. He writes that:

Speaking frankly, although the merger with the Young Bukharan group was damaging to the affairs of the party, no Young Bukharans considered it necessary to preserve the Young Bukharan group and not merge with the Communists, just because they themselves were not Communists.¹⁰⁸

For Khodzhaev, the merger was damaging only insofar as the autonomy of the Young Bukharan party was compromised. In return, they now had a more stable foundation and ally from which they could draw a sizeable military force. This force, Khodzhaev believed, was necessary to overthrow the Emir.

The Bolsheviks acted quickly after settling the issue of group unity in Bukhara. Having staged a military takeover of Khiva earlier in the year, Red Army troops were

¹⁰⁶Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.73-74. This older faction, as previously noted, was based in Samargand and was comprised of individuals not closely associated with Young Bukharans. The disputes that arose because of this merger carried into the formative period of the BPSR as well as the Uzbek SSR. In the latter case, the division between the reformist intellectuals and the Communists was personified by the Khodzhaev-Ikramov rivalry.

¹⁰⁷Ishanov, BNSR, p.177.

¹⁰⁸Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.181-182.

already poised on the border.¹⁰⁹ On August 23rd, demonstrations occurred in the Chardjui region, with the Young Bukharan/BCP forces calling for demonstrations in several border cities and for Bolshevik assistance. It is presumed that these "calls" were from agents or supporters of the Bolsheviks, since Frunze's response was almost immediate. In spite of opposition from Mukhitdinov and others who called for moderation, the BCP actively supported the Bolshevik moves.¹¹⁰ Under pressure, they ceased their protests and promised to adopt fully the Communist platform if the Revolution was successful.¹¹¹ That same day, the BCP leadership published its "Appeal of the Bukharan Revolutionary Committee to the Workers of Bukhara," in an effort to gain popular support.¹¹²

With an estimated 7,000 troops, Frunze marched on the city of Old Bukhara.¹¹³ The YBP/BCP immediately sided with the Red Army, and on September 2, 1920, entered the city of

¹⁰⁹For a discussion of the Khivan campaign, see Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi NSR, pp.95-108.

¹¹⁰See Fraser, p.48, and Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, pp.75-76 for the rivalry between Khodzhaev and Mukhitdinov. These two were to become bitter enemies within the ranks of the Bukharan elite. I will discuss this conflict in chapter six.

¹¹¹Pipes, p.184.

¹¹²Izvestiia 210 (September 29, 1920).

¹¹³Estimated vary on the troop involvement. Nazarov, for example, quotes the figure at 9,500 (p.382). For a listing of the units deployed, see Istoriia bukhary, p.204.

Old Bukhara as victors.¹¹⁴ The devastation of the city was great, as the Russians sought to wipe out any possible sources of resistance.¹¹⁵ That same day, the Emir and his retinue fled the city for the territories under Basmachi control. He was able to elude his potential captors and entered the camp of the Basmachi leader, Ibrahim Bek. Although out of power, the Emir was to remain a key figure in the years to come as a financial supporter of the Basmachi.¹¹⁶ In an article published in Izvestiia, it was announced that:

The revolution in Bukhara has triumphed. The two capitals, centers at once strategic and commercial, are in the hands of Bukharan Red troops and Muslim regiments of the Red Army. Because of Bukhara's religious character, the revolution will have considerable importance for the whole of Central Asia.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴"Bukhara sovetskaia respublika," Izvestiia (September 4, 1920), p.2; Frunze's army faced a force estimated at between 27,000 and 40,000. The quality of training and equipment more than offset the numerical imbalance. See Nazarov, p.382; Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi NSR, p.123; and "The Red Army in Turkestan," p.43.

¹¹⁵For an account of the battle itself, and the destruction of the city of Bukhara, see Glenda Fraser, "Alim Khan and the Fall of the Bokharan Emirate in 1920," Central Asian Survey 7/4 (1988):47-61.

¹¹⁶Mandel notes that the Emir, aware of the impending disaster, fled with his personal fortune of over \$175,000,000 worth of bullion and gems. See William Mandel, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia (New York: Dial Press, 1944), p.99; Kisch argues that he hastily fled with only a retinue of "British mercenaries." See Egon Erwin Kisch, Changing Asia, English translation by Rita Reil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), p.59.

¹¹⁷Izvestiia, September 4, 1920, quoted by Carrere d'Encausse, p.165.

The political transformation of the new government went quickly. Faizulla Khodzhaev took the chairmanship of the council of Nazirs and quickly formed a government dominated by Young Bukharan members. After the takeover, the YBP and the BCP officially merged as agreed on the 11th of September. On the 14th, the Revolutionary Committee established itself in Old Bukhara.¹¹⁸ Within a month, the First All-Bukharan Qurultai (Congress) convened to create a permanent political structure for the new Bukharan People's Soviet Republic.¹¹⁹ The revolution was a success. In just a few years, Khodzhaev went from being a junior member of an intellectual movement that advocated increased educational opportunities, to the political leader of the Bukharan nation-state. At least for now, he had the support of the Bolshevik Party and could quell any minor opposition forces against him that might exist in the BCP. Obtaining the full support from the peasantry and the areas of the country controlled by the Basmachi was to be a different matter.

VII. CONCLUSION: FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV IN POWER

The Young Bukharans, who had been critical of the Emir's conservative ways, now had their chance to enact sweeping political, economic, and social reforms. As seen, it took several attempts before the Bukharan intelligentsia

¹¹⁸Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi NSR, p.128.

¹¹⁹Becker, pp.294-295.

could claim a victory in their struggle with the Emir. The early attempts that involved the Provisional Government and later the Tashkent Soviet under Kolesov failed primarily because of the minimal support offered by these two groups and the lack of cohesiveness in the YBP. It was not until the YBP allied with the Bolsheviks in Moscow that a success was possible. This assistance was not without a price. With Bolshevik soldiers stationed permanently in the BPSR, ties with Moscow were strong from the start. Thus, the RCP(b) could and would influence the BCP in spite of the latter's desire to remain autonomous. Fainsod remarks that "the Bolshevik forces also invaded Bokhara, drove out its emir, proclaimed a Soviet Bokhara, and transferred effective power to an embryonic and none too reliable Bokharan Communist Party led by Faizulla Khodzhayev."¹²⁰ There is much truth in this statement for the actual motor for change was the Red Army and not the Bukharan Communist Party. If the BCP wanted to fully act out its own reform measures, it would have to take the "Bolshevik perspective" into consideration.

The newly-created Bukharan People's Soviet Republic was to face numerous problems. Although Emir Alim was deposed as the official ruler of the country, he was still an influential figure, joining the growing Basmachi movement in

¹²⁰Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.359.

the eastern regions of the country. As the anti-Soviet Basmachi forces increased in strength, his ability to challenge the Young Bukharans increased in turn. In addition, the Young Bukharans faced the dilemma of obtaining the support of the peasant population. The economy was in shambles as a result of the events of 1917-1920, and in order to transform the country into an economically self-sufficient system, much work would be required. If the BCP had any hope of success, it would have to somehow make the reform package appealing to the Bukharan peasantry. Unfortunately, this citizenry was mostly illiterate, mistrustful of the central government, and skeptical of the religious commitment of the Young Bukharans. The peasants remained oblivious to reformist programs, declarations, and even revolution. And with party divisions just under the surface of a paper-thin veil of unity, the chance that an elite-mass alliance appeared slim. And if we are to accept the position that such an alliance is critical for the establishment of a national identity, the establishment of this alliance should be a primary goal of the Bukharan leadership.

The events of 1920-1924 would continually test Khodzhaev and the reformists. For Faizulla Khodzhaev, the situation could not be more promising. At least on record, he had played an important role in the revolution and could not be accused of doubting the capabilities of the Bolshevik

Army. Indeed, of the entire group of BCP members, Khodzhaev was one of the few that could actually make this claim. Other members of the party, the Old Jadids who reluctantly joined it, for example, would carry with them the stigma of being "questionable" allies. For now, Khodzhaev's loyalty was not in doubt. At twenty-four, he was now in charge of the reformist government in his native Bukhara. The Emirate of Bukhara had been a collection of feudal entities and peoples that owed allegiance to the Muslim faith and the Emir himself. The concept of a "Bukharan people" did not exist. The creation of this was to be the first task of the new government.

CHAPTER FIVE -- FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV AND THE BUKHARAN PEOPLES' SOVIET REPUBLIC: THE FORGING OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY (1920-1924)

I. INTRODUCTION

Whereas the Emir was content to run a governmental system that placed little importance on a national identity as opposed to a religious identity, the BPSR was specifically aimed at the creation of a national identity that centered around a political "state" structure. Unfortunately, the Bukharan state consisted of numerous distinct tribal and ethnic groups that fell mostly under the rubric of the Islamic community, which possessed different languages and customs. According to official Soviet statistics, the ethnic composition of Bukhara was as follows: 50.7% Uzbek, 31.1% Tadzhik, 10.3% Turkmen, 2.2% Kazakh, and 5.7% others (Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, etc.,).¹ The task for the Bukharan leadership was to unify these disparate groups into ones that would identify with the BPSR. As noted in chapter two, the intelligentsia often determines the development and ultimate success of the formation of a national identity. Prior to 1920, there was little reason to believe that the Jadidists could accomplish

¹As noted in chapter three, the sedentary population was sometimes referred to as "sarts." Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana, vol.1 (1917-1924), (Tashkent: Akademia Nauk UzSSR, 1960), p.153. For a detailed demographic survey of the various ethnic groups, see Ian M. Matley, "Ethnic Groups of the Bukharan State ca.1920 and the Question of Nationality," in The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp.134-142.

this objective. The 1920 Revolution altered the situation and signalled a new phase in the development of the Jadidist elite. After years of pushing for reforms, they were now in a position to direct and shape the political, economic, and social aspects of Bukharan society. They believed that the only way to wean the population from the older, more traditional identification was to implement structured and efficient policies that would modernize Bukhara. Thus, in order to create a modern national identification, the Bukharans first had to create a national structure. The education, economic, and political reforms of the subsequent years suggest that this was the Jadidists' intention.

The period of 1920 to 1924 also marks a new stage in the career of Faizulla Khodzhaev. Khodzhaev had worked his way up through the Young Bukharan movement and had become a leader of the majority faction. His previous training and experience made him receptive to Russian assistance in the building of the Bukharan state. His willingness to cooperate with the Russians created divisions in the ranks of the Bukharan leadership. This, in turn, meant that Khodzhaev was to spend a significant amount of time on settling inter-party disputes instead of focusing on greater issues of state. It is in the capacity as head of state that Khodzhaev begins to exhibit the characteristics of an elite leader attempting to impose a national identity upon the people of Bukhara. This effort is cut short by the

dissolution of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic in 1924 and the creation of the Uzbek SSR. In spite of this abrupt end, we can view the years 1920 to 1924 as ones in which a truly indigenous effort at nation-building took place, with Khodzhaev as a key political actor.

II. THE FORMATION OF THE BPSR GOVERNMENT: 1920

By 1920, the Bolsheviks had the Kazakh and Turkestan regions under control and could now consolidate their power in Central Asia. Lenin's theory of national self-determination was an open-ended policy that allowed for changes in its interpretation and implementation. Carrere d'Encausse writes that:

Lenin's theory comprises two elements which co-exist only with difficulty: first the right to self-determination up to and including separation, which seems to imply that the nation is a concept as important as that of class and that it is a lasting concept; secondly, at the same time Lenin opposed the idea of a national culture as a distinctive trait of nations -- it was for him an invention of the ruling classes -- and recognized only the international culture of the workers' movement. Once the ruling class is expelled, the masses recognize their solidarity in the framework of an international culture, national cultures having no more support and the right of secession loses all significance. It is the right to unify which matters.²

In the case of Bukhara, it was important for the Bolsheviks to allow the Bukharan Communist Party leeway in its own

²Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Bolsheviks and the National Question (1903-1929)," Socialism and Nationalism, vol.III, edited by Eric Cahm and Vladimir Claude Fisera (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), p.119.

domestic policies. If the Bukharan intelligentsia could create a social and political structure more in line with a bourgeois structure, then the transition to socialism would be made that much easier. In addition, until a new cadre of leaders more loyal to the Bolsheviks emerged, the Jadidists had to be retained. If the Bolshevik leadership hoped to rid themselves of the nationalist Jadidists, they would have to make short-term concessions.³

The Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of the East that convened in Baku in September of 1920 highlighted this policy of allowing indigenous elites freedom to operate while remaining under the tutelage of Moscow.⁴ Under the guidance of the Communist International, the leaders of the Congress declared that the Asian peoples were enslaved by the European and had to rise up. The exhortations

³In addition to consolidating power in Central Asia itself, it was suggested that the Bolshevik conduct in the region could translate into increased influence in Asia as a whole. In a letter dated November 13, 1919 to the Turkestan Commission, Lenin wrote that: "The establishment of satisfactory relations with the peoples of Turkestan is for the Russian Socialist Federated Republic, without exaggeration, of tremendous and world-wide historical significance....[and] will have a practical effect upon all the peoples of Asia, upon the colonies of the world, upon hundreds of millions of people." V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. XXIV, p.531, as quoted in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East: 1920-1927, a documentary survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.160.

⁴For a detailed look at the Baku Congress and its affect on the Muslim regions of Revolutionary Russia, see Cosroe Chaqueri, "The Baku Congress," Central Asian Survey II/2 (September 1983):89-107.

implicitly added a national element to the traditional class element of Marxist thought. Consequently, the nationalist movements in Central Asia viewed the resolutions of unifying national and class struggles as a de facto approval of their own objectives. In effect, the Baku Congress was the "green light" for the Bukharan Communist Party to continue its policies of nation-building.⁵ However, it should also be stressed that the Congress reinforced the supremacy of the Russian Communist Party (bolshevik) in the international communist movement. Furthermore, the RCP(b) would, have to closely monitor those communist organizations that were still "too immature and inexperienced," such as the Bukharan Communist Party. Aminova, in her study on Uzbek economic development, defends this strategy and remarks that: "alien class elements from the feudal, bourgeois and tsarist official strata also managed to penetrate the [Bukharan] Party ranks."⁶ This position was to justify the frequent purges and party restructuring that took place in the following years. In addition, it sent a clear signal that, in spite of its nominal independence, the BPSR was not soon going to be completely free from RSFSR control.

⁵Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, translated by Martin Sokolinsky and Henry a. LaFarge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), p.14.

⁶R.Kh. Aminova, Changes in Uzbekistan's Agriculture (1917-1929), translated by V.A. Epshtein and B.N. Iunkov (Moscow: "Nauka," 1974), p.24.

It was under these circumstances that the Bukharan Communist Party's Revolutionary Committee convened on September 1 to found the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic. As previously noted, Faizulla and 'Usman Khodzhaev, along with Abdul Hamid Arifov, set up this committee to oversee the organization of governmental responsibilities.⁷ The committee also included the veteran Young Bukharans Najib Husainov, Alimdzan Akchurin, Sabirjan Iusupov, and Kari Pulatov.⁸ The group did not officially meet until the 3rd, when they were able to confidently declare a victory over the Emir's forces. Khodzhaev reflected on this event:

...the workers and deghons of Uzbekistan firmly know that the Jadidists, as such, had long since ceased being revolutionaries, and friends of the people, and at no time had allied with the working class....The revolutionary struggle of the working class and all laborers, in the end, was unified and led by the revolutionary party -- the great Leninist party of the Bolsheviks.⁹

Whether he had actually abandoned his Jadidist past is questionable in light of the fact that two days later, Khodzhaev delivered a speech entitled "On Recompensing the Military Units of the RSFSR." In it, he acknowledged the crucial role that the Red Army played in the Bukharan

⁷Faizulla Khodzhaev, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare (Tashkent: Uzbeksoi gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1926), p.76.

⁸A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev: Ocherk zhizni i deiatel'nosti (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), p.28; and Bukharskaia narodnaia sovetskaia respublika (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1969), p.197.

⁹Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.194.

Revolution. What is important about this speech is that in it, he explicitly argued for a Bukharan solution to the domestic reforms of the Republic.¹⁰ Khodzhaev's supporters, especially his uncle 'Usman Khodzhaev, strongly advocated a restructuring of the state and society that would reflect their demands of 1917.¹¹ These reforms included some land redistribution, changes in the educational system, and the development of a secular leadership. It appears that the tension between cooperating with the Bolsheviks and forging a new identity was a problem at the BPSR's inception.

Almost from the start, opposition to Khodzhaev emerged. If Khodzhaev represents the mainstream "reformist" elite member as defined in chapter two, opposition can be seen from both the assimilationist and traditional elite. The old Bukharan Communist Party, that traced its roots to the Communist Party of Turkestan, criticized Khodzhaev's leadership for not going far enough in his calls for reform. They argued that the spirit of the revolution was being diluted by the centrist reformers as the latter were not calling for an immediate expropriation of the landholdings of the religious leaders and old nobility. The Bolshevik

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹All of the documented accounts note the significant role played by 'Usman Khodzhaev. Interestingly, Olaf Caroe remarks that 'Usman was actually the leader of the BCP, not Faizulla. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p.118.

government had pressured these individuals into allying with the Young Bukharan Party. The forced merger of 1920 did not translate into an acceptance of the more moderate Jadidist ideals, and did not prevent the old communists from maintaining their own separate organizations.¹² Not much is known of the actual power structure of these underground communists, except that the key figures were Mukhtar Saidzhanov, Iakub Zade, Azimjan Husainov, Aminov, and Akchurin.¹³ In an effort to appease these individuals, Khodzhaev included a number of them in his Council of Nazirs. Although they did not have a significant number of positions at the national level, the "left opposition,"¹⁴ as Khodzhaev called the old communists, remained a force at the local level. The official Soviet history of Uzbekistan concludes that YBP/BCP membership increased to more than 14,000 with the inclusion of these separate units.¹⁵

The question that the Bolsheviks, especially V.V.

¹²A.I. Ishanov, Bukharskaia narodnaia sovetskaia respublika (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1969), p.233. Hereafter cited as BNSR.

¹³R. Vaidyanath, The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics: A Study of Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1936 (New Delhi: People's Publishing House [P] Ltd., 1967), pp.124-5. The last two were also members of the Revolutionary Committee as a concession for BCP participation in the party's unification process.

¹⁴This "left opposition" should not be confused with the Left Opposition that challenged Lenin in 1921.

¹⁵Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR, vol.3, (Tashkent: "Fan," 1967), p.187,fn31.

Kuibyshev, the recently-appointed plenipotentiary for Bukhara, had to address was how soon a real merger of the parties could take place, for until the revised BCP could successfully function as one coherent, revolutionary party, the prospects for Russian control of Bukhara remained dim.¹⁶ An associate of the leftists was the Turkestan ASSR revolutionary from Tashkent, Akmal Ikramov. Although he was not to be influential in the BPSR, Ikramov was to become a key political figure in the Uzbek SSR. During the years 1920 to 1924, Ikramov was active in the Turkestan Communist Party, and later became the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. As will be seen, Ikramov's lack of ties with the Jadidist movement, and later the Young Bukharans, made him an attractive alternative to Khodzhaev. He did not have preconceived notions of Bukharan independence and was, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, more receptive to their ideas.¹⁷

Of greater concern for Khodzhaev was the traditional

¹⁶Vaidyanath, pp.127-128. Vaidyanath remarks that Kuibyshev played a dual and contradictory role in Bukhara: "On the one hand, as the representative of the RSFSR, he assured the new Bukharan government that his state respected the complete independence of Bukhara and on the other hand, as the representative of the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International, he exhorted the party and Government of Bukhara to hasten Bukhara's socialist transformation."

¹⁷Ikramov will be a key figure in the following chapter. For further information on him, see M.G. Vakhobov and A.I. Zevelev (eds), Revoliutsionary, vozhaki mass (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1967).

opposition from the Right under the leadership of Abdul Kadir Mukhitdinov. Mukhitdinov, as one of the few rightists that held an important governmental positions, feared that Khodzhaev was driving the BPSR into too close an alliance with the Russians and would inevitably sacrifice Bukharan independence for Khodzhaev's own political aims. This dispute took on both a personal and ideological character which was noted by outside observers.¹⁸ For example, Alexandre Barmine, an emissary from Moscow, noted that:

The Young Bokhara Party did not inspire confidence. It was divided into two groups based on political and blood affiliations -- the Khodjaev, led by Faycoulla Khodjaev, and the Moukhedinov. The Khodjaev seemed to be the most modern in outlook and more inclined to be loyal to us.¹⁹

¹⁸Khodzhaev's own brief biography of Mukhitdinov is both bitter and sarcastic. Khodzhaev notes that Mukhitdinov strongly pushed for greater ties to Britain, Germany, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, in lieu of those with the RSFSR. No other documentation repeats this claim. See Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.1 (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970), pp.457-458.

¹⁹Alexandre Barmine, Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat: Twenty Years in the Service of the USSR, translated by Gerald Hopkins, reprint of 1938 edition (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1973), p.127. Barmine's preference for Khodzhaev is supported by his descriptions of the rivals. He writes that:

If it were not for the ceaseless energy of Faycoulla Khodjaev, the Turkish sympathies of the Moukhedin group would long ago have gained the day...

Khodjaev was so small that he was sometimes nicknamed "the Lenin of the Uzbeks,"...He alone was capable of devising terms in which the little revolution of Bokhara and its big brother of Russia could understand one another...

His rival, Moukhedinov, an Oriental of the traditional type, received me squatting on his heels, dressed in silken robes, in a dark little room of the Emir's palace. (pp.132-133).

It is evident that Mukhitdinov had a significant personal following and was thus too powerful to have removed from office with part of his power-base being the emerging Uzbek literary movement, the Chagatai gurungi.²⁰ It appears that the two differed in what they considered important for the BPSR. Mukhitdinov represented the values of the old Jadidist movement, emphasizing education and cultural revival. Khodzhaev, on the other hand, limited his concerns to secular political issues such as economic reform and foreign policy. This division within the ranks of the BCP would eventually damage its standing with the RCP(b). For the present, with Mukhitdinov in a position of power, Khodzhaev could not ignore this challenge. Thus, before the BPSR Council of Nazirs even held its first meeting, forces preparing to challenge Khodzhaev's power had already formed.

In spite of these divisions, it was with great zeal that the Bukharan Provisional government established a permanent political structure. At the national level, the Council of Nazirs acted as the executive and administrative branch. The Council of Peoples' Representatives, or the

²⁰For a discussion of the role Mukhitdinov played in the Chagatai gurungi, see Hisao Komatsu, "The Evolution of Group Identity among Bukharan Intellectuals in 1911-1928: An Overview," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (the oriental library), No.47 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1989), p.129.

Shura, was the elected parliament.²¹ According to Khodzhaev, the key figures in the new government were as follows: himself as President of the Council of Nazirs and Nazir of Foreign Affairs; Mirza Abdul Kadir Mukhitdinov as Prime Minister; 'Usman Khodzhaev as Nazir of Finance; Ata Khodzhaev as Nazir of the Interior; Kari Pulatov as Nazir of Education and Religion; Mukhammil al-Din Makhdum as Nazir of Justice; and Abdul Hamid Arifov, the old communist, as Nazir of War.²² Not much is known of actual responsibilities and activities of this executive leadership. However, it does seem clear that it made the key decisions of state and often advocated its position throughout the countryside. Khodzhaev personally criss-crossed the countryside from December 10 to January 4 to "announce" the new government to the people.²³

The Council of Peoples' Representatives was supposed to eventually be the legislature that would work with the Council of Nazirs. The CPR, or Shura as it was called, consisted of eighty-five members. Although these were all

²¹For a detailed study of the institutional arrangement, see A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.28-29. The Bolshevik representative, Kuibyshev attended these first meetings as an observer, as noted in A.I. Ishanov, BNSR, p.205.

²²Faizulla Khodzhaev, "K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare i natsional'nogo razmezhevaniia Srednei Azii, chast' vtoraiia," Izbrannye trudy, vol.1, p.217, and Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), pp.126-127.

²³Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.30-31.

appointed individuals, it was envisioned that there would be some form of electoral accountability in the future.

Khodzhaev's faction, the moderates, held seventy-two of the eighty-five seats. The Right and Left split the remainder, possessing five and eight seats, respectively.²⁴ Again, not much is known about the actual duties of this organization, as it was hastily formed and, as it only met for four years, was not able to fully define its functions. In spite of this, Faizulla Khodzhaev expected that the Shura would initiate the creation of a rational legal state in Bukhara. This, in turn, would rectify the injustices of the Emir's government. Khodzhaev once remarked that Emir's political "system" consisted of:

No legislative organs besides the will of the Emir, no laws besides the religious laws of the Shariat, no guarantee or inviolability of the personal and property rights existed in Bukhara...The administration was carried out by the Emir's officials who were not answerable to the people. Under these conditions, corruption bloomed in full.²⁵

In contrast, the Shura and the Council of Nazirs would afford the people of Bukhara a more receptive government. In theory, this government would address the issues of social, political, and economic concern that the Emir's government ignored. What made the new political system

²⁴Edward Allworth, Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.246.

²⁵Faizulla Khodzhaev, "O mlado-bukhartsakh," Istoriik marksist 1(1926):123-124.

suspect from the beginning was the complete lack of outside actors. All of the Nazirs and the members of the Shura were either directly linked to, or supportive of the BCP. Given the fact that the revolution was engineered by the BCP, this arrangement made it unlikely that a credible opposition force could emerge in the near future. If a truly representative system were to emerge, this would have to change.

The power of the BCP over the Shura was evident not only in the personnel overlap, but in the timing of the respective congresses. For the next four years, the BCP would meet just prior to, and sometimes after, the Shura's sessions. This began on October 2, 1920, when the First Congress of the BCP opened. 1950 delegates from the various regions of Bukhara attended the session.²⁶ Among the invited guests was the Bolshevik representative Kuibyshev. Khodzhaev's speech, "On the International Scene and the Increasing Importance of Socialist Russia" highlighted the event. Also read at the congress was an official greeting from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR.²⁷

²⁶The exact numbers from each city and region are listed in Ishanov, BNSR, p.212.

²⁷"Privetskaia telegramma," Istoriia bukharskoi narodnoi sovetskoi respubliki (1920-1924gg.): sbornik dokumentov (Tashkent: "Fan," 1976), p.61.

After the First Conference of the BCP, which was held shortly before the opening session of the Shura, the party leadership published a listing of the specific duties of the BCP.²⁸ On December 30, Khodzhaev wrote "A Circular Letter of the Central Committee of the Bukharan Communist Party to the Entire Party Organization on the Success in the Area of Party Structuring," in which he noted that the BCP would adopt a similar organizational structure to that of the RCP(b). This is further discussed in a manifesto published on February 23, 1921.²⁹ These aspirations were spelled out in the fundamental text of the BPSR that was ratified at the First Congress of the Toilers of Bukhara. Although work on the official constitution began as early as October 8th, 1920, it was not passed into legislation until the Second Quraltai of the Bukharan Soviets on September 25, 1921.³⁰

In spite of these initial calls for greater political participation, it remained evident that the BCP dominated the Bukharan political system, and furthermore, as the

²⁸Ishanov, BNSR, p.212-215.

²⁹These two party documents are general in scope. The second, the "Resolution and Decree of the I Session of the BCP," specifically discusses the responsibilities of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee. In addition, there is even mentioning of the national minorities of Bukhara. IBNSR:SD, pp.83-84; 86-88; 92-104.

³⁰Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), p. 131; Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.35 and "Bukhorida halq revoliutsiiasining ghalabasi," Obshchestvennie nauki v Uzbekistane 8/1970:20. According to these accounts, Khodzhaev was an adamant supporter of the constitution.

circle of individuals around Faizulla Khodzhaev dominated the BCP, we can assume that from the start, the Khodzhaev clique was the instrumental political force in Bukhara.

In spite of the BCP authority, and his membership in it, Khodzhaev focused most of his attention on the activities of the Council of Nazirs. And, whether it was in the BCP or the government, he faced a crucial issue: how could he reconcile his own views with those of the traditional society of Bukhara that they now governed? In an effort to forge ties with the general population of Bukharan, the BCP engineered a constitution that stressed the notion of "popular sovereignty." This gesture to the peasantry was the initial step in building mass support. In addition, the religious rights of the Bukharan subjects were respected, for Article 26 declared that: "no law of the Republic can be in contradiction with the fundamental principle of Islam."³¹ Furthermore, the traditional local governmental structure also remained intact. The system of rural elders and aksakals remained, with numerous instances of individuals retaining their same positions that they held before the revolution. Indeed, the local political institutions paralleled the ones that existed under the Emir's system. This deliberate move by the Bukharan Communists facilitated the reform measures by not upsetting

³¹Carrere d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), p.168.

the local population.³² Carrere d'Encausse explains this lack of major structural reform by stating that:

The situation was really just a consequence of the fundamental difficulties besetting the infant state. The revolution had been carried out in an extremely backward country -- a country permanently threatened by the demands of the various national groups that made it up. The Jadids who came to power in September 1920 had been obliged to take account of these problems. The institutions established and solutions adopted reflected this situation.³³

In spite of these structural compromises, Khodzhaev embarked upon a campaign to increase individual rights for Bukharans. Voting participation, for example, was expanded to include women. Under Article 58, all citizens eighteen and older could participate in the political process. Individual freedoms, such as thought, expression, the press, and assembly, were also guaranteed by the constitution.

In addition, there was a growing concern over the rights of the various non-Uzbeks in the new republic. The two groups of particular concern were the Tadzhiks and Turkmen. As early as the October 1920 Qurultai, Khodzhaev proposed greater cultural autonomy for the Turkmen in exchange for their support of the Bukharan government.³⁴ As the Bukharan government's primary concern was the economic and political stability of the state, the issue of minority

³²Allworth, pp.246-247.

³³Carrere d'Encausse, p.170.

³⁴Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.38, and "Bukharoda halq," p.21.

rights was never fully addressed. It was not until 1923 that the Turkmen and Tadzhik regions were declared autonomous political regions. Even then, the disruption caused by the Basmachi rebellion prevented any formal delimitation of national regions. This was not to take place until the 1924 national delimitation that resulted in the dissolution of the BPSR altogether.³⁵

In his attempt to create a state structure, Khodzhaev was successful in at least blending traditional elements at the local level with more modern ones at the national level. A constitution and political organs developed in direct response to the earlier programs of the Young Bukharans. At the same time, the BPSR leadership did not eliminate the systems of village elders and local leaders. This policy went so far as the recognition of local beys and political bosses who were still influential leaders in their respective regions of the country. During the Basmachi conflict, this posturing for local elite support would prove costly for Khodzhaev as he would be perceived by Moscow years later as one who catered to the "remnants of feudal society." Indeed, at this early stage in his career, Khodzhaev began to exhibit an ability to select allies and

³⁵Faizulla Khodzhaev, "V vostochnuyu bukharyu dlia ukrepleniia partiinikh i sovetskikh organov," IBSNR: SD, pp.124-125. Also see Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), chapter 2.

political position that he believed would help his goal of power consolidation. And it must be emphasized that at this early stage, power consolidation was more important to Khodzhaev than fostering a national identity. However, such maneuvering puts into question Khodzhaev's commitment to a consistent political reform agenda. This tendency on the part of Khodzhaev will be exemplified repeatedly in his policy choices over the next four years.

III. ISSUES IN BPSR REFORM

Khodzhaev's government inherited an economy that was in shambles. Although accurate figures are not available, it is estimated that the economic output of 1920 in such products as cotton and rice were at 20% of the pre-war levels.³⁶ Given the additional need to gain the support of the peasant population, the Council of Nazirs opted to first focus on land redistribution and, in the process, carry out the earlier 1917 program. This included the nationalization of the Emir's lands and their redistribution to the landless *dehqons*.³⁷ The objective of this "peasant-first" policy was politically sound. The Jadidists, having previously failed to gain the support of the peasantry in 1918, needed to convince this same population that their government would actually work for the peasants of Bukhara. They extolled

³⁶Ishanov, BNSR, p.142.

³⁷Ibid., p.241.

the view that the despotic days of the Emir were over and the BPSR was a progressive step in the future of all Bukharans. Khodzhaev declared that for the new government:

...working with the Communist Party and the Soviet power, it will be possible to rid the country of above mentioned remnants of feudalism and even meet the basic needs of the people. Nevertheless, Soviet power will be necessary to begin this work, work, which is difficult to even look at.. The popular masses have waited for action; they have waited for the lightening of their difficult situation.³⁸

Mukhitdinov reiterated this claim in a speech at the First Qurultai. He stressed the anti-populist nature of the Emir's government and its unfair land-ownership practices. These, Mukhitdinov added, would be rectified by a complete and careful re-distribution of arable land to the peasants of Bukhara.³⁹

In February 1921, the Bukharan Council of Nazirs decided to form land committees of dehqons to regulate the transfer of land titles. By February of 1922, they issued a "Decree on Land" that declared all land, water resources, forests and mineral properties to be the exclusive domain of all the Bukharans. Even animal holdings were to be redistributed.⁴⁰ In August 1922, the Third Congress of the Soviets of the BPSR was called to debate the BCP goals

³⁸Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.215.

³⁹Istoriia bukhary: c drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei (Tashkent: "Fan," 1976), p.130.

⁴⁰Aminova, pp.63-64.

outlined above and the possible expansion of agricultural production. At this congress, Khodzhaev made specific calls for the draining of swamp land and the bringing of water from the Amu Darya via canals.⁴¹ He also proposed creation of agricultural schools and increased production of cotton in lands recently retrieved from Basmachi control.⁴²

Although it was agreed that economic reforms were necessary, the question of financial and material support remained. The costs of these projects were estimated at several million rubles, far beyond what the Bukharan government had available.⁴³ As a partial answer, the government offered loans for the landless deghons pending the cooperation of the State Bank system. A problem immediately surfaced as the banks were unwilling and sometimes unable to cover all of the loans promised. Mansurov, Nazir of finance, opted to allocate greater support for industrial development and commercial ventures and, as a result, only about a fifth of the credits were

⁴¹"Polozheniie o pol'zovanii vodami v BNSR," IBNSR: SD, pp.292-3.

⁴²Aminova, pp.65-66. The "retrieving" was primarily by the Soviet Red Army, as will be discussed below.

⁴³For example, a 1923 project to expand the irrigation network of Bukhara was estimated at 1.9 million rubles alone. See "Iz otcheta upravleniia vodnogo khoziaistva BNSR ob itogakh irrigatsionnikh rabot v respublike za 1923/24g," IBSNR: SD, pp.335-340.

given to the poor.⁴⁴ As long as the BPSR had to rely on domestic sources alone, the likelihood of rapid growth did not appear great.

To shore up their deficit, Khodzhaev sanctioned several loans from the RSFSR government in 1921 and 1922. Unfortunately, as the Bukharans were unable to meet the RSFSR repayment demands, either in hard currency or in raw materials, the BPSR only fell further into a cycle of financial crisis. Mansurov's efforts at monetary devaluation had little effect on the downward course of the economy. In sum, the Bukharan economy, due to the ravages of war and an unstable market, was in pathetic shape from the beginning. Without the necessary infrastructure and support to initiate a viable reform policy, the BPSR had no choice but to approach the RSFSR government for increased assistance.

As Nazir of Foreign Affairs, Khodzhaev was the principal actor in these BPSR-RSFSR economic negotiations. In March of 1921, Khodzhaev made two trips to Moscow to discuss the role of the RSFSR in Bukharan politics and economy.⁴⁵ Although the meetings primarily addressed the

⁴⁴R.Kh. Aminova, Agrarnye preobrazovaniia v Uzbekistane (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1965), pp.120-123.

⁴⁵Istorii bukhary, pp.128, 133-135. The March meetings were a direct continuation of discussions held in the previous October, when Kuibyshev and Eliav attended the Bukharan Qurultai. It is interesting to note that later Soviet historiography remarks that Khodzhaev was a natural choice for this role, due to his "nationalist bourgeois"

issue of military assistance in the Basmachi uprising, the question of economic support was of vital importance. Throughout 1921 and 1922, Khodzhaev was in contact with the Russians, Kuibyshev in particular, in efforts to secure temporary loans and material aid.⁴⁶ Apparently Khodzhaev's tactics succeeded, as on June 19, 1922, a long-term agreement regarding a 50 million ruble loan was signed by representatives of both countries.⁴⁷ Furthermore, when the RCP(b) Central Committee created a Central Asian Bureau (called the Sredazburo) in May 1922, Khodzhaev was selected as a member of its Central Executive Committee. By this time, there was discussion of actually subordinating the BCP to the RCP(b), so Khodzhaev's membership on a Russian executive committee was not a complete surprise.⁴⁸

The structural domination of the RSFSR over the BPSR became more apparent at the Second Turkestan Conference held in Tashkent in November 1922. At this conference, which was attended by Khodzhaev, a resolution was passed calling for

tendencies.

⁴⁶For example, in a letter to G.K. Ordzhonikidze dated June 13, 1922, Khodzhaev adamantly requests 1 million rubles to rejuvenate the agricultural sector. Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, pp.430-432.

⁴⁷"Dogovor mezhdru RSFSR i BNSR o zaime v 50 mlrd.rub.," IBNSR: SD, pp.212-215.

⁴⁸The CAB consisted of 10 Russians, 7 Bukharans, and 3 Khorezmians and was theoretically set up to coordinate irrigation and land reclamation policies of the three countries. In actuality, it became yet another vehicle of Russian control. IBNSR: SD, pp.227-228.

the creation of a Central Asian Economic Council. The institution's power was increased at the March 1923 Conference of the Central Asian Republics, at which political ties were added to the economic ones. This organization first met on May 15, 1923, at which time it set the objective of trade regulation and economic development in the three Republics (the Turkestan ASSR, the BPSR, and the KPSR).⁴⁹ As a result of these policy changes, Bukhara's monetary system, transportation network, and telegraph lines among others, were unified with the RSFSR.⁵⁰

It was at these economic meetings that Pozdnyshev, a Russian member of the Central Asian Bureau, raised the question of Bukharan integration into the Soviet Union. This directly stemmed from the CAEC which itself:

...laid down the principle of a common economic policy for the participating states and to this end established an "Economic Council of Central Asia." The currencies, transport systems, and telecommunications of the two peoples republics of Bukhara and Khvarazm were to be integrated into the Russian system. Irrigation,

commerce, agriculture, and planning became a

⁴⁹Ishanov, BNSR, p.320; Kh.Sh. Inoiatov, "Narodno-demokraticeskii stroi BNSR kak predposilka perekhoda k sotsializmu," Obshchestvenie nauki v Uzbekistane 8/1970:31.

⁵⁰On April 30, the Russians formally took over all river transports on the Amu-Darya. On May 31, the customs offices on the borders between these countries was also put under Russian control. Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.308.

common domain for the whole of Central Asia.⁵¹

The transformation of the BPSR from a "partially independent" to a "marginally independent" Republic occurred very quickly. Later Soviet accounts remark that this was a logical process, as the Bolsheviks were preparing the Bukharans for the next stage of economic and social development.⁵² At a plenum of the Central Asian Bureau on January 29, 1923, Khodzhaev supported the role that the RSFSR had played in the Bukharan economy. In contrasting the state of the economy before and after the 1920, he explained that:

However, all of this, it must be remembered, was of a very chaotic character; unorganized, the lack of goods, poverty and control under the activities of individual capital characterized this period of economic development in Bukhara. It is not necessary to remind oneself now of a significant fact -- this was the problem facing the economic union of Bukhara, Khorezm, and Turkestan....[solved by] the initiative of the Turkestan republic and its development of very large measures... that were underestimated in Bukhara.⁵³

Whether this was true or not, it was clear that the power of Khodzhaev and the Council of Nazirs to make any independent decisions was rapidly dissipating. At the same time, Khodzhaev appeared to be accepting of this fate.

⁵¹Quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.183.

⁵²Ishanov, BNSR, p.347.

⁵³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, pp.241-242.

Due to the chaotic state of the country in 1920-1922 and the ever-present violence of the Basmachi, the Bukharan economy was never stabilized. Soloveichik notes drops in imports and exports of such goods as cotton, astrakhan, silk, and fruit by as much as 90% during the 1917-1921 period.⁵⁴ These decreases reflected a more serious drop in production due to the peasant population hoarding what remained, further crippling the national economy. Add to this the devastation of the Basmachi and Red Army activities, and it is no surprise that Khodzhaev would sadly remark: "The misery of the population is much worse under our government than it was in the emir's day."

Demand for education was a consistent policy position of the Young Bukharans. As early as 1921, they began to address the question of mass literacy. The Council of Nazir's first action was to declare Uzbek as the official language of the Republic. Persian had always been the "court language," with Uzbek relegated to a secondary position. This elevation to official status of the Uzbek language allowed greater participation within and identity among the Uzbek majority. This was a significant act, for:

By eliminating Persian -- which was not only the official language of the emirate, but above

⁵⁴Specifically, cotton exports from Bukhara fell from 2,000,000 puds in 1917 to 142,000 puds in 1921. There was also a similar drop from 2,000,000 to 100,000 of astrakhan, and 350,000 to 14,000 of silk during the same period. D. Soloveichik, "Revoliutsionnaia Bukhara," Novyi vostok 2 (1922):272.

all the language of the elite -- and replacing it by Uzbek, the language of the people, the government was signalling clearly its intention to being a people's government and no longer that of a few privileged groups; it was also facilitating social mobility.⁵⁵

The subject of language policy in the BPSR is a difficult one to analyze, because little time was spent on it outside of the initial development of schools. It was not until the Soviet period that the issue of "native-language" schools became a major point of debate. What is known is that Uzbeks comprised only 50% of the total Bukharan population, and thus the national and linguistic rights of the Tadzhiks, Turkmen and Karakalpaks, among others, had to be addressed.⁵⁶ The "Uzbekization" of Bukhara also facilitated social mobility. The previous educational requirements, that only the well-to-do families could afford, were dismantled. In their place arose a new pedagogical philosophy and structure.

The Nazir of Education, Fitrat, was in charge of this reform measure. In line with the 1917 program of the Young Bukharan Party, Fitrat's aimed to create a literate

⁵⁵Carrere d'Encausse, p.172.

⁵⁶Because of the "multi-national" character of the BPSR, Ian Matley concludes that "a combination of ethnic, social, and geographical factors militated against the formation of an overall national identity among the people of the state of Bukhara." This, as will be seen, was a persistent problem for the short-lived BPSR. See Ian Matley, "Ethnic Groups of the Bukharan State Ca.1920 and the Question of Nationality," in Edward Allworth (ed), The Nationality Question, p.141.

populous. To achieve this, Fitrat ordered the setting up of a series of teachers school in the Republic. The aim was to create a class of teachers versed in secular subjects such as mathematics, literature, and languages. Begun in late 1922, the fruits of this labor never appeared. Although the Bukharan government was spending over 25% of the state's budget on education by 1923, the political realities of the Russian centralization and the increasing instabilities within the Republic meant that only basic services were ever provided.⁵⁷ Fierman remarks that in addition to the lack of adequate concern for education, there was an additional lack of native-speakers who were literate enough to carry out the educational reforms.⁵⁸ As late as the Fourth Qurultai, which met from January 15 to 19, 1924, the basic task of eliminating illiteracy was a central concern.⁵⁹ Khodzhaev, in support of these policies, wrote that it was time for

⁵⁷Mandel, p.111. The number of "Illiteracy Liquidation" schools increased from 70 in 1921 to 150 by 1924. The total enrollment topped 15,000 by 1924. Thus, although progress was taking place, it was still at a modest pace. See the Introduction to IBNSR: SD, p.11.

⁵⁸Fierman writes that: "Few of these people had contact with the world beyond the immediate area where they lived. They considered themselves Moslems, members of a particular tribe, or residents of a small geographical area. There was no developed sense of Uzbek identity." To expect that the creation of mass schools would rectify this situation in less than four years was very unlikely. See William Fierman, "Uzbek Feelings of Ethnicity," Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique XXII/2-3 (Aug-Sep 1981):190.

⁵⁹See "Rezoliutsiia IV kurultai bukharskoi kommunisticheskoi partii," IBNSR: SD, pp.141-142.

Bukhara to go beyond the cultural and educational distinctions that had plagued the Emirate. He exhorted that:

In the eyes of our government, there is no distinction between Sunni and Shi'ite, Turkmen and Tadzhik, no difference between Muslim, Russian, and Jew. Our government, on the strengths of its policies, appeals to all three million inhabitants of the Bukharan republic under the red banner of labor, equality, and brotherhood.⁶⁰

In spite of this eloquent idealism, the reality of the situation was that the Bukharan government was not able to address the issues of social concern. However, this was to be a moot point in 1924 as the BPSR would cease to exist and the question of educational reform would be taken over by the Soviet government.

The inability of the Bukharans to fully implement policy goals was also true for judicial reforms and women's rights. In both cases, traditional Islamic custom superseded any attempt to secularize the system. A series of peoples' courts was set up to parallel the qazi system, but never received the necessary support.⁶¹ It is also doubtful that women actually participated in the political activities of the Republic. Statistics are not available, but the 1926-27 Hujum campaign suggests that as late as the Soviet period, women were still secondary citizens in the

⁶⁰Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Bukharskaia sovetskaia respublika i turkmenskii kurulai," Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.325.

⁶¹Istoriia bukharskoi i khorezmskoi narodnykh sovetskikh respublik (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), pp.178-179.

region.⁶²

Due to the constraints of both the Bolshevik protector and the traditional culture, the Jadidist elite had a difficult time in successfully implementing its reform measures. Economically, Bukhara became a nation dependent upon the RSFSR. Socially, it had to create a base from which to develop a sense of national loyalty and "modernicity." Fitrat's effort to create a national educational system was the essential cornerstone of this project. However, with the problem of creating a nation-state from scratch, there never was sufficient time to develop these particular infrastructures. In these pushes for social reform, Khodzhaev is noticeably absent. Part of this can be explained by the fact that as Nazir of Foreign Affairs, Khodzhaev's main focus was on forging a viable working relationship with the RSFSR and quelling the Basmachi rebellion in the provinces of Eastern Bukhara. For him, the issues of social reform seemed minor in comparison. In addition, this absence may begin to establish Khodzhaev as someone less concerned with a national identity as opposed to actual power consolidation. This view is further

⁶²For further discussion of this subject, which is outside of the purview of this dissertation, see Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). To give an indication of how underrepresented women were in Bukhara, Komsomol membership for Bukhara in June 1924 listed 1611 members, with only 51 of them being women. IBNSR: SD, p.162.

developed upon examination of Khodzhaev's action in the military and political arenas.

IV. THE BASMACHI CRISIS AND KHODZHAEV'S RESPONSE

While Faizulla Khodzhaev had little control over the areas of economic and social reform, he did have a great deal of power in the realm of foreign policy and ties with the RSFSR. He was also a key figure in the increasing trade and military relations between the two states and travelled, on numerous occasions, to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterparts. On September 14, 1920, he met with Kuibyshev to obtain a formal RSFSR recognition of the BPSR. This was received almost immediately.⁶³ Later that year, on December 2, Khodzhaev attended the 8th All-Russian Congress in Moscow. At this session, he was introduced as the Bukharan representative and met with top officials in the Russian government. Almost immediately, negotiations for a formalized treaty were underway.⁶⁴

Almost from the start, the Russo-Bukharan relationship was one typified by the former exerting pressure on the latter. The first such instance of this was the previously discussed economic alliance signed by the RSFSR and the BPSR. According to the guidelines, the BPSR was to supply the Russians with cotton, wool, and karakul in return for

⁶³Ishanov, BNSR, pp.206-209 for full text of communique.

⁶⁴Istorii bukhary, p.127.

finished products and energy resources.⁶⁵ From the Russian perspective, trade with the BPSR (and the Khorezmian Peoples' Soviet Republic) called for:

(1) a uniform production plan; (2) a single commodity fund and a uniform import-export plan; (3) a uniform structure and uniform guidance by operating agencies in the conduct of economic relations with non-Soviet states; (4) Soviet support for the development of local industry; and (5) concerted opposition to the foreign bourgeoisie and to the influx of foreign industrial capital.⁶⁶

According to these guidelines, the BPSR was, in effect, quarantined from the outside world. And as the Russians limited financial support for the Republic, the opportunity to reform and create social and economic institutions lessened.

Such exclusionary policies were heavily criticized by 'Usman Khodzhaev, who personally wanted Bukhara to open relations with Afghanistan. For the more conservative members of the Shura, relations with Afghanistan were preferable to those with Russia on the grounds that the former was historically and culturally more familiar.⁶⁷ Thus, on January 21, 1921, a Bukharan delegation headed by Yusuf-Zade travelled to Kabul. However, Soviet involvement

⁶⁵The text of the treaty is in "Soyuznii dogovor mezhdurusskimi i BCR," IBNSR: SD, pp.198-203.

⁶⁶Alexander Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan: 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p.74.

⁶⁷Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," in Allworth, p.248.

in Bukharan-Afghan relations prevented any stable alliance between the Bukharans and the Afghans.⁶⁸ In February 1921, one month after the Yusuf-Zade mission, a treaty was agreed upon by representatives of the RSFSR and Afghanistan, recognizing the borders between the countries and the promise of mutual non-interference in internal affairs.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, most of Khodzhaev's efforts were directed towards formalizing a treaty with the RSFSR, as he continued to believe that this relationship would be most important to the stability of Bukhara. Although the initial talks took place in September of 1920, it was not until March 4, 1921 that the official Russo-Bukharan treaty was signed.⁷⁰ The treaty began with the eloquent phrasing: "By overthrowing the tyranny of capital that oppressed the laboring masses in Russia, the October [old style] revolution has secured for all nations of the former Russian Empire the right of self-

⁶⁸Officially, the Russians and Afghans agreed to open consulates within each others' country and "agreed to recognize the independence and freedom of Bukhara and Khiva [the BPSR and KhPSR], no matter what form of government they might have." "Bukhara-Afghan Relations, 1920-4," Central Asian Review IX/1 (1961):91.

⁶⁹Relations between Russia and Afghanistan would remain fairly hostile, as the latter was a staging ground for independent Basmachi forces. With the waning of the Basmachi successes, and the gradual incorporation of the two Peoples' Soviet Republics into the Soviet system, the Afghan hostility towards the Soviet Union dissipated. Eventually, this translated into a secession of support for the Basmachi by King Amanullah.

⁷⁰Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.32.

determination."⁷¹ The seventeen articles that constituted the treaty addressed the various relations (political, economic, and social) between the two countries. This was to become important later on, as Soviet military intervention was justified by article three, which states that both sides will mutually undertake "to support each other in defending the independence of both republics against the unceasing attacks of the world bourgeoisie and its agents against the very existence of both soviet republics."⁷²

Economic relations were further explicated in a separate Economic Agreement also signed on March 4, 1921. In this agreement, the RSFSR and the BPSR agreed to unify industrial programs and irrigation projects among other things. The treaties of alliance and trade, in effect, granted the RSFSR the right to intervene in the foreign policies of the BPSR and, if, necessary the right to intervene in the republic's domestic affairs. The Bukharan leadership soon found out that these concessions would indeed be major elements in the course of their own policy choices in the coming years. Khodzhaev justified this treaty by noting that:

This document, as we see, well illustrates how far we comrades must still go in addressing

⁷¹Walter Russell Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia (New York: MacMillan Company, 1929), p.261.

⁷²Batsell, p.263.

the questions regarding the character of the revolution and the success of the economic construction...[after all], it is necessary to take in account the level of preparedness of the Bukharan workers themselves.⁷³

Finally, Khodzhaev committed the BPSR to the general guidelines of the Communist International on April 4, 1921.⁷⁴ With diplomatic ties such that Moscow dictated the activities of Bukhara, the latter's internal politics soon took on a decidedly Russian hue.

Why did Khodzhaev seemingly abide by these restrictions? What was the purpose of placing the BPSR under the control of the Russians, when at the same time there was an effort to create an independent nation-state? The answers to these questions can be partially explained by the dominating concern in Khodzhaev's life: the Basmachi rebellion. It can be argued that this collection of rebels effectively diverted the attention of the Bukharan leadership enough to prevent it from initiating any stabilizing measures within the Republic. Furthermore, as the Basmachi rebels were a significant military threat, it was likely he concluded that a sizeable Red Army contingent

⁷³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.225.

⁷⁴Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.33. On April 27, he reported back to the Council of Nazirs to explain the importance of joining this international organization. As Bukhara was a peripheral nation at best to the Bolsheviks, the Comintern affiliation had little bearing on Bukharan politics. Ishanov, BNSR, pp.238-239.

within the borders of Bukhara was necessary.⁷⁵

When he was deposed in September 1920, the Emir, along with a number of leading religious and governmental figures, joined the Basmachi. This group included Tokay Sari, Ishan Sultan, Dautlaman Bek, and Ibrahim Bek, the latter recognized as the chief Basmachi military leader.⁷⁶ Others soon joined the Emir, including the Bashkir Zeki Validov who objected to the Russian invasion of the Emirate. All told, the Emir was able to gather between 30,000 and 40,000 supporters in the region of Eastern Bukhara (now Tadzhikistan) to fight against not only the Russians, but the Bukharan Communist Party as well.⁷⁷

As Nazir of Foreign Affairs, Khodzhaev's main task was to forge an alliance with the Russians in an attempt to remove the Basmachi threat. In December 1920, and again in March of 1921, Khodzhaev met with Eliav and Kuibyshev to discuss how to best contain the "Bukharan Front." Soviet troop commitments were low, as they had to focus on the basmachi rebel units in the Ferghana valley. For the first

⁷⁵As early as December 30, 1920, Khodzhaev requested that 1000 Red Army troops be stationed in Eastern Bukhara. This commitment was increased by 500 by February 1921, and grew exponentially from there. See Document #127, IBNSR: SD, pp.241-242.

⁷⁶"The Basmachis: The Central Asian Resistance Movement, 1918-1924," Central Asian Review 7/3 (1959):240.

⁷⁷Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: the case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p.23.

several months, the Bukharan army could do little more than maintain lines of communication and hope that the Basmachi did not plan to initiate an offensive.

Fortunately for the Bukharan government, the first half of 1921 was a period of relative calm. Taking advantage of this respite, the more conservative members of the Council of Nazirs requested that a peaceful solution to the violence in Eastern Bukhara be found. In August 1921, the Council of Nazirs sent a "peace delegation" led by Ata Khodzhaev to negotiate with the Basmachi.⁷⁸ Ata Khodzhaev returned with a negative reply because a Russian cease fire could not be guaranteed. At this time, the Basmachi forces in Eastern Bukhara numbers more than 7,000 and had the support of the local population.⁷⁹ An additional problem lay in the attitudes of the Bukharan leaders towards the rebels who, after all, were fellow Bukharans. Carrere d'Encausse observes that:

...for most Jadids in the government, the choice was far more difficult (than outright condemnation of the Basmachi). Should they break with the Soviets and support the insurrectionary

⁷⁸Ishanov, BNSR, p.280. For the most part, the Basmachi viewed the Bukharan leaders with contempt. They were nothing more than secular lackeys of the Russians who were attempting to destroy any and all traditional values among the peasantry in Bukhara. See Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi -- I," Central Asian Survey 6/1 (1987):51-52. Ibrahim Bek publicly vowed to torture and kill any Jadids that he captured. This threat was quickly forgotten with the mass Jadid defections of late 1921. See "The Basmachis," CAR 7/3:241.

⁷⁹Broxup, p.60.

movement? Should they prefer Soviet power and the gains of revolution to support for the emir and a return to the old order? It seems certain that the emir's presence at the head of the insurrection initially restrained Bukhara's leaders from taking the plunge.⁸⁰

As the presence of Russian troops in the Republic increased, this ambivalence amplified. The Bukharan leadership was in a difficult situation. Clearly, they opposed a return to the old order as it had existed prior to the reform period. But what if a constitutional monarchy could be set up? If individual freedoms and demands as outlined in the 1917 program could be adhered to, would it be possible to negotiate?

In a communique addressed to the Council of Nazirs, the Basmachi leadership stressed that: "We are struggling against the Russians and not against the national government. If the Russians leave, we are ready to rally to the national government."⁸¹ This plea, along with ill feelings over the Russian control of trade relations, was soon to cause several top Bukharan officials to seriously re-evaluate their commitment to the BPSR. An additional letter was sent to Khodzhaev, noting that:

By taking a position similar to yours, we become cheapened, because you, with the help of your Russian Bolshevik brothers, are spilling the blood of the people (nation), and occasionally destroying valuables and bread, in a word, all

⁸⁰Carrere d'Encausse, p.177.

⁸¹Quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.178.

unnecessary for the welfare of the people...⁸²

Khodzhaev remarked that after reading this letter, he stiffened his resolve to combat the Basmachi. He remarked that, "the moment I received this letter, I decided to, from this moment on, to actively continue my endeavors against the Basmachi."⁸³

In spite of Khodzhaev's position, the Basmachi rebellion increased in scope, reaching its zenith under the leadership of Enver Pasha. As a delegate to the 1920 Baku Congress, Enver was sent to Central Asia to work out the Soviet policy in the region.⁸⁴ His traditional views, particularly his support of pan-Islamism (he was a member of the Society for the Unity of Islam), and the disappointment he must have felt towards the signing of the Soviet-Turkish Friendship Treaty in March 1921, lessened Enver's attraction to the Bolshevik cause. In its place, he found in the Basmachi movement a chance to advance his objectives. Thus, on the pretext of going out on a "shooting party" with 'Usman Khodzhaev, he left Bukhara in November 1921 and joined the forces of Emir Alim.⁸⁵

⁸²A letter dated September 18, 1921, as quoted in full in Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, pp.235-236.

⁸³Ibid., p.235.

⁸⁴Pipes, p.258.

⁸⁵Chokaev, p.286; Fraser, p.53. The participants of the "shooting party" are noted in Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.414.

Of serious concern for Khodzhaev that the defection of Enver Pasha was the startling defection of 'Usman Khodzhaev, who had accompanied Enver. For the first time, a member of the Bukharan government had gone over to the Basmachi. Within a few months, Mirza 'Abd al-Qadir and Muhyi al-Din Makhdum, the chief of police in Bukhara, also defected, as did the Minister of War, Abdul Hamid Afandi.⁸⁶ Arifov did not defect until March of 1922, giving his reason as the excessive Russian involvement in BCP affairs and the military operations in Eastern Bukhara.⁸⁷ The floodgates had opened and many of the more conservative Bukharans decided to throw their lot with the Basmachi rebels. For Khodzhaev, this was a political disaster as essential members of his leadership were abandoning the BPSR experiment.⁸⁸

⁸⁶Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," in Allworth, pp.251-252; Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan," Asiatic Review XXIV/78 (April 1928):286; and Egon Erwin Kisch, Changing Asia, english translation by Rita Reil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), p.85. Kisch remarks that mass defection had been planned for some time:

It was not generally known that he was conspiring with Usman Khodzhayev, chairman of the Central Executive Committee. Enver sent Usman a report to the effect that the Great Powers had decreed the imminent doom of the Soviets. Whereupon Usman followed Enver, together with Ali Riza, chief of militia, two hundred cavalry, and four hundred infantry.

⁸⁷Istoriia uzbeksoi SSR, vol.III (Tashkent: "Fan," 1967), p.311.

⁸⁸Surprisingly, Khodzhaev did not openly condemn the actions of his fellow Bukharans. He simply notes their departures and continues his narrative regarding the actions

The concern over Russian troops in Bukhara was addressed as early as the Second Qurultai in December 1921. At this meeting of the Shura, a representative of the Soviet Red Army failed to give an expressed timetable as to when the Red Army would be withdrawn. Instead, it was announced that the Red Army contingent was going to be increased. With this commitment, the Red Army went on the offensive in late 1921. A massacre of civilians in the Baysun area by a Red Army unit resulted in a polarization of support for the government and the Basmachi. Carrere d'Encausse writes that:

The emir had left the territory of Bukhara for Afghanistan, perhaps feeling that his presence was preventing the movement from drawing to it the country's liberal elite. Jadids were now fighting among the rebels. The rebellion was becoming a refuge for all who had been victims of Soviet repression.⁸⁹

Within months, the army under Enver Pasha topped 18,000, the strongest the Basmachi had been yet. By early 1922, the Bukharan Army could no longer contain the movement and, fearing the collapse of their own government, the Bukharan Council of Nazirs approved yet another increase in Soviet troop commitment in the area.⁹⁰ By the middle of that year,

against the Basmachi.

⁸⁹Carrere d'Encausse, p.178.

⁹⁰In a letter dated November 1921, Khodzhaev outlined the possibility of having a large Red Army contingent on Bukharan soil. It was decided at that time that if the need arose, separate Bukharan units would form under the overall military leadership of the Russians, and that the [then]

Red Army troops in the Fergana, Lokai, Karakum, and Bukharan regions totalled 160,000, with an estimated 50,000 in Bukhara alone.

This period was a turning point for Khodzhaev, as he strengthened his ties with the Russians. On March 13, 1922, he met with officers of the Red Army and the Russian representative, Ia.A. Peters, to formalize the chain of command and coordinate the Russian-Bukharan offensive against the Basmachi. Ivanov and Berezin were put in charge of the two Russian armies in Eastern Bukhara, while Khodzhaev was awarded command of the Bukharan forces. This was officially announced on April 1 by the Revolutionary Military Council.⁹¹

For the next several months, Khodzhaev travelled throughout the Republic in an attempt to drum up support for the Bukharan military units.⁹² He was also responsible for the transfer of control in areas recently "liberated" from Basmachi units by the Red Army. For example, from April 15

astronomical sum of 270 million rubles be raised to finance the war effort. IBNSR: SD, pp.245-249.

⁹¹See Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.42-49 for the details of the meeting.

⁹²In a letter to a member of the RCP(b) Central Committee, he outlines the progress of the campaign against the Basmachi, noting that he is telling the troops that the Russo-Bukharan alliance is necessary in "this extraordinary moment in the history of the Bukharan republic, when necessary decisions, and correct, but difficult, policies [must be made]..." Khodzhaev, "Pis'mo L.M. Karakhany ot 5 apreliia 1922g.," Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, pp.429.

to May 3, Khodzhaev oversaw the "liberation" of the Kermin and Karshi regions, and as late as September was in the Darvaz region attempting to organize anti-Basmachi units.⁹³ These Bukharan units, set up behind Russian lines, were instrumental in this pacification process.⁹⁴

For his efforts, Faizulla Khodzhaev was awarded the Order of the Red Star. This was announced on July 22, 1922 after what most accounts call a "long and difficult" summer.⁹⁵ According to the official history of Uzbekistan, Khodzhaev received this award for his struggle against the "Emir-Basmachi band" and for the strengthening of the power of the Soviet people in Bukhara.⁹⁶ This emphasis suggests that Khodzhaev had become a participant in the goals of the Bolsheviks and less so of the BPSR. In addition, Khodzhaev was involved in the reorganization of the Bukharan-Red Army units into "flying cavalry wings."⁹⁷ From these actions, one can conclude that Khodzhaev took his position of liaison with the Red Army seriously and have every intention supporting the Red Army in its drive to consolidate power in Central Asia. He writes that:

⁹³Ishanov, BNSR, p.295.

⁹⁴Broxup, p.67.

⁹⁵Ishanov, BNSR, p.295; Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.52-53.

⁹⁶Istoriia uzbekskoi SSR, p.314.

⁹⁷See document #145, IBNSR: SD, pp.262-263.

In support of the role of the fraternal Russian and victorious Red Army, the Bukharan troops have, in the course of several months, have broken and pushed to the limits Enver and his army in Eastern Bukhara, and have weakened or destroyed Basmachi units in other regions. In addition, the revolutionary government has energetically carried out measures against the members of villages that supported the Basmachi...⁹⁸

This activity apparently took its toll on Khodzhaev's health and stamina. In September, he travelled to Moscow and later Berlin for a month long respite. He did not return to Tashkent until November 6, at which time the Basmachi threat was already fading.

The accolades heaped upon Khodzhaev did not mean that he was popular with all in Bukhara. Khodzhaev had shifted his energies from the politics of restructuring a nation-state within the halls of government in Old Bukhara, to fighting along side the Russian Red Army. It appeared as if Khodzhaev had finally subordinated himself to the Russian command. Clearly, others held this view, for in July of 1922, an assassination attempt was made on Khodzhaev's life. Supposedly under orders from Enver Pasha, Khodzhaev was to have been shot en route to his command headquarters. The attempt was botched, and Khodzhaev reached his destination unharmed. On record, this is the only known assassination attempt on a non-Russian leader during the Basmachi rebellion.⁹⁹

⁹⁸Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.341.

⁹⁹Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.46.

As for the Basmachi, the hit and run tactics of Enver Pasha were quite successful in foiling the efforts of the Red Army to maintain order. By accident, the drama ended. On August 4th, with only twenty-five soldiers accompanying him, Enver Pasha was ambushed by a Red Cavalry unit at Bal'dzhuan and killed.¹⁰⁰ Shortly thereafter, the movement's unity began to disintegrate. Individual Basmachi leaders regained their own commands, and without a central leader, the Basmachi once again took the form of a divided rebellion. By the Fall of 1922, the Basmachi were isolated in the mountainous regions of the South-east.¹⁰¹

In spite of the decreased Basmachi threat, the Russian domination of the Bukharan military was formalized on March 4, 1923, when the two sides signed yet another military treaty. This agreement allowed the Red Army to move at will throughout Bukhara and requisition provisions if necessary from the local population. In addition, any added expenses to the expeditions would be paid by the Bukharan government. Khodzhaev believed that with this form of cooperation, the

¹⁰⁰The "official announcement" of Enver's death was in the August 16, 1922 issue of Turkestanskaia pravda. Krist remarks that Ibrahim Bek's refusal to fully cooperate with Enver Pasha, derived primarily from his hatred for the man, resulted in the latter's being unaware of Russian troops in the area. See Krist, pp.75-91.

¹⁰¹Asiatic Review 1931, pp.686-7. In addition, the Bukharan forces now numbered over 20,000 as noted by Khodzhaev. Khodzhaev, "K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare i natsional'nogo razmezhevaniiia srednei azii," Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.235.

Basmachi would be eliminated as a major threat to his government.¹⁰² We can only guess that the underlying logic was a belief in the eventual withdrawal of Frunze's troops once the conflict was over.¹⁰³ Furthermore, on May 31, 1923, Red Army troops moved to the Bukharan-Afghan border and placed a number of Bukharan Army units directly under Russian command. In that month, the Red Army troops defeated Ibrahim Bek in one of the campaign's few open-field battles. Shortly thereafter, the Basmachi were reduced to hit-and-run tactics based primarily in Afghanistan.

In retrospect, the Basmachi rebellion forced the Jadidists to choose between national interests in the form of armed resistance and national interests in the form of change from within the Soviet orbit. Carrere d'Encausse remarks that: "This second option was adopted by the most eminent of the Jadids, perhaps because they had not the chance of leaving Bukhara in time, perhaps also because they did not want to abandon the state to the Communists."¹⁰⁴ I would add that some remained in the Bukharan government because they felt that change was still possible. In spite

¹⁰²To cover these expenses, Khodzhaev suggested that the Bukharan government increase the tax rate. He raised this issue on December 23, 1923, but by early 1924, the issue of national delimitation had already begun to dominate Bukharan politics and nothing was carried out on the tax question. See Document #147, IBNSR: SD, pp.264-265.

¹⁰³Carrere d'Encausse, p.176.

¹⁰⁴Carrere d'Encausse, p.180.

of the encroaching Soviet control, the fundamental spirit of national self-determination had not been eliminated.

Perhaps Khodzhaev believed that his active participation in the war effort would pay off in future relations with the RSFSR. Unless he had completely abandoned his goal of creating an independent nation in Bukhara, this appears to be the most probable justification.

The Bolsheviks perceived the Bukharan actions in a different light. Mass defections and an uncertain ally gave further evidence to the belief that the BPSR was a temporary political structure that would have to be seriously re-evaluated if the Bolsheviks hoped to maintain a power base in the region. With a large portion of the Red Army already stationed in Bukhara and control over the communication and transportation systems, as well as the BCP itself, the Bolsheviks could now contemplate a more complete political incorporation of Bukhara into the RSFSR. Indeed, with the demise of the Basmachi threat, this issue became the central focus of Russian-Bukharan relations.

V. CRISIS IN THE LEADERSHIP: 1922-1924

Weakened by defections to the Basmachi, it was clear that the BCP core was quickly losing its authority. As early as 1921, conflicts within the Bukharan leadership indicated that all was not well in the republic. This was exemplified by the split between Khodzhaev and Mukhitdinov.

The conflict between the opposing camps reached a climax in September 1921. Mukhitdinov, believing that Khodzhaev had compromised the integrity of the Bukharan state by allowing the Red Army to remain stationed on Bukharan soil, organized a protest march in the city of Old Bukhara. He intended to pressure Khodzhaev into resigning his position as President of the Republic and Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to Khodzhaev, the demonstration took place on September 27 in the capitol city. Quickly, the pro-Mukhitdinov protesters were confronted by military units loyal to Khodzhaev. After an exchange of words, shots were fired and a general riot ensued. In the end, the pro-Khodzhaev forces prevailed.¹⁰⁵ The expatriot Togan parallels the 1921 conflict with the religious riots of 1910. He writes that: "...it became evident that the Russians were on the side of Fezullah....The Russians gained a faithful adherent in Fezullah..."¹⁰⁶ This was confirmed in a letter by A.A. Ioffe, a representative of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), who wrote that it was essential that Khodzhaev's faction, deemed more favorable to the Bolsheviks, win.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Otvét na pis'mo upolnomochennogo NKID RSFSR po srednei azii D.Iu. Gopnera ot 15 iulia 1921g.," Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.413.

¹⁰⁶Ahmed Zeki Velidi (Togan), Turkestan Today (Istanbul: 1940), p.527, as quoted by Donald Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy (Selected Works)," Kritika VIII/1 (Fall 1971):63.

¹⁰⁷Ishanov, BNSR, p.247.

Mukhitdinov was removed from his post and replaced by Faizulla's uncle, 'Usman Khodzhaev.¹⁰⁸

The intra-party, conflict coupled with the defections of key Bukharan leaders, led the Bolsheviks to conclude that it was essential for them to control as much as possible the political situation in Bukhara. Carrere d'Encausse writes that: "Young Bukharan unity was broken and the question of supporting the insurrectional movement or remaining faithful to the revolution was posed."¹⁰⁹ From this point onward, the Bukharans would have to repeatedly prove their Party loyalty to Moscow.

This concern on the part of the Russians over the non-Russian BCP was indicative of a changing trend in Bolshevik attitudes towards the non-Russians in general. At the Bolshevik Party's Tenth Congress in March 1921, Stalin declared that the native communists:

Neglect the class interests of the workers and confuse them with so-called national interests. They are unable to distinguish the former from the latter, or to orient the party's work toward the toiling masses alone. This situation explains the appearance of bourgeois-democratic nationalism, which in the East often

¹⁰⁸Within a few months, Pulatkhodzhaev defected to the Basmachi. As for Mukhitdinov, he remained active in Bukharan politics, later becoming a key political figure for the Tadzhik minority in the Uzbek SSR. In 1929, Mukhitdinov became the Premier of the Tadzhik SSR, holding this position until his death in 1934.

¹⁰⁹Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," in Allworth, p.251.

takes the form of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.¹¹⁰ One leader targeted was the National Communist Mir Sa'id Sultan-Galiev.¹¹¹ A Tatar, Sultan-Galiev had worked his way up through the ranks of the Commissariat of Nationalities. Supportive of the Bolshevik policy regarding the nationalities, he was instrumental in swaying nationalist leaders over to the Bolshevik side. However, by 1922, Sultan-Galiev had become critical of the continued Russian domination of regional economic and political interests. For him, the Russians had become no better than the Western colonial powers. The only way that the Muslims in the RSFSR and the Russian-controlled areas, such as Bukhara, could achieve any form of equality would be to (1) establish an autonomous Muslim Communist Party administratively separate from the RCP(b); (2) create a Muslim Red Army with Muslim officers; (3) establish a large Muslim-Turkic state, often referred to as the Republic of Turan; and (4) create a Colonial International independent

¹¹⁰Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 11 (1933):99.

¹¹¹For a detailed account of his life and impact on Soviet Central Asia, see Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie: I. Le "Sultangalievisme" au Tartarstan (Paris-La Haye: Mouton, 1960), and Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).

from the Communist International that would address the specific questions and concerns of the colonial peoples.¹¹²

The mainstream Bolsheviks considered such views to be heretical, and almost immediately began attacking Sultan-Galiev. At the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 and again at the Fourth Conference of the RCP(b) Central Committee with the Workers of the National Republics and Regions in June of that year, he was the subject of vicious attacks. In a report from the conference, it was stated that:

Sultan-Galiev was nominated by the Party to a responsible job as a member of the Collegium of Narkomnats, where he took advantage of his position and relations which he obtained through his position with local workers in order to create with some workers of the national republics (Party members and non-Party members), who were not yet very solid in their convictions, an illegal organization. Its aim was to oppose measures taken by the central organs of the Party. He used conspiratorial methods and classified information in order to subvert the Party's decision in the field of nationalities policy.¹¹³

The illegal organization in question, the "Ittihad ve Taraqqi" ("Union and Progress") was to later become a focal point in Faizulla Khodzhaev's trial of 1938. It was suggested that Sultan-Galiev contacted other nationalists, including Faizulla Khodzhaev, and persuaded them to join

¹¹²"Sultan Galiev: A Brief Portrait," in M.S. Sultan-Galiev, Articles, reprint series No.1, (Oxford, England: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1984), pp.9-10.

¹¹³Revoliutsii i natsional'nosti 11(1933):107. Also quoted in Bennigsen and Wimbush, p.84.

this group whose purpose was the continuation of a nationalist struggle against the Bolshevik hegemony. Eventually, Sultan-Galiev was ousted from the Party, arrested, and disappeared in 1929, presumably dying in one of the Siberian labor camps.

The initial impact of this "anti-nationalist" campaign on Khodzhaev's career was not as severe. Although he was not publicly ostracized, Khodzhaev did come under increased suspicion. Because individuals like Khodzhaev and Akmal Ikramov were associated with the other Muslim national communists, they were subject to similar attacks. This suspicion of nationalist leaders prompted the RCP(b) to pressure the BCP into a quick political unification. In early 1922, this formal union of the two parties took place. On February 1, Khodzhaev met with Stalin, Chicherin, and Kuibyshev. The formal announcement of the merger was on February 2.¹¹⁴ For the first year, little activity other than increasing membership took place within the ranks of the party. It appeared that the Bolsheviks hoped to simply stabilize the Peoples' Republics during this initial period.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴Istoriia uzbekskoi SSR, p.309.

¹¹⁵A similar process was taking place in the Khorezmian Peoples' Soviet Republic as well. See Ann Sheehy, "The Khorezm Communist Party," Central Asian Review XVI/4 (1968):314-315.

However, as a result of the defections of BPSR leaders, the RCP(b) began to purge the BCP of "undesirable elements" and "remnants and sympathizers of the feudal-bey regime of the Emir." The main target, according to Stalin, was the dominant cadre of nationalists in the Bukharan leadership. Because of these recalcitrant members, progress was being curtailed in the Republic. He remarked that:

These survivals find practical expression in a certain national aloofness and a lack of complete trust on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples in measures proceeding from the Russians. However, in some of the republics...this defensive nationalism often turns into aggressive nationalism, into the outright chauvinism of the stronger nationality directed against the weaker nationalities of these republics...

The deviation towards nationalism is dangerous because, by hindering the emancipation of the national bourgeoisie, it impedes the knitting of the proletarians of the various nationalities into a single internationalist organization.¹¹⁶

The political liquidation of the BCP was necessary for the final delimitation effort. After the mass defections of 1921-1922, Khodzhaev reformed a government with Abdul Ra'uf Fitrat taking the position of Nazir of Foreign Affairs.¹¹⁷ The nucleus that formed around these two men were to bear the brunt of the Soviet purges in 1923. After Stalin's harsh criticism, a Turkic Commission under the leadership of

¹¹⁶J.V. Stalin, "Theses on National Factors in Party and State," in Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: International Publishers, 1942), pp.132, 135.

¹¹⁷He would subsequently be removed from office in 1923.

Ia.A. Rudzutak arrested numerous Uzbek political figures on the grounds of extreme nationalism.¹¹⁸

On April 23, 1923, the newly-appointed first secretary of the BCP Central Committee, Pozdnyshev, wrote a letter to the RCP(b) Central Asian Bureau in which he stated that: "From the point of view of organization, the Bukharan CP is of all parties to be placed on the bottom-most rung. Figures do not exist. The party claims to have 16,000 members but this cannot be verified. Base organizations and cells do not exist anywhere, nor even in the city of Bukhara."¹¹⁹ Stalin remarked in June of 1923 that the Bukharan leadership was still a body of bourgeois merchants and leaders from the past. The Council of Nazirs, he stated, contained eight merchants, two members of the intelligentsia, one mulla, and no peasants.¹²⁰ This signalled the anticipated full-scale purge in the summer of 1923 that reduced the party to a mere fraction of its past number. By the end of the summer of 1923, barely 1,000 members of the old BCP remained. The Council of Nazirs was

¹¹⁸Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The National Republics Lose Their Independence," in Allworth, p.255, cited from R. Abdushukurov, Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia: Rasvet uzbekskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii i sbliizhenie ee s natsiami SSSR (Tashkent: Gospolit Izdatel'stvo Uzbekskoi SSR, 1962), pp.32ff.

¹¹⁹Abdushukurov, Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia, pp.176-7. as quoted in Carrere d'Encausse, p.182.

¹²⁰Park, p.86.

streamlined and the ministries of foreign affairs, education and finance were placed under Bolshevik control.

When it was over, the post-purge BCP carried a membership of 2,226 of which most of them had little connection to the pre-revolutionary period.¹²¹ At the IVth Qurultai, which was held on October 11 to 17, 1923, 253 of the 383 delegates were either peasants or workers. Likewise, the 52 of the Shura's 85 members were classified as such.¹²² Finally, a number of separate organizations for agricultural and industrial workers were created in order to promote these members into the BCP.¹²³

Through it all, Khodzhaev retained his post. In large part, due to his now uncompromising support for the reform measures, and his ability to distance himself from his opposition who were themselves purged, Khodzhaev was able to appear as a devout Communist to the leadership in Moscow. This is not to say that Khodzhaev remained above the turmoil. Pozdnyshev, on several occasions, singled Khodzhaev out in his attacks on the BCP. In a letter to the Central Asian Bureau, he stressed that the BCP had been

¹²¹According to the 1924 official membership role of the BCP, only 16% of the Party had joined prior to 1920. 20% had joined in 1920; 10% in 1921; 6% in 1922; 16% in 1923; and 32% in 1924. The members who participated in the 1917 founding were a mere 2% (41). "Informatsionnie otchet TsK BKP," IBNSR: SD, p.182.

¹²²IBNSR: SD, p.7.

¹²³Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana, volume I, p.174.

repeatedly infiltrated by "individuals alien to the working class," who had obtained positions of power. He wrote, "F. Khodzhaev's group had turned its back entirely on the tasks it had to fulfill and accused it of various acts of treason or deviation." Furthermore, it was noted that "so far, Fayzullah has selected people to work on the basis of kinship and nepotism....a secretary of the Bukharan CP must remain independent of nationality."¹²⁴

Khodzhaev, branded a bourgeois deviationist, was under close scrutiny during this period, in which those considered to be linked to the former government were stripped of their rights and property. Although this did not happen to him, Khodzhaev was forced to accept the little-known Kasim Atabaev as his political assistant.¹²⁵

As the purge ended, it was clear that Faizulla Khodzhaev had lost control of the political structure of the Bukharan Communist Party. Prior to the outright decimation of party loyalists there was at least the semblance of an indigenous leadership in charge of the reform measures in Bukhara. After the defections of the Rightists, and the purging of most of the rank and file, Khodzhaev had very few Jadidist allies left. Indeed, what remained were Russian-approved party members who were prepared to support the

¹²⁴Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p.194.

¹²⁵Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.57. The other cabinet members are also listed. Also see Inoiatov, p.30.

Soviet position in the next debate in the Shura: the dissolution of the BPSR and its incorporation into the USSR. Faizulla Khodzhaev was effectively out of power.

VI. THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BUKHARA

According to a British observer at the time: "The politically independent factors of the movement are divided amongst themselves, and they would be opponents if it came to a question of definite organization and control."¹²⁶ This remarks sums up the problems that Khodzhaev faced during the first years of the BPSR. The failure in overcoming this problem was that: "the idea of nationality among the Central Asian Muslims, despite the efforts of the Jadids and of the Pan-Turkic reformers (most often they were one and the same), still rested on an ethnic-tribal, religious, and traditional basis."¹²⁷ Because of the small native intelligentsia, the mass illiteracy, and the need to overcome a strong feudal tradition in the former Emirate that hindered the development of a sense of national identity, the Jadidists were unable to create a viable nation-state.

¹²⁶Lt-Col. E.P. Etherton, "Central Asia: Its Rise as a Political and Economic Factor," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society X/pt.11 (1923):91.

¹²⁷Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkic Nationalities: Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-Chinese Relations," in Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers op cit., p.125.

External factors also played a crucial role in the failure of the BCP. The aggressive Bolshevik policy of economic, military, and eventual political domination of the republic meant that the possibility for actual independence was remote. Furthermore, the Basmachi threat accelerated this process of Bolshevization. By the time the question of national delimitation arose, Bukharan independence really became a moot point.¹²⁸

It should also be emphasized that the Bukharan leadership itself voted for incorporation. Perhaps Khodzhaev believed that the gradual domination of the Bolsheviks was a temporary phase. His writings do not indicate a hostility towards the Russians. On the contrary, he appears to support and appreciate their activities. This is especially evident in his retrospective look at the development of the Uzbek SSR, Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva. In it, he declares that:

The October Revolution, in spite of the initial passivity at the beginning on the part of some of the deghons and a significant number of the indigenous poor, in time aroused out of its sleep the popular masses [of Bukhara].¹²⁹

Khodzhaev further outlines the significance of the Bolshevik Revolution and the role that its leaders played in the

¹²⁸The National Delimitation will be discussed in chapter six.

¹²⁹Faizulla Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva (Tashkent: Uzbekskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1927), p.14.

development of Central Asia, Bukhara in particular. At the same time, he remained strongly supportive of the Bukharan state up until the period of the delimitation.

In the end, why did the Bukharan Jadidists fail to create a nation-state complete with a politically aware population? Carrere d'Encausse concludes that:

...they had come too early themselves; in so backward and wretched a society, they found themselves isolated. Even if the Jadids succeeded in expressing the problems of the masses, the masses were incapable of following them; tradition kept them tied to their religious leaders. The conquest, by aggravating their economic difficulties, did not help to hasten their political maturity; on the contrary, it drove those wretched masses, obsessed with the sole problem of survival, back towards the traditional order, towards stability.¹³⁰

The Jadidists were simply not in touch with the local population. The reform measures, noble as they might be, did not take hold for various reasons, not the least of which was the recalcitrance of the peasants in sticking to their old leaders and customs. The move towards building a nation-state in such a short period of time was too difficult. Mandel adds that:

The non-socialist character of the Bokharan Republic was evident from its first political and economic measures. True, the richest merchants, mullahs, and ex-officials of the Emirs were not allowed to vote or stand for election to the first All-Bokhara Congress of Soviets. The masses of the people experienced only such an improvement of their position as resulted from the confiscation

¹³⁰Carrere d'Encausse, p.190.

of the property of the Emir and his highest officials and the abolition of the old taxes.¹³¹

It appears that Khodzhaev optimistically set goals for the new Bukharan state. Following on the footsteps of the Emir's government, it was an insurmountable task to rectify all of the major problems in such a short period of time.

As noted in chapter two, a strong relationship between the intelligentsia and the masses is essential for the development of a national identity. By reviewing the actions of Faizulla Khodzhaev during this period, one can see where he failed. To a great extent, Khodzhaev spent his time negotiating and cooperating with the Soviet leaders and military, and thus had little time for domestic considerations. With the mass defection of his compatriots, his own loyalty to the Soviet-Bukharan alliance became suspect. Buffeted from both sides, the Bukharan population and the Soviet leaders, Khodzhaev's national goals quickly evaporated.

It is perhaps with this in mind that one can understand his ultimate decision to support the delimitation campaign in an almost caricature fashion. In his later writings, he acknowledges the logic of this political move and repeatedly notes the advantages that the incorporation had for the

¹³¹Mandel, William. The Soviet Far East and Central Asia (New York: Dial Press, 1944), p.110.

Central Asian peoples.¹³² At the same time, there is evidence of a positive portrayal of the pre-1920 ideals of the Jadidists. From this, it can be concluded that although Khodzhaev openly accepted the new political future of Central Asia and the role he would play in the newly-created Uzbek SSR, he still retained some of these earlier aspirations and goals. Thus, a dual policy formed in the early 1920s: on the one hand, there existed superficial declarations of national autonomy and, in the case of Bukhara, actual political independence. On the other hand, while the Soviet government carefully observed these limits on their own abilities to intervene politically, they were able to maintain a significant amount of control through economic relations, joint military operations against the Basmachi, and direct intervention in the politics of the BCP. It was primarily through these vehicles that the Soviet leadership was able to exert external pressures on the fledgling Bukharan government.

¹³²Khodzhaev's strategies and advocacy for the delimitation will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX -- FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV AS PRIME MINISTER OF THE
UZBEK SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC: THE RISE OF THE UZBEK
ELITE (1924-1929)

I. INTRODUCTION

Khodzhaev's experience as head of the failed Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic demonstrates that it is difficult to create a national identity without a strong political structure and mass support. Within two years of its founding, the BPSR faced numerous problems, not the least of which was the ever-increasing influence of the RSFSR. The economic, military, and political domination of this outside political force translated into a weakened Bukharan leadership. This also meant that Khodzhaev had to devote more time and energy to issues of international relations than the cultivation of ties with the population of his own country. Finally, the development of these ties in a heterogeneous population was unlikely in such a short period of time. The divisions within the Bukharan leadership, between the leaders and the general population, and between the Bukharan government and the RSFSR overwhelmed any efforts to create a unified political state in Bukhara.

During the years 1925 to 1929, Khodzhaev began another chapter in his political career, that of a liaison between the Soviet government and the newly-created Uzbek SSR. By most accounts, including his own, it was during these years that Khodzhaev openly campaigned for Soviet-sponsored programs and became a strong proponent of the National

Delimitation.¹ The episode of the Delimitation of 1924 arguably belongs in the discussion of the BPSR of the previous chapter. However, I believe that with respect to Khodzhaev's political development, it belongs in the early-Uzbek phase of his career. By the time the delimitation discussions were underway, Khodzhaev had already submitted to Soviet control and his actions in 1924, albeit as head of the BPSR, better reflected those of the Uzbek period.

During the years of the BPSR, Khodzhaev needed to obtain support from the Bolsheviks and compromised the basic Jadidist reform agenda. During the early-Uzbek period, these "compromises" continued. His views on the national delimitation, the economic reform measures, and even educational policies, were all in congruence with overall Soviet policy. In practice, it appeared, Khodzhaev had made the transition from being a Bukharan nationalist to being an ally of the Soviet Union. However, a few actions and writings indicate that he had not completely eliminated his nationalist tendencies. It was simply in his drive to organize and modernize the Uzbek SSR that Khodzhaev acquiesced on most issues. The more notable re-emergence of the "nationalist" Khodzhaev was not to take place until the

¹For examples of Khodzhaev advocating this position, see his speech to the Iind Session of the CEC/USSR on October 27, 1924 entitled, "O natsional'no-gosudarstvennom razmezhevanii srednei azii," in Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970), pp.362-369.

Soviet policy in Central Asia radically changed with the collectivization and purge campaigns of the 1930s.

Khodzhaev's nationalist beliefs are reflected in several factors. First, his writings as late as 1926 give favorable accounts of the Jadidist movement, considering it, as opposed to the Bolshevik Party, to be the critical force in the formation of Uzbekistan. Khodzhaev's revision of К истории революцсии в Бухаре suggests that the changing political climate in Uzbekistan required a de-emphasis on the Jadidists. Second, the First Secretary Akmal Ikramov, the bitter political rival of Khodzhaev, was critical of Khodzhaev and often condemned the actions of the Jadidists. The division between Khodzhaev and Ikramov on issues of economic and social reform indicate that the former was not an enthusiastic supporter of all of the Soviet policies. Third, Khodzhaev admitted during his trial in 1938 that he opposed Soviet policies in Uzbekistan. Although the veracity of his statements in such a constrained setting should be questioned, there is a logical quality to what he said. Specifically, his testimony regarding his "nationalist" interests are consistent with positions and statements he supported earlier in his career. These points will be evaluated in the following two chapters.

II. THE NATIONAL DELIMITATION OF 1924

By the end of 1924, the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic had ceased to exist as a legitimate political entity. Most of the original political leaders had either fled the country or had been forcibly removed from office. The notable exception was Faizulla Khodzhaev, although even he became the target of criticism. He defended the Soviet state and supported the incorporation of the BPSR into the newly-formed USSR. This is particularly evident in the discussions on the 1924 Delimitation and the opening session of the Uzbek government. In short, Faizulla Khodzhaev had become a classic example of a "Sovietized" indigenous political leader. This is at least the image that Khodzhaev presented during the first years of the Uzbek SSR's history.

The incorporation of Bukhara into the Soviet Union was a seemingly inevitable process. The flexibility of Lenin's program of Self-Determination is evident in the theoretical arguments for delimitation. One Soviet scholar states that:

The population of Central Asia at the time of the socialist revolution was not yet consolidated into nations. It consisted of conglomerations of numerous and diverse nationalities, tribes, and ethnic groups, standing at different stages in their historical development, and not yet fused into historically stable societies with a language, territory, economic life, and psychic outlook which characterizes modern nations. The process of national consolidation, in essence, had only taken its first step.²

²V. Manelis, "Razvitie sovetskykh prava v vostokey," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 6 (1939):82.

Accordingly, the Soviet leaders did not consider Bukhara to be a "nation." Thus, the guidelines of national self-determination did not apply to this particular state.

Of greater significance than the theoretical basis for incorporating Bukhara into the USSR was the strategic consideration of Stalin. As Lenin's power waned due to his ill health, Stalin emerged as the key figure in Soviet nationalities policy. As noted in chapter two, Stalin advocated a strongly centralized system that possessed, at least visibly, a federated territorial structure. On December 30, 1922, the Third Congress of Soviets adopted the Treaty of Union which officially formed the USSR. Although the states supposedly had separate rights, the sheer numerical advantage held by the RSFSR and the centralized nature of the Bolshevik Party would translate into Russian power over the national republics. "Its ability to control national territorial formations through diverse institutions -- the Party, economic organs, the Army -- was obvious."³

³Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, translated by Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. LaFarge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), p.23. One scholar remarks that "It seems clear that the long-term intention of Lenin's Party and Government was, as stated at the 1920 Comintern Congress, to employ the federal principle as a means of transition to a fusion of minority nations into larger, less nationally conscious wholes. Stalin's formula of "national in form but socialist in content," anticipated such a development." William K. Medlin et al., Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p.56.

As early as 1923, Stalin had denounced what he called "Uzbek chauvinism" in the BPSR. He remarked that a Bukharan nationality did not exist and, consequently, the BPSR should be abandoned.⁴ This was also noted by Stalin at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets where he remarked that:

Two independent soviet republics, Khorezm and Bokhara -- being people's soviet, but not socialist, republics -- remain for the present outside the framework of this union solely and exclusively because they are not yet socialist. I have no doubt -- and I hope you too have no doubt -- that, in proportion to their internal development toward socialism, they likewise will enter the structure of the Union state now being formed.⁵

Stalin argued that a national delimitation was a logical course of action. He concluded that the regions of Central Asia, specifically the Turkestan ASSR, the BPSR, and the KhPSR, would be reorganized into separate political entities based upon ethnic groupings.

Scholarship on the delimitation generally supports the notion that it was a deliberate effort to divide the traditional units in Central Asia, especially Bukhara, into "manageable political and economic units."⁶ The old

⁴J.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol.V (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1946-1951), p.189.

⁵J.V. Stalin, "On the National Question," Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p.123.

⁶For example, see Olaf Caroe, The Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp.147-148.

borders of Central Asia were haphazard, economically inefficient, and ignorant of "existing ethnographical divisions" in the region.⁷ Inoiatov argues that this was a realized fact on the part of the BPSR leadership itself, and notes that they had discussed a political merger with the RSFSR as early as January, 1921.⁸ This appears unlikely, given the actions of the BPSR early in its existence.

Finally, the question arises as to whether Khodzhaev was a supporter of the delimitation of Central Asia.⁹ Allworth notes that Khodzhaev justified his position by relying on Stalin's definition of "nationality." Consequently, he viewed Bukhara as a collection of divided nations and not a nation itself.¹⁰

At a plenum of the BCP Central Committee, held on February 25, 1924, members of the BCP called for unification

⁷R. Vaidyanath, The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian: A Study of Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1936 (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1967), p.155.

⁸Kh.Sh. Inoiatov, "Narodno-demokraticeskii stroi BNSR kak prednosilka perekhoda k sotsializmu," Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane 8/1970:32.

⁹Istoriia uzbekskoi SSR, vol.III, (Tashkent: "Fan," 1967), p.383.

¹⁰Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p.198. Allworth cites Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Bukharadagi rewalyutsiya wa Orta Asiyaning milliyterritorial chegaralanishi tarikhiga dair," Tanlangan asarlar, volume 1 (Tashkent: "Fan," 1976), pp.291-292.

with the RSFSR.¹¹ Faizulla Khodzhaev, in his keynote address, "The Current Situation on the Question of the Formation of Uzbekistan," argued that the future of Bukhara should entail a greater political cooperation with the Soviet Union. This would best be served by a complete political unification. At the plenum, Khodzhaev sponsored a declaration, signed by the Central Committee members present, that supported the voluntary union of Bukhara and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Khodzhaev noted that the delimitation would "solve" the problems of the minority Turkmen and Tadzhik populations. The Turkmen would unite with the other Turkmen of Central Asia to form their own republic, and the 400,000 or so Tadzhiks would have their own separate political unit.¹²

Two months later, in a speech to the Second Session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, Khodzhaev argued that the peoples in the region "would achieve less in the struggle with their own adversities than they could achieve

¹¹A.A. Gordienko, Sozdanie sovetskoi natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti v Srednei Azii (Moscow: "Nauka," 1959), p.156.

¹²A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), pp.63-64. The other signatories of the declaration were Mukhitdinov, who later became a prominent Tadzhik political figure, Pulatov, and Saidzhanov, both of whom became Uzbek officials. All were removed from power in the early 1930s. Mukhitdinov died in 1934 and thus escaped the Purges.

with unification along national and economic lines."¹³ The Central Committee of the BCP passed a resolution in support of unification on April 13, 1924, and from that moment on, agitated for unification throughout the Republic.

Khodzhaev himself was active in the campaign to rally support for the delimitation. Two weeks later, at a plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP, Khodzhaev addressed the subject of the "Current Situation on the question of the formation of Uzbekistan." He repeated this speech on the 28th at a meeting of the Central Asian Bureau of the RCP(b). Finally, in late May, he attended the XIII Congress of the RCP(b) in Moscow, and presented himself as an advocate of unification. Khodzhaev's central argument was printed in Turkestanskaia Pravda that month. In it, he wrote that:

...it was extremely difficult to promote the development of all national groups in a equal measure unless the multi-national structure of the Central Asian republics was scrapped and nationally homogeneous political units were created.¹⁴

Thus, he concluded, it would be better to develop along "natural" national lines.

As most of the political leaders and Party members who were former Jadidist had been purged, there was little opposition to policy. Most of those that remained participated in the various committees and meetings on the

¹³Alexander Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p.89.

¹⁴Turkestanskaia pravda 99/376, May 7, 1924.

subject. On April 10th, the Central Committee of the BCP set up a five-man commission under the leadership of Khodzhaev to work with the Central Asian Bureau of the RCP(b) on the subject of organizing a thorough propaganda campaign in support of the delimitation.¹⁵

On the local level, Khodzhaev spent much of the Summer of 1924 travelling throughout Bukhara, very much in the same way he drummed up support against the Basmachi two years earlier. The effectiveness of these stops is unknown. The only accounts of these speeches are from the newspaper accounts and from his collected works. More than likely, the general population did not seriously consider the delimitation as there were no plebiscites or polls to gauge their opinions.

Khodzhaev's group also studied a proposal of the BCP that the region be divided into union republics for the Uzbeks and Turkmen, and autonomous oblasts for the remaining peoples.¹⁶ The primary purpose of these groups was to facilitate the transition of power in the region and more fully incorporate the distinct economies into one system.

¹⁵The members were the Russian Karklin, Rakhimbaev, Abdusaliyamov, Khodzhanov, and Khodzhaev. In addition, the commission met with Mukhitdinov, Pulatov, and Ryskulov, who apparently acted as advisors. See memo of April 28, 1924, document #299 in Istoriia bukharskoi narodnoi sovetskoi respubliki (1920-1924gg.): sbornik dokumentov (Tashkent: "Fan," 1976), p.449.

¹⁶Kh.T. Tursunov, Obrazovanie uzbekskoi sovetskoi sotsialisticheskoi respubliki (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1957), p.117.

In addition, it was a good method of discerning which regional leaders could be employed in the future political structure.¹⁷ Khodzhaev's "loyalty" was evident in his article in Turkestanskaia pravda in which he openly stated that the mission of the BPSR had been accomplished and now it was time for a new stage in the development of the region.¹⁸ Indeed, any Bukharan official who retained their position in government after 1924 spoke in favor of the delimitation.¹⁹

This was most apparent at the Fifth All-Bukhara Quraltai of Soviets which began on September 19, 1924. At the Quraltai, the delegates debated a resolution declaring the BPSR a full-fledged Soviet Republic.²⁰ On paper, Khodzhaev and the rest of the Council of Nazirs supported

¹⁷S. Radzhapov, "Etapy razvitiia sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo stroia v srednei azii," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 11 (1948):66.

¹⁸Turkestanskaia pravda 183/460, August 20, 1924. This was only one a series of articles that Khodzhaev wrote in the region's newspapers during the months of May through September.

¹⁹Khodzhaev's opposition to the delimitation will surface at his 1938 trial. Some accounts suggest that Khodzhaev was adamantly opposed to the project and fought bitterly against the destruction of Bukhara. I believe that although he might have preferred an independent Bukhara, Khodzhaev willingly participated in the Soviet policy and therefore must be viewed as being at least tolerant of it. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p.43, on the subject of Khodzhaev's opposition.

²⁰Baymirza Hayit, Sowjetrussische Orientpolitik am Beispiel Turkestans (Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1962), pp.106-108.

this document. After the usual praises of the revolution and the progress of socialism in the struggle against capitalism, the "aims" of the Quraltai were announced. The proposal stressed that:

(1) The supreme will of the peoples of Bukhara -- the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks -- is the creation by them, together with the Uzbeks of Turkestan and Khorezm, of the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic, a part of which is formed by the Autonomous Region of Tadzhiks.

(2) There is a fraternal agreement on the entering of the Turkmen people of Bukhara into the composition of the Turkmen Socialist Soviet Republic.

(3) And there is an absolute necessity for socialist Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of socialist construction, protection against imperialism, and in virtue of international fraternity of the laboring masses.

Go ahead, brothers and comrades, against the national hostility and subjugation by the bourgeoisie, for the liberation of western peoples, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and for communism!²¹

With the transformation of the BPSR into a "full socialist" republic, the stage was set for the final act of the republic's history. According to Carrere d'Encausse, "...the Bolshevik government could now think about restoring unity and about reorganizing in the framework of a Soviet federation the nationalities which had struggled so fiercely for their independence."²²

²¹Walter Russell Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia (New York: MacMillan Company, 1929), pp.356-357.

²²Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The National Republics Lose Their Independence," in Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.255-256.

With the delimitation, the region had become a full, integral part of the USSR with the local leadership now occupying a de jure subordinate position. On October 27, 1924, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Khodzhaev reiterated the need for the national delimitation, noting that:

The population that lives in Bukhara, Turkestan, and Khorezm are mainly Uzbek, then (in order of population) Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirghiz. If the national-territorial delimitation were not carried out, then these peoples would live separated; not possessing the basic characteristics of nationality, economy, or culture...²³

Demographically, the existing political units unnecessarily divided national groups. According to a 1924 count, Bukhara was 45.1% Uzbek, 40.0% Tadzhik, 7.5% Turkmen, 1.5% Russian, and 5.9% other; Khorezm was 64.7% Uzbek, 26.8% Turkmen, 3.4% Kazakh, 3.8% Karakalpak, and 1.3% other; and Turkestan was only 41.4% Uzbek, 9.5% Russian, and the rest divided among the other nationalities.²⁴ In order to accommodate the respective national groups, territorial boundaries had to better reflect the population centers of these "nations."

In the end, the region was divided into the following political units: Uzbekistan comprised of the central part of Old Bukhara, the southern part of Khiva (Khwarezm), and the districts of Samargand, Ferghana, Amu Darya, and Syr

²³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I, p.366.

²⁴M.A. Nemchenko, "Natsional'noe razmezhevanie Srednei Azii," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 4-5 (1924):86.

Darya (all from the former Turkestan province); Turkmenistan included the Transcaspian province, western Bukhara, and parts of Khiva; Tadzhikistan, which remained an "autonomous Republic," was the Eastern section of Bukhara. It did not become a full Republic until December 5, 1929. Likewise, the Karakalpak ASSR was transferred to Uzbek political and administrative control in 1936, previously being part of the Kazakh Republic and the RSFSR.²⁵ This translated into a regional domination of the Uzbek SSR. With over half of the region's population, 60% of the agricultural lands, and almost 70% of the economic profits, Uzbekistan became the leading republic of Central Asia.²⁶ Consequently, it became important for the republic's elite to become the model leaders for Soviet Central Asian policies. This, as will be seen, was evident in the first year of the Uzbek SSR's existence.

²⁵The Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik ASSR) was 187,180 square miles; the Turkmen SSR was 161,598 square miles; and the Kirghiz was 70,304 square miles. The Uzbek superiority is further exemplified by the fact that it contained 2/3rds of the region's wealth, 1/2 of the population, 1/2 of the railroads, all of the industry and the best agricultural lands.

²⁶S.K. Kondrashov, "Srednei aziatskoe razmezhevanie," Planovoe khoziaistvo 4 (1925), pp.256-258. The 1926 census indicated that Uzbekistan had a population of 5,297,457. This was broken down into 3,475,340 Uzbeks (66%), 976,728 Tadzhiks (18.1%), 246,521 Russians (4.7%), and the remaining 598,848 (11.2%) being Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Jews, etc., With the official separation of Tadzhikistan, most of the Tadzhiks became official residents of that republic. From William K Medlin et al., p.255.

Finally, in the years immediately following the delimitation, Khodzhaev defended his support for it. In 1925, Khodzhaev wrote Khoziastvennoe polozhenie uzbekskoi SSR i perspektivy ego razvitiia, in which he argued that the process was necessary for both political and economic reasons. Focusing primarily on the economic conditions of the region, Khodzhaev noted that industrial and agricultural modernization could only come about if Bukhara "structurally" became part of a larger, more advanced system.²⁷ Regardless of his theoretical argument, Khodzhaev's actions must also be considered for their pragmatic character. Simply stated, in order to retain his position in the region's political elite, Khodzhaev had to abide by the Soviet decision.

III. THE FORMATION OF THE UZBEK SSR

In the newly-established republic of Uzbekistan, the Soviet government continued to rely on the indigenous elite for leaders. As there were few Russians in Uzbekistan, and even fewer Bolsheviks, they were forced to rely on many of the former Bukharans to fill leadership positions in the republic. Repeating the chain of events of four years earlier, Khodzhaev was called upon to head a provisional

²⁷Faizulla Khodzhaev, Khoziastvennoe polozhenie uzbekskoi SSR i perspektivy ego razvitiia (Tashkent: "Uzbekskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo," 1925), pp.6-7. This is again the subject of his address to the opening session of the Uzbek SSR Soviet, discussed below.

government in anticipation of forming a permanent political hierarchy in the republic. Khodzhaev's acceptance of the status quo is evident in his active and zealous participation in the Provisional Government's activities which began on December 5, 1924.²⁸ The functions of this body, as later explained by Khodzhaev, were the construction of governmental institutions in Uzbekistan, the continuation of the fight against the Basmachi, the organization of local sectors of the Red Army, the supervision of the economic reforms and cotton production as dictated by Moscow, the development of a "class tax" on the wealthier citizens of the Republic, and the addressing of issues regarding women's rights, education and public health.²⁹ In the three months of the Provisional Government's existence, it is unlikely that it pursued any of these issues, save the structuring of institutions and the combatting of the Basmachi.

The Provisional Government's primary function was to set up of the First Congress of Soviets of the Uzbek SSR. The Congress convened on February 13, 1925, shortly after the First Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party.³⁰ Khodzhaev delivered the opening speech in which he explained

²⁸A.I. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), p.66.

²⁹See Khodzhaev, Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie. Also noted in Frank Adolph Ecker, Transition in Asia: Uzbekistan Under the Soviets (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952), pp.41-2.

³⁰Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.66-67.

the purpose of the new government. He stressed that:

The base of our present organization is primarily the central apparatus of the former Turkestan Republic, and part of Bukhara, but the nature of the partitioning changed the operations of these central organizations. Therefore, the Revolutionary Committee (PG), to begin with had to busy itself with the organization of corresponding Peoples' Commissariats (Nazirates) and of separate departments and the establishment of economic organizations to calculate the material means which we received as a result of the partitioning and, finally, had to organize our modern Uzbekistan. These tasks we have almost half completed. At the present time we have formed a central administration with suitable commissariats and separate departments: they are manned and their work is progressing in proper order.³¹

Khodzhaev's statements at this time appear to be less that of a Jadidist and more of an ardent supporter of the new Communist government in Moscow.

This perception is strengthened with a reading of the transcripts of the first session immediately following the above explanation. At one point, Khodzhaev remarked that: "Comrades, we must proceed to select a presidium of our Congress. Comrade Maksumov has a proposal." To which Maksumov answered: "In the name of the Communist faction of our Congress, I move that we select a Presidium of the following sixty-one people (reads the list of names)." Khodzhaev then responded: "Is there any objection to the published list? No. We will consider the list adopted."

³¹Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Natsional'no-gosudarstvennoe razmezhevanie i dostizheniia Uzbekistana za god sushchestvovaniia respublikii," Izbrannye trudy, volume II (Tashkent: "Fan," 1972), pp.415-416.

(Applause)" This style of presentation continued for all six sessions of the Congress. In addition, 160 members and 44 alternates were selected to the Central Executive Committee. Sixty delegates to the All-Union Congress of Soviets were also selected as were eleven observers.³²

Beyond this episode, the most significant event of the Congress was the election of the body's top leadership. The chief nominator was Akmal Ikramov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. According to Ishanov, his nomination of Faizulla Khodzhaev provoked boisterous and prolonged applause by the delegates. So great was the clamor that when it finally subsided the presiding officer of the meeting interrupted it in a truly novel manner, as he announced, "Comrades, your loud applause indicates that you accept the candidature of Comrade F. Khodzhaev unanimously, therefore, I will not put it to a vote. (more applause)."³³

Khodzhaev's position of Prime Minister of the Uzbek SSR was countered by the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov. Two years younger than Khodzhaev, Ikramov was viewed as a "outsider" in Uzbek politics. Presumed to be a member of the Samargand group that opposed

³²Among the members were Khodzhaev, Akmal Ikramov, and the figurehead Uzbek President, Akhunbabaev. Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.68.

³³Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.67. Also cited in Ecker, pp.48-49.

the Tashkent organization of Khodzhaev before the 1920 revolution, Ikramov was also a devoted Communist. Whereas Khodzhaev's political beliefs were shaped by the Jadidist movement outlined in chapter three, Ikramov, it is believed, never associated with the reformers during this early period.³⁴ His views resemble more those of the Bolshevik Party than the nationalist elite, which made him a logical choice for the position of First Secretary. Carlisle adds that as Ikramov was not a member of the Bukharan inner-circle, his political future in Uzbekistan would be limited without an external supporter, namely Moscow. Ikramov's zealous agreement with Soviet policies in Uzbekistan substantiate this position.³⁵ Finally, it is also clear that a serious rift existed between Khodzhaev and Ikramov. While the former typified the more moderate reformists of the Jadidist line, the latter became an advocate of the

³⁴Writing on Ikramov is sketchy and sometimes contradictory. Soviet accounts generally focus on his activities as First Secretary and stress his socialist views. Carlisle, on the other hand, concludes that, by his actions, Ikramov can be seen as a "...modernizer intent on moving his people into the modern world and eradicating every vestige of backwardness." The central accounts of Ikramov's career and writings are Akmal Ikramov, Izbrannye trudy, 3 volumes (Tashkent, "Uzbekistan," 1972), K. Khasanov, Tovarishch Akmal' (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1970), and "M.G. Vakhabov and A.I. Zevelev (eds), Revoliutsionary, vozhaki mass (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1967), pp.385-407. The only english-language account is a review of the above works is Donald Carlisle, "Review of Khasanov, Tovarishch Akmal' and Vakhabov and Zevelev, Revoliutsionary, vozhaki mass," Kritika VIII/3 (Spring 1972), pp.155-171.

³⁵Carlisle, p.163.

Marxism-Leninism of Moscow. On a broader scale, this translated into a rivalry between the State and Party institutions themselves; a rivalry that was to continue until their executions thirteen years later, ironically after having been tried as co-conspirators.

Finally approved of by the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets, the Uzbek SSR was formally created on May 13, 1925. Of symbolic importance in this founding was the initial designation of Samarqand as the Uzbek capital. This move suggests a possible compromise between the Russians and Uzbeks on the Central Executive Committee. As Tashkent was perceived as being a "Russian" city, and Bukhara was connected with the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, Samarqand became the "neutral alternative."³⁶ The subsequent transfer of the capitol from Samarqand to Tashkent in 1929 supports this claim, as that year also signalled an increased Russification in Uzbekistan.

In spite of the formation of official institutions and the semblance of an autonomous political leadership under Khodzhaev and Ikramov, comments emanating from Moscow indicated that these actions were mere gestures. Medlin remarks that:

The nature of the Soviet power structure and the absence of a formal native political system, indicated that these Uzbek officials performed technical roles and were not invested with

³⁶This is noted in Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, volume II, p.602.

original decision-making powers, which were in fact lodged in regional authorities and federal agencies where Russian officials set policies.³⁷

This paradoxical situation would eventually force Khodzhaev to re-examine his support for the Soviet policies and later openly oppose them.

The dominant position of the central government in Uzbek affairs was reiterated by Stalin. Five days after the official founding of the Uzbek SSR, Stalin delivered a speech to the students at the University of the Toilers of the East, in which he reiterated the significance of this merger. Now that the republics of Central Asia have come out from under the "yoke of imperialism," they could participate in the progressive experiment of the Soviet Union. At one point, he remarked that: "Its [the national delimitation] significance can only be that it places in the hands of the active workers in these republics a new weapon with which to facilitate and accelerate the work of linking these countries with the general system of Soviet economic development."³⁸

In the speech, Stalin outlined five major tasks that confronted the peoples of Central Asia: (1) the creation of industrial centers around which the peasant-workers alliance can form; (2) the advancement of irrigation and agricultural

³⁷William K. Medlin et al., p.57.

³⁸J.V. Stalin, "The Soviet Republics of the East," in Marxism and the National Question; Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p.198.

development; (3) the improvement of cooperative efforts with the other republics of the Soviet Union in order to create a more cohesive economic structure; (4) the need to have the masses identify with the Soviet system of governmental representation; (5) the development of a national culture which would include a national system of schools and trade unions.³⁹ For the most part, these superficially coincided with Khodzhaev's goals. As head of the BPSR, Khodzhaev advocated the agricultural and industrial development. In addition, he supported cooperation with outside forces. The Central Asian Economic Council is indicative of this position. Where he might differ would be in the areas of structural and cultural unity with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

Stalin concluded his address with a warning on deviations in Soviet Central Asia. The first deviation was "oversimplification." As a warning to the more zealous Communists, Stalin stated that one cannot assume development and social conditions will remain the same throughout the Soviet Union. Specifically, how economic development occurs in central Russia will differ from that in Georgia or Uzbekistan. Some areas might lag in the process and must be treated differently. How, and to what extent, this differential treatment takes place was not explicitly

³⁹Ibid., pp.193-194.

⁴⁰These various points will be discussed below and in chapter seven.

stated. However, it did become the foundation for his later changes in policy. In particular, as cotton monoculture developed in Uzbekistan, Stalin further stressed this belief in regional differentiation.

Stalin offered a second warning directed more at the Uzbek leadership. He stated that:

The second deviation, on the contrary, lies in the exaggeration of local peculiarities, in the fact that the common and main thing which links these Eastern republics with the industrial regions of the Soviet Union is forgotten, that socialist tasks are hushed up and that adaptations are made to the aims of a narrow and restricted nationalism....The result of this deviation is that they [the nationalists] become divorced from socialism and degenerate into ordinary bourgeois nationalists. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres in a spirit of irreconcilable warfare against this latent nationalism.⁴¹

This argument colored the relationship between the central authority and the regional elite, and justified the former's intrusions into the activities of the latter. Nationalism and national sentiments that conflicted with the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union simply could not be tolerated.

For Khodzhaev, this meant that the views he expressed during the 1917-1924 period were suddenly unacceptable. Thus, he had two choices: refute his earlier nationalist position, or disagree with the new ideology of the Soviet Union regarding nationalities policy. For the first several

⁴¹Ibid., p.200.

years, it appeared as if Khodzhaev opted for the former position. For example, in his work commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Khodzhaev writes:

I personally hope that this pamphlet, in conjunction with the works of other comrades, who are dedicating their works to illuminating other problems, indicates the importance, although only partially, of our October achievements, and shows the readers the truths of very important works, which are being produced in our country for the worker-peasant masses...⁴²

As suggested in these comments, Khodzhaev centers the work around the relationship between the Bolshevik Revolution and the social and economic changes in Central Asia. References to the Young Bukharans are sparse, and are only raised in conjunction with the Bolshevik successes. It was only later, as state policies infringed more fully upon any sense of local autonomy, he moved to the second.

The reality of the situation was that by May of 1925, Uzbekistan became a de facto protectorate of the central government in Moscow. The nationalist Khodzhaev had also become a participant in this development. Unlike the experience of the past several decades, the new Uzbekistan possessed no autonomous political force, and it had its geographic borders designated from above. This would be most evident in future economic and social decisions.

⁴²Faizulla Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva (Tashkent: Uzbekscoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'svto, 1927), p.3.

IV. UZBEK ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE 1920S

The 1924 national delimitation and the creation of the Uzbek and Turkmen republics signalled a new period in land reform. On November 23, 1925, Khodzhaev presented an agricultural development plan to the Second Session of the Uzbek Communist Party Congress. He noted that the cotton harvest was only 55% of the pre-war level for the region, and that in order to increase productivity, a more substantial financing plan was needed. He suggested that 46 million rubles be designated for agricultural improvements, with 12 million alone going towards irrigation expansion. In addition, he argued that a series of agronomist offices and machine-tractor points be set up at a cost of 700,000 rubles. These modest measures would gradually increase the efficiency and productivity in the region.⁴³

This was formalized on December 12, 1925, when the Uzbek government published the "Water and Land Reform Decree," which reiterated the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee decree of the previous month. The decree spelled out the structure of land commissions that would exist at all economic levels, from the smallest raion to the republic government. Specifically singled out was the attack on the "feudal-beys," those landowners who possessed a disproportionate share of land and resources. According to

⁴³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, volume II, pp.81-83. He repeated this speech to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in June of 1926. Also see Ishanov, pp.70-71.

official statistics, large landowners constituted roughly 5.3% of the agricultural population, but owned 36.7% of the land in 1924.⁴⁴ Aminova states that:

Delegates of the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan stressed the need for an early solution of the land question. In its resolution "On the Work Among the Uzbek Peasantry" the Congress pointed to the need for preparatory work before the land question could be settled and called on all Party members to take an active part in this preparation.⁴⁵

The decree declared that all lands, forests, waters and mineral resources in Uzbekistan were state properties and could be re-allocated according to state planning.

From December 1925 to early 1926, the Uzbek government carried out the policy of confiscating the holdings of all "non-toiling" households.⁴⁶ This classification applied to

⁴⁴Large landowners were defined as those who possessed over 10 dessiatins of land. Middle landowners possessed between 3 and 10 dessiatins each, and poor had below 3. The middle landowners constituted 20% of the agricultural population with 36.8% of the land, and the poor made up the majority at 74.7% with only 26.5% of the land. For further discussion, see Postroenie ekonomicheskogo fundamenta sotsializma v SSSR 1926-1932gg (Moscow: "Nauka," 1960), p.304.

⁴⁵R.Kh. Aminova, Changes in Uzbekistan's Agriculture (1917-1929), translated by V.A. Epshtein and B.N. Iunkov (Moscow: "Nauka," 1974), p.76. She also remarks that in October, 1925, two months prior to the decree, there were peasant demonstrations in Samargand, demanding a more equitable land policy. Khodzhaev does not mention this in any of his writings.

⁴⁶R.R. Sharma, "Class and Social-Agrarian Transformation in Soviet Central Asia: A Historical-Cultural Context," in Socio-Economic Transformation of Soviet Central Asia, edited by R.G. Gidadhubli (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1987), pp.121-122.

those able to hire servants and field-hands and in possession of over a specific acreage.⁴⁷ By the end of this period, 56,830 peasant households received "Bey-owned" lands and 19,790 received newly-irrigated properties. In addition, sections of 21,298 farms were redistributed according to the laws regulating the acreage allotted to each farmer.⁴⁸ The acreage limits were as follows: in the Ferghana -- 7 desiatins; in Tashkent and Samarqand -- 10 desiatins; in the rest of Uzbekistan -- 12 desiatins. The land was to be parcelled out according to a preference list with sharecroppers, farm hands, and the landless poor given top priority.⁴⁹ The reform policy created a new social class structure in Uzbekistan. Technically, the landless population dropped to zero. Poor peasants increased to 37.6%, middle peasants to 61%, and the wealthy peasants dropped to a negligible 1.4%.⁵⁰

⁴⁷Depending on the region in question. For example, in the Ferghana, the number was set at 110 acres; in Tashkent and Samarqand it was 135. See Park, p.343.

⁴⁸Babushkin, L.N. (ed), Soviet Uzbekistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p.52.

⁴⁹To carry out this policy, the Uzbek Central Executive Committee set up a Central Land Commission which was comprised of five sub-committees: (1) irrigation; (2) stock-taking; (3) finance; (4) propaganda; (5) information bureau. In addition, each region had its own Regional Land Commission with the Ferghana having an additional four more District Land Commissions. All told there were 64 DLCs: 36 in the Ferghana, 15 in Samarqand; and 13 in Tashkent. Aminova, pp.79-80.

⁵⁰Aminova, pp.100-1.

The question arises as to whether Khodzhaev actively supported these measures, or saw them as a means by which the Soviet government could control Uzbekistan. Critchlow, in his recent discovery of an Uzbek-language transcript of the Second Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party (November 22-30, 1925), contends that Khodzhaev adamantly advocated the land reforms.⁵¹ At the Congress, Khodzhaev remarks that:

With the old-time land relations, the old order of land distribution, the working of land with old methods, on the basis of the old areas of irrigated land, our territory will not be a rich territory, and will not be able to meet the needs of the people. The land reform puts before us the possibility of broad advancement and prepares the way with rapid steps toward establishing our own economy and consolidating society in our territory.⁵²

It would appear that Khodzhaev believed the reforms to be beneficial to the Uzbek people themselves, and thus supported the measures. Khodzhaev later added that:

We believe that our success on this fundamental aspect of our agricultural construction is a significant step in elucidating the general increases in the economic growth of Uzbekistan, as a part of the Soviet Union; and gives meaning to the very significant effects,

⁵¹James Critchlow, "Did Faizulla Khojaev Really Oppose Uzbekistan's Land Reform? (An Old Document Surfaces)," Central Asian Survey 9/3 (1990):34.

⁵²Faizulla Khodzhaev, Ozbekistanning iqtisadii tuzilishi kelgusi amallar. Tashkent: Uzbekistan State Publishing House, 1926, p.29, as quoted in Critchlow op cit, pp.34-35.

which it is having on the hard-won freedoms of the working masses.⁵³

This position muddles the argument that Khodzhaev was a Jadidist nationalist at heart, for it presents him not only as a defender of his people, but as a builder of communism. The duality in Khodzhaev's statements indicate that at best, he was an advocate of modernization and regional development. The motivation behind this position, whether it was out of a nationalist or communist line of reasoning, remains unclear.

During this period, acreage under cultivation in Uzbekistan increased. Indeed, during the period of 1925-27, cultivated land increased from 1.5 million to 1.6 million hectares. However, the increased productivity was almost exclusively in cotton planting as reconverted lands were earmarked for cotton production.⁵⁴ Lands devoted to cotton production increased from 26.6 to 33.1 thousand dessiatins during the years 1925-28. Conversely, lands allocated for cereals dropped from 56.9 to 50.2 thousand dessiatins during the same period. Indeed, with the exception of alfalfa, all crops devoted for consumption dropped, many by over a half

⁵³Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by, p.36.

⁵⁴O.B. Dzhamalov (ed), Istoriia narodnogo khoziastva Uzbekistana, volume I (Tashkent: Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1962), pp.152-6. As a result, while cotton production had already reached the 1914 level, grain production was only at about 65%.

of the former production.⁵⁵ In 1925, 28.6% of the land was devoted to cotton. By 1929, this figure increased to 43.2%. Cotton had become the primary crop of the region, with little opposition from the Uzbek leaders.⁵⁶ Finally, peasants received advance credit to repair damaged irrigation canals. By 1926-7, about 78% of the irrigation systems in Uzbekistan had been restored, with the figure rising to 82% in the following year. This last measure was important as the cotton crops required extensive irrigation.

In May, 1928, Stalin announced that the land reforms had been successful in: "(1) partially eliminating the exploiters, the kulaks and rich landlords; (2) stimulating cotton production; and (3) preparing the way for the next step -- the collectivization of agriculture."⁵⁷ This foreshadowing of the policies of the 1930s did not immediately affect Khodzhaev. On December 7, 1928, at the Fourth Session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Khodzhaev restated his support for transformation of the Uzbek economy into a primarily cotton-based system.⁵⁸ Khodzhaev later wrote that:

⁵⁵Aminova, p.102.

⁵⁶Khodzhaev himself even stresses the importance of this development in Uzbek agriculture. See Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva, pp.29-32, 38.

⁵⁷Donald L. McQueen, Uzbekistan and the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), p.222.

⁵⁸Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.78-79.

In this respect, the Sovnarkom of Uzbekistan customarily called, in its capacity, the basic instillation of the current sowing campaign -- "the maximum increase in production of agriculture for the fulfillment of industrial and raw material needs, which are requirements of the population, and the development of exports for the basic expansion of kolkhoz and sovkhos construction and the reconstruction of individual farms....With the organizational measures of the present year [1929], we have better prepared for the future... presently supporting the activities of the deghons, strengthening the cooperative systems, etc.,⁵⁹

In all fairness, the policy changes thus far did not necessarily portend the massive collectivization that was to take place in the next several years.

For the most part, the modest measures of the 1920s paralleled the Young Bukharan goal of creating a modern agricultural system in the region that would entail a more equitable land distribution. On both counts, the Soviet Union accomplished what the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic did not. It appears that Khodzhaev believed this himself, as from 1926 to 1928, he frequently travelled to Moscow to coordinate economic plans for the region.⁶⁰ Furthermore, his active involvement in the overseeing of the land redistribution indicates that, at least with respect to

⁵⁹Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, p.562.

⁶⁰Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.76-77. As Prime Minister, it appears as if Khodzhaev was the central liaison between the economic officials in Moscow and Tashkent.

this issue, he was in agreement with the Soviet government.⁶¹

This is exemplified by Khodzhaev's support for the development of the "Koshchi." The Koshchi, or the "the Union of Toiling Peasants," was an organization whose objective was "to direct and organize the rural proletarian and semiproletarian masses for the purpose of promoting class stratification in the village, kishlak, and aul."⁶² At the Second Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party in 1925, the Koshchi organizations were given minimal powers over land that was to be expropriated from the large landowners. Within a year, membership had increased to over 155,000 peasants. By giving some powers to the local population, the Soviet government, at least initially, created a sense of stability in the region. Khodzhaev himself comments that the Koshchi established order in otherwise chaotic rural regions of Uzbekistan.⁶³ He also noted that they were

⁶¹Khodzhaev notes this in a speech delivered on October 15, 1926, entitled "Two Years of Work of the Government of Uzbekistan." In it, he focuses on the development of the three key regions in Uzbekistan: the Ferghana, Tashkent, and Samarqand oblasts. This was partially printed in Pravda vostoka, November 25, 1926.

⁶²Park, p.146.

⁶³Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by, p.33. For example, in 1927, the Koshchi represented 22% of the rural voters and 60% of the local council seats. Most accounts note that after the collectivization campaign in the early 1930s, the Koshchi's importance waned. It had, as far as the Soviet government was concerned, served its purpose of organizing the lower classes in Uzbekistan. Medlin et al, p.60.

instrumental in the successful reorganization of Uzbek rural society. He commented that:

Now it is possible to say that the mistakes [in land usage and distribution], which were admittedly evident before all, have been corrected. Our success has been widely shown to the masses of deghons. Don't let the hostile elements speculate any more about our mistakes.⁶⁴

Reform measures were finally being implemented in Uzbekistan, where they had not been successful in the previous BPSR.

The last area of economic policy was industrial development. In Uzbekistan, from 1925 to 1929, the emphasis remained on agriculture; however, attention was given to industrial expansion and development.⁶⁵ Industry in Uzbekistan during the NEP period was small and almost exclusively state-run. State industry constituted 98% of all industry in 1925/26, dropping to only 96.3% in 1927/28. Cooperatives rose from 1.2% to 3.3% during the same period, and private industry was halved, from a paltry 0.8% to 0.4%.⁶⁶ One result of this exclusive state policy was that during the period of massive industrialization in the 1930s, there was not the need for an extensive attack on private companies or entrepreneurs that existed in other republics.

⁶⁴Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, p.582.

⁶⁵Khodzhaev comments on the "supporting role" of industry in Uzbekistan. Khodzhaev, Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie Uzbekskoi SSR, pp.26-27.

⁶⁶McQueen, p.214.

The nature of industry in Uzbekistan made this transition fairly easy.

As with the rest of the Soviet Union, the New Economic Policy had an impact on Uzbekistan. For the republic, it meant the focus was to be on small-scale businesses that were associated with textiles. Prior to 1917, there were 251 ginning mills. Although this number was down to 60 by the 1920s, the remaining firms were more prosperous. According to Park, this phenomenon "indicated a reversal of the pre-revolutionary trend toward the establishment of new enterprises rather than the expansion of existing plants and equipment."⁶⁷ By 1927, in almost all areas of industrial development, the pre-war levels had either been reached or surpassed. It is important to note that even at this early stage of development, there was a conscious effort to establish the supremacy of cotton-related industries in Uzbekistan. Khodzhaev justifies this by saying that the new Soviet period is simply accelerating the ascension of agricultural development, "which includes in the present time, a significant role for our cotton industry."⁶⁸ The effects of the "cottonization" of both agriculture and industry would not be felt until the following decade.

⁶⁷Park, p.271.

⁶⁸Khodzhaev, Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie Uzbekskoi SSR, p.26.

The exception to this trend was in the energy sector. In order to build a sufficient basis for future economic expansion, the Soviet government decided to utilize the power resources in the area. Hydro-electric plants, benefitted by the powerful Amu and Syr Daryas, increased power capabilities several times over. In Uzbekistan, the total power resource count stood at 36.4 million kilowatts in 1925/26 and increased to 52.0 million the following year.⁶⁹ The rivers of Uzbekistan made it a natural base for such energy development, and thus most of the initial investments went into this area. In addition, the oil reserves in Uzbekistan became a source of minimal industrial growth. Khodzhaev remarked that from 1924 to 1927, oil production increased 60% (to 360,000 puds of oil) as a result of increased financing from the central government.⁷⁰ As with the economy in general, the energy sector would not experience a significant level of development until the 1930s.

In general, Uzbek agriculture and industry during these years grew at a steady but slow rate. Agricultural production was just beginning to become "cottonized" and the New Economic Policy meant that state interference was not complete. Organizations such as the Koshchi, although

⁶⁹Park, p.274.

⁷⁰Khodzhaev, Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie Uzbekskoi SSR, p.30.

ultimately directed from above, sent a signal to the peasants that they could have some control over their own farms. Consequently, there was seemingly little opposition from Khodzhaev. Khodzhaev can be viewed as an advocate of economic development during this period. The general policies initiated from 1925 to 1928 paralleled his own objectives of previous years. His writings also suggest that Khodzhaev believed that these measures would directly benefit the Uzbek people and create a viable economic base in the region.⁷¹ Thus, outside of the issue of determining who controlled the process, there was no real reason for Khodzhaev to oppose the Soviet economic policies.

V. UZBEK SOCIAL REFORMS OF THE 1920S

One reason the Soviet government took control of the political and economic institutions of Uzbekistan was that there were very few educated and technically capable Uzbeks in the mid-1920s. Although exact figures are difficult to determine, it is reasonable to assume that less than ten percent of the Uzbek population was literate. To make matters worse, many of the intelligentsia that could have helped develop a technical class had either fled the country or had been discredited enough to prohibit their future

⁷¹This is evident in speeches that Khodzhaev delivered to various factory and Communist Party organization during the 1920s. Khodzhaev, "Chetyre goda," Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, pp.502-504. This piece was originally printed in Pravda vostoka, July 8, 1927.

involvement in Uzbek politics. Of the remaining intellectuals who were decidedly pro-Soviet, few held posts of real value and were usually outside of the political system.⁷²

To rectify this situation, the Uzbek government immediately began a campaign for mass literacy in the republic. A series of schools, called likbez (the acronym for "illiteracy liquidation") schools, developed. Khodzhaev considered the problems of these schools to be, among other things, "an insufficiency in the provisions of the schools, and other instructional and fundamental investments."⁷³ Basically, there were insufficient funds to fully implement the likbez program.

Years later, the shortcomings of the likbez system revealed discouraging observations. As late as May of 1932, Khodzhaev was to lament that, "[i]t is impossible to close our eyes to the fact that some who have concluded courses in likbez are still semi-illiterate."⁷⁴ Official statistics note that in 1925, likbez enrollment stood at 20,729. This figure increased to over 37,000 by 1927 and 70,700 in 1928.

⁷²Park, p.364.

⁷³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, pp.264-266. Khodzhaev adds that "through planning," every school will eventually become part of the system, which will benefit the poor.

⁷⁴Revoliutsii i natsional'nosti, May 1932, p.11.

The corresponding figures of "literate" Uzbeks were 5.6% in 1925, 7.0% in 1927 and 9.8% in 1928.⁷⁵

Standardized, secular schools also increased during the first years of the Uzbek republic. Again, citing statistics of the period, elementary schools increased from 867 in 1925 to 2,194 in 1929. Intermediate and secondary schools grew from 40 to 121 during the same years. The corresponding student enrollment escalated from 56,542 elementary and 18,976 intermediate and secondary in 1925 to 122,406 and 44,231 respectively.⁷⁶ Although still in its initial stage, the education reform began to have an impact on the Uzbek intelligentsia. Whereas prior to 1925, it was difficult for the intellectuals to associate with the masses, there now began a period in which such a connection was possible.

To assist in this educational program, Soviet officials organized a series of conferences and discussions on the subject of standardizing the Uzbek language, with respect to both vocabulary and script. During the mid-1920s, much of the work remained in the planning stage, with most of the

⁷⁵Eugene Medynaky, "Schools and Education in the U.S.S.R.," American Sociological Review 2 (June 1944):289; and Revoliutsionyi vostok 1 (1934):151.

⁷⁶E.V. Rachinsky et al., (eds), Narodnoe obrazovanie v Uz.SSR, 1924-1939 (Tashkent: "Gosizdatel'stvo," 1939), p.47-49.

implementation taking place in the years 1928-1938.⁷⁷ Overall, the mass education program forced the indigenous writers and leaders to address the new nationalities' labels of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ Khodzhaev, as one of these leaders, began to write from the "Uzbek" perspective, and by 1926, had dropped all references to a Bukharan or Turkic identity.⁷⁹ At the December 2, 1926 extraordinary session of the Tadzhik ASSR Supreme Soviet, Khodzhaev spoke on the foreign and domestic problems facing the Soviet Union. The content of the speech was not nearly as important as Khodzhaev's delivering the speech three times in three different languages: Russian, Uzbek, and Tadzhik. Through this gesture he hoped to underline the distinctiveness of the various ethnic groups in the region.⁸⁰ At this early

⁷⁷Thomas G. Winner, "Problems in Alphabetic Reform among the Turkic Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 1920-1941," The Slavonic Review XXXI/76 (December 1952):138-141.

⁷⁸For a discussion of the techniques of mass education, see Mandel et al., op cit.

⁷⁹This was not the case for many writers in Uzbekistan. According to other accounts, groups, such as the Chaghatai gurungi (a literary group that concentrated on reviving the Central Asian past), still maintained a belief in a turkic people as opposed to the nationality configuration set up by the delimitation. See Edward Allworth, "Intellectuals and Literary Change," in Allworth, Central Asia, pp.382-385; Hisao Komatsu, "The Evolution of Group Identity among Bukharan Intellectuals in 1911-1928: An Overview," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library), 47 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1989), pp.134-137.

⁸⁰Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.72.

stage, support for the local languages was still considered essential in Soviet policies.

The same could be said for religious and traditional social institutions. Although clearly opposed to religious beliefs and practices, the Bolsheviks continued their policy of relative tolerance with regard to Islam. In governmental decrees and local propaganda, there was a lack of anti-religious sentiment. In Uzbekistan, the traditional role of the aksakal, or rural elders, was left intact. This was part of a conscious effort to curry favor with the local population. Accordingly, an official government proclamation read:

Hence the measures directed by the Soviet government toward supplying the landless peasants with surplus lands and toward freeing the serfs from age-long humiliation and bondage -- such measures shall never be unlawful according to the Islamic religion.⁸¹

In spite of this commitment, there were gradual restrictions placed upon the religious institutions. Because the Soviets were able to parcel out land to the peasants, gradually reduce the social importance of the waqf holdings, and maintain tolerate other Islamic practices, the Uzbek (as well as other Muslim) population did not protest.⁸² Khodzhaev later reflected that these restrictions were

⁸¹Joshua Kunitz, Dawn Over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia (New York: Covici-Friede Publishers, 1935), p.190.

⁸²Park, p.221.

necessary because the rural regions still maintained some animosity towards the socialist agenda.⁸³

The Shari'at courts that continued in the BPSR met a similar fate. Although the Bukharan government attempted to reform the legal code in 1924, by the time of the delimitation, the Shari'at still retained its position in society. In 1925, the judgeship posts (qadis) were filled with reformist and liberal mullas, thus facilitating the transition to the more uniform Soviet legal code. One Soviet scholar remarked that:

The shari'at court of the qadi has departed in many respects from the Shari'at. Judging by judicial decisions, this court may qualify as a mixed soviet-shari'at court. Because of the demands of life and changed relationships, the qadi without special compulsion has had to resort to the articles of our code...The clear imprint of the new Soviet legislation lies on the present-day court of the qadi.⁸⁴

Like the vaqf lands, the shari'at courts were limited by central legislation. By 1926, they became "voluntary" organizations and given token powers. The Soviet government, on September 21, 1927, issued the decree "On Shari'at and Adat Courts," which prohibited such

⁸³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, pp.574-575. In a speech to the RCP(b) Central Asian Committee, Khodzhaev saw these counterrevolutionary elements as those who opposed the modernization program and cotton industry in Uzbekistan. He further noted that the Soviet leadership should take note that this conservatism existed in both the villages and in the cities, and was a deep-rooted problem.

⁸⁴Fioletov, "Sudy kaziev v Sredne-Aziatskikh respublikakh," Sovetskoe Pravo 1 (25) (1927), p.145, quoted in Park, p.236.

organizations from interacting in the Soviet legal system. In effect, they were banned.⁸⁵

Like the educational and economic measures, Soviet policies towards Islam were gradual in implementation and received the support of Khodzhaev. This was evident in Khodzhaev's vocal approval of the "hujum" campaign that entailed the unveiling of Muslim women in Central Asia. Women's rights had been a platform for the Young Bukharans as far back as the 1917 declarations.⁸⁶ For example, there began a move to encourage women to work outside the home.⁸⁷ In support of this, Khodzhaev wrote that:

The brow-beaten woman of Uzbekistan, with terrible strain and incredible labor, has come from under the foot and might of great damnation and deprivation, is now pulling herself together [towards] her course and building for herself a new future.⁸⁸

⁸⁵Shokhor, "Religiozno-bytovye sudy v RSFSR," Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo 8-9 (13-14) (August-September 1927), p.110-111.

⁸⁶According to most accounts, the most vocal advocate of this reform measure was not Khodzhaev, but Ikramov. See Vakhabo and Zevelev, Revoliutsionary, p.390.

⁸⁷By the 1930s, women made up one-third of the entire industrial work-force in Uzbekistan, with most of them concentrated in the textile industries. Dzhakhan Abidova, "Zhenshchina uzbekistana v bor'be za svoe raskreposhcheniie," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 3 (March, 1936):46-50; Fannina W. Halle, Women in the Soviet East (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1938), p.260.

⁸⁸Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, p.548.

The goal was to bring the women into the work force and, more importantly, weaken the traditional ties that bound the Uzbek society.

With the prompting of the Soviet government, and the Women's Section (Zhenotdel') in particular, the Uzbek government advocated the removal of the paranja; the traditional veil that Muslim women were required to wear.⁸⁹ On March 8, 1927, after a year of extensive propaganda in the press, an estimated 90,000 Uzbek women associated with the Zhenotdel' refused to wear their veils.⁹⁰ In the following months, a number of women were murdered, often by their own family members, for participating in this campaign. Officially, this number was placed at twenty-seven, although an unofficial count has it at much higher.⁹¹ During the next several years, the number of women unveiling steadily increased as the reaction subsided. The actions of the wives of progressive religious leaders were of particular importance. According to one account:

Mullah's wives would persuade and dissuade,
and a progressive section amongst the Muslims

⁸⁹Dinerstein, p.509.

⁹⁰See Izvestiia, October 13, 1927. For a chronology of the hujum, see Dzh. Abidova, "Zhenshchina uzbekistana v bor'be za svoe raskreposcheniye," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 3 (1936):46-50.

⁹¹The vicious attacks on these women were justified by some on the grounds that they had dishonored their families. For an account of this, see A. Nukhrat, "Usilit' kassovuyu bditel'nost' i proizvodstvennuyu aktivnost'," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 3 (1933):46-59.

evolved a liberation movement of their own which won over many of the best of the Uzbeks.⁹²

The success of the campaign was marred by the women's deaths. Khodzhaev, in the March 22, 1927 issue of Pravda vostoka, defends the actions and considers them to be part of the "new era" in Uzbekistan. He writes that:

The resolution of this objective is now presenting itself in increased revolutionary actions, to a completion of the problem in which the ultimate place belongs to the newly-emancipated women. The working masses of Uzbekistan understand, that it is impossible to be cultured as long as half of the population -- the women, are obscured, forgotten, and wrapped up in a paranja -- eking out a miserable existence until they are old.⁹³

In retrospect, the women's liberation campaign was not to be realized for some time. Women, under pressure from their families, continued to wear the veil. An official report of 1941 indicated that women still wore veils.⁹⁴

The social policies initiated during the 1920s possessed a common theme: there was a gradual approach to modernization in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, by weakening the basic tenets of the traditional culture in the region, the leadership hoped to foster a sense of "Uzbek identification." Khodzhaev continually stressed the need to

⁹²Ernest S. Bates, Soviet Asia: Progress and Problems (London: Jonathan Cape, 1942), p.149.

⁹³Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, p.496.

⁹⁴"Antireligioznaia propaganda -- delo vsexh partiinykh i nepartiinykh bolshevikov," Pravda vostoka, February 10, 1941.

use the modernized Uzbek language in communication in order to develop this identification. He noted that it was the only way the local communities could finally associate with the national government's agenda.⁹⁵ However, Khodzhaev later remarked, this did not give license to expressing any form of "Pan-nationalism." In a speech to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, he emphasized that the revolutionary masses need to combat bourgeois nationalists outside the country, referring to the emigres Zeki Validov and Mustafa Chokaev. Furthermore, the Uzbeks had to continually combat the remnants of any "feudal" customs such as the kalym (bride's payment), polygamy, and, of course, the paranja.⁹⁶ With the attacks on traditional practices, there gradually emerged a new, national, identity in Uzbekistan.⁹⁷

VI. FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV AS A BEARER OF "UZBEK" NATIONALISM

The first years of the Uzbek SSR were critical for the republic's elite. In spite of the obvious Russian control from above, there remained an element of local power in such

⁹⁵Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, p.196.

⁹⁶Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, p.79.

⁹⁷Allworth remarks that these policies created a "new intellectual base" for the Uzbek leaders, and "broke a crucial link self and group and group and outside world." In sum, it laid the foundations for a new identity in the region that the intelligentsia had to support. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks, p.209.

issues as education and agriculture. The only indigenous practices that had been significantly curtailed pertained to Islam, and even this process was in its initial stages. The gradual economic reforms coincided with the objectives of the Young Bukharans as did the push for mass-literacy in the republic. These policies created a stable environment in which the Uzbek republic, and the Uzbek nation in particular, could develop.

This is the central theme of Khodzhaev's Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva, written in 1927. In this short piece, Khodzhaev summarizes the activities of the Young Bukharans in their drive for political control of Bukhara. What makes this writing different from his 1926 K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare is that he more closely ties the Bukharan revolution to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. He argues that there is a direct link between the destinies of the Russians and the Central Asians, which culminated in the creation of the Uzbek SSR.⁹⁸ As a result of the economic progress that took place during the first several years of the new system, Uzbekistan has become a strong economic force in the region. Khodzhaev concludes that this should send a clear signal to countries such as India and China that the Soviet approach is a viable path to modernization,

⁹⁸Faizulla Khodzhaev, Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva (Samarkand: Uzbekskoi gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1927), pp.14-15.

and should be emulated by other countries.⁹⁹ This positive portrayal of the new Soviet system is the central theme of the later writings of Khodzhaev. On the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Khodzhaev declared that:

If you desire to see what we have achieved as a result of national-state delimitation, look upon the territory of the present Uzbek republic, see how the relations between the various nationalities are established, see how the wide strata of workers and peasants have been associated with the entire administration in this Republic; see and tell us who rules the country. Look at the number of schools which the Soviet Government has established and also the work it is carrying out in the educational sphere; look at the mutual relations which have evolved between the Soviet republics and the Soviet Union into which Uzbekistan, on its own free volition, has entered as an equal member; look at the complete national peace which now prevails, the growth of our industries, agriculture and trade which have already attained the pre-war level (of development). See all these and be convinced about all that national delimitation has given to Central Asia.¹⁰⁰

This statement expresses Khodzhaev's position of the late 1920s. Allworth argues that Khodzhaev's rationale stems from his inherent communist ideology.¹⁰¹

In spite of this, there is no indication that Khodzhaev had abandoned his Jadidist beliefs. He simply argues that the initial programs of the Soviet Union in Uzbekistan were

⁹⁹Ibid., p.42.

¹⁰⁰Quoted in B. Kul'besherov, "Sovetskoi stroitel'stvo v Srednei Azii i ego zadacha k 10-letiiu Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii," Novyi vostok XXXII (1927):19.

¹⁰¹Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks, p.202.

beneficial to the Uzbek people themselves.¹⁰² Critchlow gives a plausible explanation for Khodzhaev's actions. He writes that:

The year 1925 was still a time of revolutionary romanticism for those who believed that change was needed. If Khojaev did in fact become decisively disillusioned with the Soviet regime, it seems likely that developments subsequent to the 1925 land reform would have been a greater factor....He was required by his position to support all of these actions [of state control]...¹⁰³

It was only after the Soviet government began to completely dominate Uzbek politics that Khodzhaev had doubts about the system. Nevertheless, as early as the late-1920s there began a series of attacks on Khodzhaev's loyalty and credibility, largely because tensions within the Soviet Union were beginning to focus upon the national republic leaders. Even though Khodzhaev was better characterized as a strong advocate of modernization, he could be, and was, considered a possible nationalist.

This latter perspective is corroborated by Ikramov's attacks on Khodzhaev. Ikramov, the "leftist" First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, began to criticize Khodzhaev for being too much of a "rightist" and "nationalist." In a speech on March 20, 1927, Ikramov,

¹⁰²This is the theme of a speech Khodzhaev delivered on April 27, 1927. Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Rech na IV s"ezde sovetov SSSR," Izbrannye trudy, volume II, pp.497-501.

¹⁰³Critchlow, "Did Faizulla Khojaev Really Oppose Uzbekistan's Land Reform?," p.37.

expressed his displeasure with Khodzhaev's timid policies regarding the language reforms. By not supporting the full integration of Uzbekistan into the USSR, Khodzhaev was permitting the development of a distinct, non-socialist nationality. At one point, Ikramov goes so far as to suggest that Khodzhaev was actually a member of a nationalist organization called the "Group of 18."¹⁰⁴ Supposedly founded on the principles of creating a true nationalist state in Bukhara, and later Uzbekistan, the Group of 18 was considered by Khodzhaev's opponents to be his underground support system. Although its exact composition and purpose was never explicitly determined, the "Group of 18" membership was to be charged against Khodzhaev that would resurface throughout the next decade. Ikramov repeats this claim in October 1927 and, again, at the Third Party Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in the following month.¹⁰⁵ At the Congress, Khodzhaev was forced to respond to Ikramov's charge that he was a "closet nationalist." In a brief address, Khodzhaev only noted that he was working for the success of the republic. He did not challenge the nationalist label.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴Akmal Ikramov, "Zakliuchitel'noe slovo po dokladu o praktike i zadachakh ideologicheskogo fronta 20 marta 1927g," Izbrannye trudy, volume I (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), pp.263-269.

¹⁰⁵Akmal Ikramov, Izbrannye trudy, volume I (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), pp.324, 371-376.

¹⁰⁶Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, pp.571-572.

Finally, it is important to address the issue of whether a sense of "Uzbekness" began to develop. Prior to the actual creation of the Uzbek SSR, the ethnic groups known as the "Uzbeks" did not have a distinct political structure. With the sudden creation of an Uzbek "nation," the indigenous elites began to coalesce around this concept. On issues of culture and literature, this even translated into minimal opposition to the state. Carrere d'Encausse writes that:

Here [in Uzbekistan], opposition to Soviet authority was, as in the plains, economic, social, and cultural at the same time. The first clashes were over the politico-literary aspirations of the Chagatay group mustered around the old literary language of Western Turkestan, which this group wanted to resuscitate for distinctly nationalistic purposes.¹⁰⁷

This focus on a nationalist theme is evident in Khodzhaev's 1926 work K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare. Within five years, he was to come under severe criticism for his "nationalist" views and was forced to revise the text. This incident at least gives credence to the argument that Khodzhaev had not completely sold out to the Communists. In addition, Khodzhaev wrote that a new nation and people were developing in Uzbekistan. This was often qualified by such statements as "this theme of the masses is expressed by the revolutionary intelligentsia, which does not forget that

¹⁰⁷Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Republics Lose Independence," in Allworth, Central Asia, p.262.

ultimately this "nation" is of a bolshevik people."¹⁰⁸

Again, Khodzhaev modified his position, more than likely for the sake of obtaining approval from above.

Whether an Uzbek nation actually emerged is ultimately difficult to evaluate. It does seem clear that efforts were made to establish such an identity among the elite, however the mass support needed was still in the formative stages. It could be argued that for most of the elites, 1925 to 1929 was a period in which:

...the majority of the national leaders tried to salvage what they could of their earlier hopes within the republic governments....Everywhere the cooperation begun in 1924 led to conflict from about 1928-1930, when it was a question of imposing Soviet order, and ended with the liquidation of national elites.¹⁰⁹

The conflict between Soviet demands and the goals of the indigenous elite would be the central theme of the next period in Khodzhaev's career, and a contributing factor to his eventual removal from power and execution.

¹⁰⁸Khodzhaev, desiat' let bor'by, p.40.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p.264.

CHAPTER SEVEN -- FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV UNDER SIEGE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM (1929-1938)

I. INTRODUCTION

In the late 1920s, Soviet policy towards Uzbekistan had changed. Until 1929, the Uzbek leadership, in particular those former members of the Jadidist circles, acted under minimal constraints. Although land reform, educational, and social reforms were largely enacted by the central government, most had met with the approval of the indigenous leadership. These policies resembled the Jadidist programs of 1917 as well as the general policy directives of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic. However, when Stalin began to consolidate his power in the central government, the role of the national republics and their leaderships changed. Stalin's emergence as a national leader and his subsequent actions are well-documented.¹ Stalinism is a phenomenon that greatly affected Khodzhaev's career. The nation-wide policies of massive collectivization, industrialization, the attacks on linguistic and cultural groups, and the party purges and restructuring of the mid-1930s all had direct impacts on the development of the Uzbek republic and its elite. Whereas the period of 1925-1929 was one tacit agreement between the Uzbek nationalists and the

¹One of the more recent interpretations on the subject is Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990).

central government, the 1929-1938 period was one of open disagreement and conflict.

Until 1929, Khodzhaev was a willing accomplice to the overall Soviet policies, primarily because he believed that they would successfully transform the Uzbek republic into a progressive and modern national region. If differences existed, they were usually over the question of implementation. By the 1930s, the differences between Moscow and Tashkent widened to include the core question of national autonomy. As Faizulla Khodzhaev was the governmental representative of the Uzbeks, he became the principal actor in this drama. His past actions as a Young Bukharan and later, when he was head of the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic, became the subject of debate and supporting material for his opponents. Within a few years, Faizulla Khodzhaev the Communist was once again being cast as Faizulla Khodzhaev the Nationalist. His actions during this period did not help his chances to remain in power. By 1937, Khodzhaev was to be eased out of office. His political career was over.

II. COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

At the end of 1927, Uzbek agricultural output was still below the pre-revolutionary levels by about 20%. Because the Uzbek economy lagged behind that of the other republics, the government in Moscow began to take an even greater role

in its development. A second factor was that as Uzbekistan developed a more extensive system of cash crops, predominantly cotton, more "supervision" was required. It is estimated that 100% of raw cotton procurements was already earmarked for state usage.² In order to meet the growing demand for cotton, new lands had to be utilized for cotton production.

During the first years of the Uzbek republic, crop growing was based on individual farms. As noted in chapter seven, the Uzbek economy retained the local elders, and village customs for irrigation rights, and self-sufficiency in crop planting. However, as the cotton industry increased in importance, so did the Soviet centralization of the Uzbek economy.³ Ikramov justified the greater state involvement when he noted that: "Cotton was important for protecting our Socialist fatherland from imperialism. The resolution on this question is one of the means for safeguarding our Soviet Union as it has existed thus far, independent both economically and politically from capitalism."⁴ Such remarks foreshadowed the collectivization campaign.

²O.B. Dzhamalov, Istoriia narodnogo khoziastva Uzbekistana, volume 1 (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1962).

³"The Economic Paradox in Uzbekistan," The Contemporary Review CXXXVIII (August 1930):219.

⁴Ikramov speech, Vtoroi s'ezd sovetov rabochikh...p.235 as quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Sovietization of Uzbekistan: The First Generation," in Russian Thought and Politics edited by Hugh McLean et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.508.

Khodzhaev's ambiguity on the issue of cottonization is exemplified by criticisms made against him as early as 1929. At the Fifth (1929) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Khodzhaev spoke on the need to improve cotton production figures in the Five-Year Plans. In July, 1929, Khodzhaev announced that the Uzbek government would approve a new agricultural program that allocated 62% of all new development resources to the cotton industry.⁵ These official declarations contrast with Ikramov's speeches in which he continually criticized Khodzhaev for being a half-hearted communist. In September, 1929, and again at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party the following January, Ikramov accused Khodzhaev of deliberately slowing the pace of collectivization as it contradicted traditional, Islamic customs.⁶ Ishanov's biography of Khodzhaev addresses the conflict between the two rivals only by noting that they supported different levels of development in the cotton production.⁷ At his trial, he declared that he opposed the campaign and actively sought to wreck it.

⁵Khodzhaev, "O rabote glavkhopkoma" cited in Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev (ocherki zhizni i deatel'nosti) (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), p.81.

⁶Akmal Ikramov, Izbrannye trudy, volume III (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1972), pp.111, 213-219.

⁷Ishanov, Faizulla Khodzhaev, pp.85ff.

Other accounts note that he played an instrumental role in the agricultural policies.⁸ Khodzhaev, himself, stressed that:

Comrades, this growth in agriculture that we have must not just be in the areas of irrigated regions....But comrades, it is not just important that we have overall growth in agriculture, it is important to us that the greatest area of our agriculture, in which every year it plays a greater and more significant role, is cotton -- it is the foundation of our culture and essential for future material and cultural improvements for the workers and deqhons of Uzbekistan....The development of the cotton industry must go at an extraordinarily accelerated tempo.⁹

These remarks, delivered at the Ivth Uzbek Supreme Soviet Congress on March 26, 1931, are indicative of Khodzhaev's position early in the campaign. It is probable that Khodzhaev supported the development of the agricultural industry because it was a positive step for the regional economy. Khodzhaev's final position on the collectivization campaign is unclear. It is possible that Khodzhaev did not realize, or did not know of, the extent of the collectivization and cottonization policies. However, in light of the partial rehabilitation of Khodzhaev, it is probably the case that Khodzhaev was not fully supportive of the agricultural reforms as they came to fruition in the mid-1930s.

⁸M.G. Vakhobov and A.I. Zevelev (eds), "Faizulla Khodzhaev," Revoliutsionaryi vozvaki mass (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1967), p.380.

⁹Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.III (Tashkent: "Fan," 1972), p.16.

Due to the lack of voluntary collectivization in the area, particularly in the cotton-growing regions, the central government initiated a large-scale collectivization of agriculture. On July 18, 1929, it was announced that: (1) collectivization would begin; (2) the remnants of the large landowners and beys would be eliminated; and (3) that cotton production would be the primary concern of Uzbek agriculture.¹⁰ As early as 1927, there were increased pressures to create collective farms on lands confiscated from large landowners. However, it was not until 1929 that the first state-sponsored collectivization drive took place. As with the rest of the country, the collectivization campaign met significant resistance. Soviet sources note that this was primarily due to a lack of discipline on the part of the Uzbek peasants, although the methods of collectivization probably contributed more to the problems.¹¹

The net result of the collectivization program was overwhelming. In 1928, collective farms constituted only 1.2% of all farms. This percentage increased to 3.0% in

¹⁰Donald L. McQueen, Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), pp.222-223.

¹¹M.L. Bogdenko, "K istorii nachal'nogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR," Voprosii istorii 5 (1963):18-35; Z.Kh. Arifkhanova, "O pomoshchi rabocheho klassa v sozdanii i organizatsiionno-khoziaistvennom ukreplenii kolkhozov uzbekistana v 1930-32 godakh," Obshchestvennye nauki v uzbekistane 10 (1962):25-32.

1929; 34.4% in 1930; 68.2% in 1931; 74.9% in 1932; 77.5% in 1933; 79.9% in 1934; and 84.7% in 1935.¹² The increase in cotton production paralleled this rapid growth. The areas of cotton sown increased from 255.6 to 530.2 thousand hectares from 1924 to 1928. During the collectivization period, this figure increased to 947.1 thousand hectares by 1931.¹³ Again, as previously noted, the increased cotton signalled a proportionate decline in production of other crops, especially crops for individual consumption. With respect to the ever increasing domination of cotton monoculture, the 1930s saw an explosion in planting. "In 1913, the last year in the period before the revolution, 518,000 tons of cotton were picked in Uzbekistan; in 1938 the total crop was 470% greater." The vast percentage of this increase took place during the first two Five Year Plans.¹⁴

The land needed for cotton amounted to 55.9% of the total lands available, which was an increase from 38.9% in 1928. Conversely, grain production dropped from 44.7% to

¹²Ilias Alkin, "Uzbekskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Sovetskaya Respublika," Revolutsionniy vostok (1935/1):127; Azizur Rahman Khan and Dharam Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

¹³Alkin, p.125.

¹⁴Arif Alimov, Uzbekistan, Soviet Booklet No.60/D (London: Progress Publishers, 1960), p.15. In 1932, Uzbekistan was responsible for 61% of the entire cotton harvest in the Soviet Union.

15.8% and alfalfa rose from 9.2% to 15.6%. The percentage increase coupled with an increase in the absolute total of land under irrigation (4.4 million acres or 1,759,000 hectares to 6.9 million acres or 2,786,700 hectares) meant that cotton was being grown on as much land in 1932 as the total land under irrigation four years earlier.¹⁵ Whereas the period of 1925-1928 was one of land-reclamation, that of 1928-1932 was one of expansive growth and cottonization.¹⁶ In addition to other agricultural products, such as alfalfa and barley, orchards were uprooted and pastures irrigated to make room for more cotton fields. From 1932 onward, the cottonization of Uzbekistan became the central agricultural concern.¹⁷ Khodzhaev commented that:

Thousands of kolkhozniks desire to fulfill the quotas of the leader of the party and all the people, comrade Stalin, and go to Moscow next year with an even greater, illustrative, struggle for the cotton harvest.¹⁸

This rather verbose support for the cotton harvest and the "agricultural struggle" were common themes in Khodzhaev's

¹⁵"The Cotton Policy of the Soviets," The Asiatic Review XXVII/91 (July 1931):546; V Nodel, "Zemel'no-vodnye reformy na sovetskom vostokey," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 1 (January 1930):48-50.

¹⁶Matley, Ian, "Agricultural Development," in Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.288.

¹⁷For a statistical analysis, see Dzhakhan Abidova, "Narodno-khoziaistvennyi plan uzbekskoi SSR," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 6 (June 1936):24-27.

¹⁸Faizulla Khodzhaev, Uzbekistan na pod'eme (Tashkent: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo UzSSR, 1936), p.34.

speeches and writings in the mid-1930s. Whether Khodzhaev was sincere or not was a moot point, for by this time, Uzbek domestic policies were now almost exclusively directed from Moscow.

From 1934 to 1938, agricultural output doubled. An unfortunate consequence of the overproduction of cotton was the effect it had on the water irrigation system. One scholar remarks that:

...an error was made in insisting on the substitution of cotton for rice among Uzbeks. They were promised grain to live on in place of the rice, but the grain did not arrive. Then they were told to return to growing rice: but the ancient and perfected irrigation-system suited for the rice had been destroyed to make way for the different requirements of the cotton, and the restoration of rice-irrigation will take years.¹⁹

These affects would become a major issue of protest for the later generations, as the effects of this environmental destruction became more evident. At this early stage, it simply was a symbol of the fact that cotton monoculture now dominated the economic situation in the republic.

In addition to the dramatic effect that cottonization had on other agricultural products, it also was reflected in the livestock numbers. In 1917, livestock in the Ferghana valley alone numbered about 8.4 million head. By 1920, this number dropped to 3.4 million. This drop was mostly the result of the violence of the Revolution. Gradually, these

¹⁹Ernest S. Bates, Soviet Asia: Progress and Problems (London: Jonathan Cape, 1942), p.109.

numbers increased. In Uzbekistan, in 1924 the total figure was about 2.9 million with 1.7 million sheep and goats. By 1928, this figure increased to 5.6 million with 2.9 million sheep and goats, but the collectivization policy initiated a livestock slaughter patterned on what was happening in the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union. In 1932, it was estimated that the herds had dropped to 3.4 million with 1.6 million sheep and goats.²⁰ This visible and dramatic expression of dissatisfaction had severe repercussions for the Uzbeks. Opponents to the collectivization campaign were seen as being wreckers and bourgeois nationalists. As noted in Pravda vostoka:

The kulak declares that the cultivation of cotton is disadvantageous for the country; that it is a measure imposed by the will of a foreign nation (Russia); that the cultivation of other crops such as rice, corn, or vegetables and fruits is more to the interests of the local rural population than that of cotton. The kulak is all for the individualization of a bourgeois Uzbekistan and is opposed to collectivization.²¹

Opposition to collectivization thus became a basis for accusations of "nationalism" and opposition to the Soviet state in general. Several years after the campaign, Khodzhaev pleaded in the May 30, 1935 issue of Pravda vostoka for the deghons to begin reorganizing the collective

²⁰Matley, "Agricultural Development," in Allworth, pp.299-300.

²¹Pravda vostoka, March 7, 1931.

farms and rejuvenate the livestock herds.²² The effects of the slaughter, however, would last for some time.

As a result of the widespread livestock slaughter of 1929-1930, there was a shortage of fertilizer materials. Thus, during the First and Second Five Year Plans, numerous fertilizer plants were built to make up the difference. The largest and most famous was the Chirchik Electro-Chemical Combine. Largely through this "backdoor method," industry was introduced to Uzbekistan.²³

Although small in absolute numbers, Uzbek industry grew well beyond the level it had previously held. During the first sixteen years of the Uzbek republic's history (1924-1940), the Soviets built 1,445 large-scale and over 20,000 small industrial enterprises. From 1928-1938 377 key industrial projects were built which yielded 62.8% of the total industrial output of the republic.²⁴ Gross production increased from 270 million rubles in 1913 to over 1,936 million rubles by 1940, with the overwhelming majority of the increase occurring in the last decade. This was an increase of 720%.²⁵ Under the First Five Year Plan, over 264 million rubles were invested in Uzbek industries.

²²Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.III, pp.475-476.

²³McQueen, p.226.

²⁴Babushkin, L.N. (ed), Soviet Uzbekistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp.50-51.

²⁵McQueen, p.233.

The economic policies forced upon the Uzbek republic did not go unchallenged, and the Soviet leadership knew this. Carrere d'Encausse writes that:

Local personnel who, at the time of the revolution, had seen the perils of economic dependency based on the monoculture stirred up the population against orders coming from the central government. Behind the cotton problem, sensed the Soviet leaders, was fierce national resistance. What the Uzbeks wanted to save was their integrity in every domain.²⁶

Similar to the agricultural reforms, the industrialization campaign initially received Khodzhaev's support. He was prominent at ground-breaking ceremonies, chaired meetings, and wrote extensively on the need to industrialize the republic. Industrialization meant more than simply building factories, as Khodzhaev wrote that:

The fundamental reason for underfulfilling the plan which includes total output is, first of all, that we do not have a sufficient number of cadres, who are familiar with the technical administration of the ever-changing industries of Uzbekistan.

Secondly, up until now, we have not had large-scale work projects abound which the workers can achieve success.²⁷

Khodzhaev extended this support to the Five Year Plans. In one article, he argues that Central Asia is embarking upon a "new level of social development," the economic cornerstone

²⁶Carrere d'Encausse, "The Republics Lose Independence," in Allworth, p.263.

²⁷Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.III, p.435. Most of the works that are included in volume III of his collected works are speeches in support of the industrialization policies in Uzbekistan. His most detailed analysis of the program is Uzbekistan na pod'eme.

of which is the cotton industry. In this piece, there is no hint of anti-Soviet sentiments. On the contrary, it reads like a standard pro-Soviet article arguing for mass support for the industrialization campaign.²⁸ This is continued in his Uzbekistan na pod'eme, in which he writes that:

It is necessary to stress that we should not forget the great success in industrialization. The [Five Year] Plan was the reason for the wide scale of increased production in industry, new construction, and reconstruction, and the reason for the large-scale "Stakhanovite" activities [in Uzbekistan].²⁹

This vocal support for the industrialization campaign, was tempered with criticism from others. As with the collectivization campaign, Akmal Ikramov was strongly critical of Khodzhaev's "lack of support" for the industrialization of Uzbekistan.³⁰ Finally, the Soviet biographical material simply notes that he was involved in the decision-making, and devote more time to Ikramov's activities. With these contradictory signals, it is probably the case that Khodzhaev had reservations about the industrialization campaign. The decreased severity of the

²⁸Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Nekotorye voprosy vtoroi piatiletki v uzbekistane," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 5 (May 1932):6-13. Strangely, this article is not included in his collected works.

²⁹Khodzhaev, Uzbekistan na pod'eme, p.40.

³⁰Ikramov, Izbrannye trudy, volume II, p.216-217.

criticisms suggest that his opposition to industrialization was less than that towards collectivization.³¹

As long as Soviet policies tangentially affected the local political setting, Khodzhaev did not object. However, once the policies began to significantly infringe upon the rights of the local leaders to assert any semblance of power, he voiced his concern. In his speeches, Khodzhaev presented himself as an advocate of local autonomy in both agricultural and industrial planning. With this pulled from under him, Khodzhaev suddenly found himself in direct opposition to the government that he had supported for so long.

III. CHANGES IN THE UZBEK SOCIAL POLICIES

A similar pattern developed with respect to social policies in Uzbekistan. As noted in the previous chapter, Khodzhaev remained supportive of the reform measures initiated in education. However, with the massive restructuring of the region's economic system via the collective farms, and the parallel elimination of traditional power hierarchies, the Soviet government furthered this activity in the cultural lives of the Uzbeks. The changes included the emphasis on Russian language

³¹A good contrast is found in Vakhobov and Zevelev's short biographies on the two. Whereas the one on Ikramov spends much time on the 1930s, the one on Khodzhaev glosses over this period, and only gives dates of meetings that Khodzhaev attended.

training in the educational system, and the revision of the Uzbek language script to a Cyrillic alphabet.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, there was a dramatic increase in the number of schools in Uzbekistan. In 1927/28 there were 1,933 schools with 139,800 students (of which there were about 35,000 girls). From 1928 to 1932, 366 new schools were built and from 1932-1937, an additional 735. From 1933-1938, enrollment increased from 1,001,200 students to 1,629,000.³² This is compared to the increase in the total population which was from 4,446,000 in 1926 to 4,563,000.³³

What made the push for educational reforms disturbing to Khodzhaev was the emphasis placed on the Russian contributions. Conquest reports that in 1930, while meeting with party members in Samarkand, Ikramov was handed a note that read:

Our Uzbekization proceeds in such a way that Uzbeks sit at the head of the institutions, and Uzbeks are the coachmen: some are riding, some are driving, but the work is directed by the Russians. Is this really Uzbekization? Is this not colonization by the Russians?³⁴

This was the first of a series of complaints registered by the Uzbeks concerning the increasingly dominant role of the

³²McQueen, pp.264-268; William M. Mandel, "Soviet Central Asia," Pacific Affairs XV/4 (December 1942):409.

³³McQueen, p.346.

³⁴Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 8-9 (1930):31. Cited in Robert Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Bodely Head, 1967), p.52.

Russians in their republic. Khodzhaev himself recognized the impact that Russian was having on the Uzbek educational system. In 1935, he noted that:

Up till '26 the official language was Russian for all matters of government. Now the villages and the Central Organizations correspond in Uzbek. All teaching is now carried on in the native language. In '24 only 10 percent of the population was literate, but in '32 the proportion had risen to 60 percent.³⁵

In short, the educational system was succeeding, albeit with some concern over Russian involvement. The problem facing a political leader who advocated an "anti-Russian" position in educational matters could easily be branded a "nationalist." Already having faced several charges of being a nationalist, it seems that Khodzhaev stopped short of any open defense of an "Uzbek" position (versus a "Russian" one). This was evident in his apparent participation in the linguistic reform measures.

A major issue in these complaints was the linguistic policy of alphabet standardization. As noted in the previous chapter, throughout the 1920s Uzbek and Russian leaders discussed the possibility of writing a standard Uzbek language in a script other than Arabic. The logic behind this move was that Arabic was simply too difficult for most people, and if a mass-literacy campaign was to be enacted, the Latin script would facilitate the process. The

³⁵Quoted from an interview with Faizulla Khodzhaev in Ella Maillart, Turkestan Solo, translated by John Rodker (London: Century Publishing Company, 1985), p.194.

real push for linguistic reform came at the First Turkological Congress in Baku in February-March of 1926. In an article in Pravda, the decision to use a latinized script was good because it would "simultaneously isolate the Muslims from their fellow religionists south of the Soviet border and undermine Islam whose sacred and legal texts were all in Arabic."³⁶ In 1927, the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet created an All-Union Central Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet. During the next several years, extensive work was done on publishing works in the Latin script in the Uzbek as well as other Turkic republics. Khodzhaev was often listed as a member of these conferences and organizations and, it can be concluded, gave his public consent to the measures proposed.

Ten years later, in February 1937, at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet, the delegates opted to support the move to the Cyrillic alphabet on the grounds that it would enhance Soviet unity. In addition, the usage of Russian loan words was strongly encouraged and in many cases, Russian words simply replaced the Uzbek vocabulary. Caroe observes that:

Apart from that [linguistic unity] was the reasonable point that the adoption of the Cyrillic script for the local tongues would make it easier to teach Russian as a second language. But there was surely a motive of a more subtle kind -- the realization that change upon change in the medium of education would tend to sever the generations

³⁶McQueen, p.297.

from one another and help to usher in the new age.³⁷

This not only applied to the language itself, but to works written in Uzbek. Although not fully implemented until the 1940s, this policy debate became a critical point of debate for the Uzbek leaders as yet another national character was being "russified." However, by this time, Khodzhaev was out of power.

Pressures from above also evident in the increased attacks on religious and traditional customs. Whereas Soviet policy regarding Islam was incremental during the 1920s, it increased in intensity in the 1930s. Much has been written on the "destruction of Islam" in Soviet Central Asia.³⁸ Islam was curtailed both constitutionally and socially. The 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, for example, omitted any reference to religious propaganda, but retained the right of anti-religious propaganda. In addition, the government shut down many mosques in Central Asia and persecuted religious leaders.³⁹ In some

³⁷Caroe, pp.156-157.

³⁸For example, see Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp.44-49, and Islam v SSSR (Moscow: "Misl'," 1983).

³⁹A. Hakimoglu, "Forty Years of Anti-Religious Propaganda," The East Turkic Review II/4 (December 1960):67-69.

instances, this resulted in the arrest and execution of these leaders.⁴⁰

Throughout the campaign against Islam, Khodzhaev remained silent. Whereas Ikramov wrote and spoke supporting the Soviet policy, Khodzhaev did not add his voice to it. This lack of cooperation suggests that Khodzhaev was not supportive of the cultural attacks in Uzbekistan. This position would have been consistent with his earlier views of the 1910s and 1920s; namely, in spite of his desire to create a modernized state in the region, he did not foresee the elimination of Islam.⁴¹ On the other hand, he did support those measures which he felt would modernize the Uzbek people. For example, he strongly believed that the mistreatment of women was one aspect of Islam that should be corrected. He wrote that:

The fact that the 'chedra' has been cast aside has no particular significance; it must be taken as a symbol of liberation merely....What is of real significance is psychological maturity, and that we are achieving through our schools, our propaganda, and wage-earning, which makes the woman independent of her husband.⁴²

⁴⁰The Sufi brotherhoods were especially singled out for attack. For example, in 1936, 32 leaders, including the sheikh Satybaldaev, of the Yasawi order were executed. For a discussion of the fate of these orders, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p.35.

⁴¹Khodzhaev only opposed the conservative leadership in Bukhara and their distortion of Islam, as noted in chapter five.

⁴²Maillart, p.197.

As with the economic reforms, Khodzhaev was hesitant about supporting the Soviet policies if they contradicted his views of the 1920s.

Thus, the image that Khodzhaev had fully adopted the Russian position as suggested by his initial cooperation is suspect. For the most part, he retained his earlier beliefs. This is corroborated by the attacks of Ikramov, among others, who chastised Khodzhaev for his lack of commitment and his tolerance of the old, "feudal-bey" traditions of Uzbekistan. Throughout the 1930s, Khodzhaev was more frequently being seen as a conservative leader and one that was not fully embracing the radical Soviet reform policies.

This is particularly evident when evaluating the pressures Khodzhaev faced to conform literary themes and subjects to a politically correct standard and the subsequent repression of any dissenting voices.⁴³ For Khodzhaev, this translated into an attack on his major work of the previous decade, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare. As early as 1929, Ikramov publicly attacked Khodzhaev's book for its emphasis on the Bukharan intelligentsia.⁴⁴ Ikramov noted that Khodzhaev's work gave a distorted account of the events that lead up to the revolution of 1920 in Bukhara.

⁴³See Allworth, op cit.

⁴⁴M.G. Vakhobov and A.I. Zevelev, "Akmal Ikramov," Revoliutsionariy vozvaki mass, p.392. Ikramov's comments were published in Pravda vostoka, February 27, 1929.

What was missing in Khodzhaev's work, Ikramov continued, was an acknowledgement that the Bolshevik Party and Lenin, in particular, were instrumental in guiding the revolutionary activities of the Young Bukharans, a group prone to bourgeois nationalist ideals.⁴⁵ Khodzhaev defended his position in a speech at the Fourth Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party. In it, he recognized the possibility of slighting the role of the Bolsheviks, but did not admit to distorting the events.⁴⁶

The dispute over Khodzhaev's interpretation of the Bukharan Revolution was one of the issues where Khodzhaev and Ikramov found themselves on opposite sides. The attack on Khodzhaev resulted in his having to re-write his book, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare. In 1932, he added a new section on the success of the socialist revolution as evident in the events of the past fifteen years. In addition, he minimized references to Bukharan leaders and their "nationalist" views, often deleting entire paragraphs and sections.⁴⁷ In addition, Khodzhaev's historical

⁴⁵Kommunisticheskaia partiia uzbekistana v rezoliutsiiakh i postanovleniiakh s"ezdov izdaniia 2-e (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1968), p.270.

⁴⁶As for the revision, Khodzhaev retorted that all people make mistakes. He noted that, "If you ask me directly, 'And what about you, as a member of the Central Committee, are you accountable to your mistakes?' I will answer directly..." Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.II, pp.571-572.

⁴⁷The 1932 edition is in Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy, vol.I. Also see Carlisle, "Review," pp.65-67.

discussions now focused on the impact that the Bolshevik Revolution had on Central Asia. For example, at a peoples meeting in Tashkent on August 1, 1936, Khodzhaev commemorated the 1916 uprising. Instead of noting the indigenous causes of the rebellion, he connected it to the "Great October Revolution," noting that its ultimate success came about with the Bolshevik participation in the following years.⁴⁸ This sort of historical modification is evident in Khodzhaev's later works.

In a broader perspective, the attack on Khodzhaev was indicative of Stalin's campaign against suspected nationalists in the various republics. Having centralized the economy of Uzbekistan and the other republics, the Soviet government began to re-evaluate the importance of the national leaders. Now that Soviet power in these areas was complete, these individuals were deemed expendable.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Faizulla Khodzhaev, "Istoricheskoe znachenie vostaniia 1916 goda," Izbrannye trudy, vol.III, pp.484-488. In reality, the 1916 rebellion in Central Asia had little to do with the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, the Jadids themselves, Khodzhaev included, had little involvement, as it was primarily a mass revolt against an attempted military conscription of Muslims into the Russian army. See chapter three for a discussion of this.

⁴⁹P. Urban, "The New Soviet Drive Against Nationalism in Turkestan," The East Turkic Review II/4 (December 1960):13-23.

IV. FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV ON THE DEFENSIVE

In addition to taking their toll on Khodzhaev's loyalty to the regime, Soviet policies resurrected sentiments for the Basmachi rebels. Since the mid-1920s, the Basmachi remained largely inactive. However, with the First Five Year Plan and the focus on collectivization, the Basmachi, under the leadership of Ibrahim Bek, re-emerged.⁵⁰ In April and May, articles in Pravda told of sporadic raids from across the Afghan border. With only a few hundred active fighters, initially he did not pose a serious threat to the Soviet control over the area.⁵¹ However, combined with the resentment over collectivization, it appears that support for Ibrahim Bek grew. Conquest and other scholars on the collectivization campaign of 1929-1930 indicate that support for Ibrahim Bek increased as the bitter realities of the "Soviet alternative" became less desirable. Basing himself in Afghanistan, Ibrahim Bek made several forays into Tadzhikistan and the southeasternmost part of Uzbekistan. The April issues of Pravda vostoka indicated that "thousands of Red detachments" were required is some indication that

⁵⁰Carrere d'Encausse, "The Republics Lose Independence," in Allworth, Central Asia, p.263.

⁵¹Although it is still unclear, his relationship with the Afghan Emir was shaky at best. Reports indicate that he was temporarily captured by Afghan army units in late 1930, only to escape again. See Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi -- II," Central Asian Survey 6/2 (1987):23.

this manhunt was taken quite seriously. In addition, it was reported that:

On this side British imperialism transformed the Basmachi movement into an instrument of struggle against the USSR. Profiting by the difficulties encountered by the Soviet power, and turning to their own advantage errors committed by the local Soviet authorities, as well as the obscurantism of the peasantry of Central Asia, British imperialism and Bukharan feudalists strove more than once to prevent the Soviets from installing themselves in the country.⁵²

Evidently, the Soviet government still felt uncertain as to whether they had a firm grasp on the region. In addition, the fear or suspicion of nationalism was also perceived as a threat. This fixation with a potential nationalist leader soon forced the Soviet leaders to re-examine their own deputies in Tashkent.

In April of 1931, Ibrahim Bek crossed into the Soviet Union for the last time. With about 800 men, he faced a well-disciplined groups of Red Army paratroopers and was soundly defeated. On the run for the next several months, he was eventually captured while attempting to re-cross the Afghan border.⁵³ Shortly after his capture, Ibrahim Bek was taken to Tashkent and executed. The Basmachi was, for all practical purposes, a finished chapter in Central Asian

⁵²Source unknown, quoted in "Soviet Press Comments on the Capture of Ibrahim Bey," Asiatic Review XXVII/92 (October 1931):691.

⁵³Ritter, William S., "The Final Phase in the Liquidation of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924-1931," Soviet Studies XXXVII/4 (October 1985), pp.490-491.

history. Sporadic raids took place for the next several years, but not on the scale of Ibrahim Bek's forays of 1931 and definitely not on the level of the 1920s. With Ibrahim Bek went the last of the Basmachi opposition. As for the intelligentsia who had sided with the Basmachi, those who were not killed in the fighting soon emigrated to Turkey or Europe, if they had not already. For the ardent nationalists, the hopes of creating a pan-Turkic, Bukharan, or Uzbek state had all but disappeared.⁵⁴

The resurgence of Basmachi activity had direct ramifications for the Uzbek leaders. The Basmachi scare once again damaged the Soviet perception of the Uzbek leadership. The Soviet view of the Uzbeks was already markedly low. The past history of the Bukharan and Uzbek intelligentsia was a tale of defections and conflict. Clearly, with the social and economic components under control, the Soviet government was in a position to once again attack the political leadership. Although Khodzhaev had survived several purges, it appeared that the next round of dismissals would surpass in scope the previous ones. As the attacks accelerated, any form of opposition to the state

⁵⁴Fraser, "Basmachi -- II," p.23. Fraser concludes that the Basmachi, like the liberal reformists, never fully obtained the necessary support from the peasantry to achieve their goals. And with a determined Soviet policy of modernization and Sovietization, the ability to promote a more traditional way of life decreased. In a sense, the Basmachi's inability to transpose a feudal-theocratic system paralleled the Jadid's inability to create a liberal nationalist society.

would be considered grounds for removal and punishment. For this reason, Khodzhaev became a prime target.

In the first round of purges, Party cards were withheld in an effort to rid it of recalcitrant members.⁵⁵ According to the Soviet scholar, Mitrofanov, in his analysis of the Uzbek party purges of 1930:

As a result of the cleansing, roughly one-third of the village communists were expelled from the Party and given diverse penalties, and approximately 80 percent were (found to be) technically and politically illiterate. The general conclusion regarding conditions in the overwhelming majority of village cells is that, as presently constituted, the village organs cannot fulfill the tasks of socialist reorganization of the villages. Experience of the cleansing showed that the political activity of farm laborers and poor peasants had exceeded the activities of many cells and that this was also true in organizing kolkhozes. Indications of conditions in village party organizations give rise to the urgent task of strengthening the village sector of the Party through the broad admission of farm laborer-poor peasant actives and through the mobilization of the adequate number of proven communists for the city sector.⁵⁶

The admission of lower classes in the party translated into a 35% increase in party membership in the first half of 1930, with native recruits making up 84% of this number. In 1931, membership only increased by 13.6%, with a corresponding non-Russian total of 65%. In spite of the call for greater indigenous activism, the central party

⁵⁵Ia. Alexandrovskii, "Uchit'sia na oshibkakh," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti, 2 (June 1930):60-62.

⁵⁶A. Mitrofanov, "K itogami partichistki v natsrespublikakh i oblastakh," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti 2 (February, 1930):49-50.

organization was still wary of flooding the Uzbek party with too many questionable member. All told, the membership increased from 43,000 in January 1930 to 81,600 on January 1, 1933.⁵⁷ Once again, the Jadidists' power was diluted with the increased numbers of newcomers.

As in the 1923 purge, the number of illiterate and non-active members increased accordingly. Occasional checks indicated that up to 20% of the Party members were functionally illiterate. In addition, the members were made aware of the presence of class enemies within the ranks. Tyuryabekov, as head of the Uzbek Central Control Commission declared that:

From the experience gained by the Central Control Commission in checking raions and kolkhozes during the past year and a half, facts and examples show that whenever we have failures in raions and kolkhozes, the basic reason is that the party organization did not understand the maneuvers of class enemies, who had filtered into important posts in the kolkhozes.⁵⁸

To combat this, in December of 1932, the Party refused new admissions and began to reevaluate existing membership cards. From January to September of 1933, membership declined to 64,739, a drop of over 16,000. The general reason for departure was either "voluntary," "kulak," or "dead soul." Ikramov noted that past admission policies had

⁵⁷Pravda vostoka. January 17, 1935. According to the February 4, 1933 issue, worker membership was 22,694 in 1930 and increased to 40,272 in 1932.

⁵⁸Pravda vostoka, January 17, 1935.

been too lax and that the Party had admitted too many non-active member. He cites an almost 100% acceptance pace in the Ferghana and Samargand regions.⁵⁹ All of these issues were brought out at the Sixth Uzbek Party Congress.

Dissent in the leadership, on the other hand, was taking the form of nationalist opposition to the central Party apparatus. It was this point, more than any other, that defined the division between the former Jadidist, Faizulla Khodzhaev, and the Communist Party Secretary Ikramov. Alluding to Khodzhaev's nationalist leanings, Ikramov exhorted:

It must be said that during these years we discovered a considerable activism of national-chauvinist elements. During these years there were revealed such organizations as "Milli Ittikhat" and "Milli Istiklyal," the organization of Batu, Ramzi, and others, the territorial organization of Faizullin (a former Commissar of Supply), a number of nationalistic groups and organizations in the Tashkent Industrial Academy, in Samarkand institutes of higher learning, in a number of cities and even in individual villages. All of these facts indicate the recent strengthening of local nationalism, the revival and activation of nationalistic counter-revolution.⁶⁰

While only 22 members had been expelled for "extreme nationalism" from 1930 to 1934, this charge was to become a central theme in the purges of the following years. The repeated attacks against Khodzhaev on issues ranging from language reform to the collectivization resurfaced and began

⁵⁹Pravda vostoka, January 16, 1934.

⁶⁰Pravda vostoka, January 16, 1934.

to take their toll on him. With his loyalty in doubt, Khodzhaev became a symbol of the "nationalist element" in the Uzbek leadership. One anonymous source commented that:

I can't say for sure whether he [Khodzhaev] has that confidence [of the CPSU]. He has been threatened with expulsion three times. In '25 he was against agrarian reform, then he was opposed to the liberation of women -- he even has two wives himself, one at Tashkent, the other at Bokhara -- and the third time he was against the drive for collectivization. On each occasion he got himself out of his difficulties by writing a letter exculpating himself.⁶¹

Although I disagree with the points raised in this remark regarding Khodzhaev's positions on certain policy issues, it is evident that such perspectives were being defended by 1934. Khodzhaev, having held a prominent position for some time, was particularly vulnerable to these attacks that could not only besmirch his reputation, but endanger his political career.

The scrutiny under which the Uzbek political leadership found itself in further intensified in 1934. In May of that year, the central party apparatus initiated yet another examination of the party. Ia.Kh. Peters, the designated head of the Central Asian Territorial Commission on Party Purging, announced that the primary targets would be those party members who were not fully committed to the socialist

⁶¹Maillart, p.191.

revolution.⁶² A lack of cooperation on the part of the local party organizations prompted the Central Asian Bureau to initiate the purge itself. The reason for this footdragging can be traced back to the general opposition that the leadership found it had with Moscow. It appears that at this time, individuals like Khodzhaev had finally given up on the "Socialist experiment of the Soviet Union." In a dramatic move, the Communist Party Central Committee abolished the Central Asian Bureau on the grounds that a separate party organization for the Central Asian republics was now superfluous. This eliminated a layer of bureaucrats and functionaries that might impede the progress of the party reorganization.

The effect of this change was almost immediate. In January 1935, at the third plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee, K.B. Hey, a representative from Moscow announced a new phase in the party purge. Party registrations were to be audited and admittances were to be again postponed. This is not to say that the purging thus far was unsuccessful. From 1933 to 1935, party membership was cut from 81,600 to under 45,000. It was also reported that by the plenum, 53

⁶²Pravda vostoka, May 24, 1934, in a speech for the Tashkent Communist Party organization. Peters declared that: "Comrades, from the members of the Party is demanded not a general declaration of agreement "in principle" with the party line, but a strong fight for the fundamental content of the general party line, for achieving plans for a socialist building, in whatever sector the Party places him."

of the 79 raions had been successfully dealt with, resulting in the elimination of another 30% of the party roll call. Finally, numerous candidate members had been denied admission altogether.⁶³ The new interest was in removing those members who were taking advantage of the system and their position. Such targets included kolkhoz leaders, members of the educational institutions, and governmental officials.

Eventually, these charges were levied against Faizulla Khodzhaev. Medvedev writes that a letter critical of local political and economic development, and suspected deviation was sent by Stalin and Molotov to Uzbekistan and read before a Central Committee plenum.⁶⁴ A member of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee since its inception in 1925, Khodzhaev was not elected at the VIIth Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party (which ended on June 17, 1937). Within weeks, actions and speeches against Khodzhaev were made. On June 27th, he was removed from his positions as Chairman of the Uzbek Central Executive Committee. On July 10th, it was reported that his brother committed suicide, as a result of his "illicit activities." Not surprisingly, this further implicated Khodzhaev's own activities and

⁶³Pravda vostoka, January 13, 1935 and January 17, 1935 for Heys' speech and the statistics.

⁶⁴Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, translated by Coleen Taylor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp.200-201.

position, especially when it was "announced" that Khodzhaev had buried his brother according to traditional Islamic rites.⁶⁵ In September, a CPSU Central Committee member, A.A. Andreyev, went to Tashkent on the orders of Stalin to "clean house." The attacks against the leadership quickened as the second week of September saw the printed denunciations of Khodzhaev, Ikramov, and other Uzbek party members.⁶⁶ Ikramov was accused of "political blindness towards bourgeois nationalists, allegedly headed by F. Khodzhaev in league with Bukharin, Antipov, and other ex-opportunists who had already been arrested." A special committee was set up and in September 1937, Ikramov was ousted from his position as First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party.⁶⁷ Shortly thereafter, Khodzhaev was arrested and charged with the crimes of "extreme nationalism" and "anti-Soviet behavior." By early 1938, he and the newly-arrested Ikramov were sent to Moscow for further questioning and trial.

⁶⁵The removal from office is reported in the June 27, 1937 issue of Pravda vostoka and the remarks about his brother's suicide in the July 10, 1937 issue of Zariia vostoka. This is also paralleled by a charge made by the Secretary of the Uzbek Komsomol', Israil Artigoglu, who accused Khodzhaev of secretly continuing "religious-feudal customs."

⁶⁶See the September 8, 1937 Pravda for the denunciation of Khodzhaev and seven others. In the September 10 and 12 issues, Ikramov is denounced.

⁶⁷Medvedev, p.207.

In opposing the Soviet policies of the 1930s, Khodzhaev had re-emerged as a "nationalist" leader. Unfortunately for Khodzhaev, by 1937, his major powerbase within the intelligentsia had vanished, either through emigration or death, and he was left with little support in this opposition. Conquest calls Khodzhaev: "By far the most prominent and effective Uzbek to have taken the Communist side right from the time of the Revolution, in the struggle against the old Emir of Bokhara."⁶⁸ This has been shown to be only partially correct, for when his nationalist views were challenged, Khodzhaev went on the defensive.

V. THE TRIAL OF 1938

The trial took place from March 2nd to March 13th. Khodzhaev, who could boast that he has head of a country in 1920 at the age of 24 and President of a Soviet Republic in 1925 at the age of 29, was now refuting all for which he had worked.⁶⁹ On the first day, the court charges were officially brought against the defendants. In all cases, they were divided into the following categories: (1) conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet state; (2) nefarious

⁶⁸Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, revised edition (New York: MacMillan Co., 1973), p.517.

⁶⁹Carlisle called this a "degrading and pathetic performance" for Khodzhaev. Donald Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy (selected works), volume I," Kritika VIII/1 (Fall 1971):45.

relations with foreign states; (3) espionage; (4) "wrecking and diversionist acts" against the Soviet economy; and (5) involvement in terrorist acts against key Soviet officials, Kirov in particular.⁷⁰ A.A. Vyshinsky, the chief prosecutor, questioned each of the twenty-one defendants in turn, often redirecting questions on the above points. After each session, it was made to appear that the defendants were connected with numerous crimes, often in collusion with other defendants.⁷¹

Khodzhaev's turn came on the morning of March 4th. Vyshinsky cross-examined Khodzhaev on a number of charges, specifically (1) his involvement in secret societies; (2) Khodzhaev's opposition to numerous Soviet policies, including the National Delimitation of 1924, and the industrialization and collectivization of Uzbekistan; (3) Khodzhaev's attempts to forge alliances with England and Nazi Germany; and (4) the conspiracy that existed between Khodzhaev, Ikramov, Bukharin, and Zelinsky.

⁷⁰Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, March 2-13, 1938 (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938), p.34.

⁷¹This was the standard mode of operation during the trial. Often, contradictory evidence was accepted simply to ensure that enough charges were put forth against the defendants. This will be seen with respect to the supposed alliance between Khodzhaev and Ikramov. For an analysis of the methods of confessions, see Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954).

Immediately, Vyshinsky asked about his involvement in the "Milli Ittihad," or the "National Alliance." Khodzhaev confessed that as early as his Presidency of the BPSR, he had actively participated in this secret organization. He remarked that:

It set itself the aim of transforming the Bokhara People's Republic into a bourgeois-democratic republic, as a buffer state between Britain and Soviet Russia....I took part in and directed its counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet activities.⁷²

Throughout the interrogation, the topic of Khodzhaev's involvement in secret organizations resurfaced. First, he was accused of belonging to the previously-noted "Group of 18," which was called a "bourgeois-nationalist" organization bent on wrecking any efforts at the establishment of a Soviet system in Uzbekistan.⁷³ Second, he discusses his involvement with Ikramov in anti-Soviet activities.

Regarding the first charge, outside sources indicate that Khodzhaev was involved with Sultan-Galiev's organization in the 1920s. As the repressive policies of Moscow intensified in the 1930s, the possibility exists of

⁷²Report of Court, p.212. Bennigsen and Wimbush suggest, but do not verify, the fact that Khodzhaev was involved in these organizations. See Appendix 1 of Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).

⁷³This is noted in Ishanov's biography of Khodzhaev, although the author is vague about Khodzhaev's actual role. As the biography appeared after Khodzhaev had been politically rehabilitated, this "nationalist charge" was something to skip over. Ishanov, p.74.

Khodzhaev actually involving himself in such a secret organization. It was not uncommon for the Uzbek leadership, especially those that had been connected with the Jadidist movement, to defect or form opposition groups, so Khodzhaev's involvement is not entirely out of the question.

The charge that he conspired with Ikramov is interesting given the fact that the two men despised each other. The validity of this "collaboration" is shaky, especially in light of the contradictory evidence that both men presented at the trial. Khodzhaev began by noting that he had forged an alliance with Ikramov as early as 1928, just prior to the collectivization campaign.⁷⁴ Three pages later in the transcript, Khodzhaev then remarked that the alliance began in 1925, when Khodzhaev's own nationalist organization forged an agreement with Ikramov's "Milli-Istiklal," or "National Independence" group. Vyshinsky asked Ikramov to elaborate, at which time he argued that the alliance did not begin until 1933. Furthermore, Ikramov argued that Khodzhaev did not cooperate until the latter's faction in the government was defeated by Ikramov's. This supposedly took place in 1928. Prior to this time, Ikramov asserted, the two were bitter enemies. Ikramov remarked that:

In the years 1925-1927 there was an acute struggle going on between me and Faizulla Khodzhaev...I was one of those who showed active

⁷⁴Report of Court, p.213.

initiative in carrying out the land reform....Faizulla and his group were chastised at every Plenum of the Central Committee. He, it is said, lost his men, the Bukhara group, but we brought about his loss, that is, we smashed him.⁷⁵

These groups, if they existed, aimed to wreck or hinder the establishment of socialism in Uzbekistan. Khodzhaev claimed that he opposed the national delimitation because it would be the "prelude to an even greater strengthening of the influence of Soviet Russia and the Sovietization of Bokhara." He justified his open support by noting that "concealing my real attitude, I intended to continue the struggle [against Soviet Russia]."⁷⁶ This struggle entailed the establishment of nationalist cadres throughout Uzbekistan that would form the nucleus of a future bourgeois-nationalist state. Again, he brought up his alliance with Ikramov on this point. Specifically, he commented on the cases of two "nationalists" in Uzbekistan, Ramzi and Batu. These individuals were charged with nationalist behavior in 1930 for their opposition to the collectivization campaign.⁷⁷ Khodzhaev and Ikramov

⁷⁵Report of Court, p.352. Carlisle also notes this discrepancy in the two testimonies in his respective reviews of Khodzhaev and Ikramov, op cit.

⁷⁶Report of Court, p.215.

⁷⁷Ramzi was the chief of the Scientific Research Institute and Batu was the chief of Cultural Affairs in the People's Commissariat of Education.

apparently decided to not interfere in the trial as it might expose their nationalist intentions.

The trial then shifted to the subject of economic wrecking, especially in the area of the cotton harvests.⁷⁸ Khodzhaev confessed that he tried to over-emphasize the development of cotton monoculture in order to incite peasant opposition to the Soviet economic plans. By forcing peasants to plant in excess of the recommended acreage for cotton, other products would fall short of their production levels. This would, in turn, disrupt any economic equilibrium in the system and shatter the peasant farms. Khodzhaev stated that he would tell the peasants: "This is the Moscow plan, we are merely the servants of Moscow, we are carrying out Moscow's instructions. Don't you like it? Then complain against Moscow."⁷⁹

Vyshinsky also raised the issue of Khodzhaev's cooperation with foreign powers. Khodzhaev dwelled on his relations with Great Britain to a considerable extent. He noted that as early as the founding of the BPSR, he had established ties with the British in India and came to an agreement regarding Bukhara becoming a British client state.

⁷⁸Supposedly, Khodzhaev also intended to destroy to crop rotation system, silk cultivation, and cattle herding in an effort to stir discontent among the Uzbek people. No supporting documentation is available to corroborate these claims. Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen (eds), The Great Purge Trial (New York: Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1965), p.201.

⁷⁹Report of Court, p.224.

At one point, he asserts that in order to sever ties with Russia and forge ones with Britain:

We formed our armed forces chiefly in the shape of the militia. We endeavored to make use of the Basmachi movement, which at that time had already appeared in Bokhara. We endeavored to create new Basmachi cadres....to strengthen the connections and relations with neighboring capitalist states, and through them to form real connections with England, which at that time was the most outspoken opponent of Soviet Russia.⁸⁰

Khodzhaev's testimony had moved from the questionable to the ridiculous. There is no evidence that Khodzhaev established ties with Britain. Furthermore, to argue that he was supportive of the Basmachi, an organization that had attempted to assassinate Khodzhaev in 1922, is far-fetched. Nevertheless, after further questioning on these points, the Court President called for a twenty minute adjournment.

When the trial resumed, Vyshinsky once again questioned Khodzhaev about his anti-Soviet activities. Much of this second session's time was devoted to Khodzhaev's involvement with Bukharin and Nazi Germany. As with his previous testimony, improbable statements dominated his remarks. Khodzhaev confessed to meeting with Bukharin on several occasions with the intent of establishing ties with Britain. To add to the implausibility of the confession, Khodzhaev noted that Bukharin's real intent was to forge an alliance with Nazi Germany and Japan in order to defeat Stalin's

⁸⁰Report of Court, pp.214-215.

Russia.⁸¹ There was a particularly heated exchange between Khodzhaev and Bukharin and Ikramov, who all expressed conflicting testimonies. Khodzhaev argued that he met with the former Politburo member, Alexei Rykov, as early as 1930, on one of his many trips to Moscow. From 1930 to 1934, another supposed conspirator, Antipov, journeyed to Tashkent to establish contacts with the nationalist organizations in Uzbekistan. Finally, Bukharin met with Khodzhaev in 1936 to finalize the conspiracy. The Rightist conspiracy, Khodzhaev claimed, was supposed to overthrow the Soviet government, establish an alliance with Nazi Germany and Japan, and allow Uzbekistan to forge its own alliance with Britain (presumably after breaking away from the USSR?). Bukharin remarked during his testimony that:

Khodzhaev asserts that I advised him to get in contact with the British resident agent...this is far from the truth. I told Khodzhaev that advantage should be taken of the antagonisms between the imperialist powers, and in a vague form I supported the idea of the independence of Turkestan. Not a single word was said about any resident agents.⁸²

It is interesting to note that the supposed meeting took place in August of 1936 at Khodzhaev's country house in Chimgan.⁸³ This was the same month as the Kamenev-Zinoviev

⁸¹Report of Court, p.230.

⁸²Report of Court, pp.770-771; Leites, pp.199, 285.

⁸³This meeting is not mentioned anywhere else, although this one reference is sufficient for some scholars to assume that it did take place. See George Katkov, The Trial of Bukharin (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), pp.149-150.

Trial and the month that charges were being directed against Bukharin. As the trial progressed, it appeared that Bukharin's involvement was the more important, and any contradictory evidence by Khodzhaev or Ikramov was to be ignored.⁸⁴ In short, Bukharin was the more important figure in the trial and it was imperative that there be as many charges as possible levelled against him.

Another defendant, Zelinsky, was also implicated in the charges. An early supporter of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Zelinsky was the Secretary of the Central Asian Bureau from 1924 to 1931.⁸⁵ His role, as indicated by the various trial accounts, was to coordinate the meetings between the principal actors. In addition to these crimes, Khodzhaev also confessed to secretly being in agreement with Mukhitdinov, and other Rightist nationalist in Central Asia. This appears most unlikely, as it will be remembered that Khodzhaev and Mukhitdinov had been bitter rivals since 1917. Mukhitdinov died in 1934, so he was unable to testify at the trial.

The likelihood that any of these charges were true was irrelevant to the trial proceedings. There is some merit to the charges that Khodzhaev became involved in nationalist organizations. If his past record is any indication, this

⁸⁴Ikramov barely touched on the subject, only noting that Antipov had previously alluded to the proposed agreements with Germany and Japan.

⁸⁵Tucker and Cohen, p.721.

would be a possible recourse for him. As for his involvement with foreign powers or specific wrecking activities, we only have the trial records as supporting evidence. On March 12th, the defendants were allowed to make one last plea. Khodzhaev admitted to crimes and activities that he did not participate in and begged for clemency. He began by stating that:

From the first moment of my arrest I began to make sincere confession of the misdeeds I had committed. I did this because I realized the utter loathsomeness of what has been done by the bourgeois nationalists in Uzbekistan.⁸⁶

This was a typical plea from the defendants of the trial. After recounting his crimes against the Soviet Union, he finished with the hope that:

I ask for life so that perhaps, in the remainder of my days, I might obliterate at least some particle of my crimes and my profound guilt. I want to live so that somehow, somewhere, I may again prove useful to our great country and serve the great cause of the building of socialism.⁸⁷

This plea had no effect for Khodzhaev was sentenced to death on the 13th of March. The verdict was read at 4:00 am on that day. The following morning he was shot with Bukharin and the other co-defendants.

⁸⁶Report of Court, p.744.

⁸⁷Report of Court, p.748.

VI. FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV AS A FAILED NATIONALIST

The execution of Khodzhaev and Ikramov signalled the final stage in the purge of the Uzbek nationalists. Medvedev writes that along with Khodzhaev and Ikramov, Uzbekistan lost D. Tiurabekov, D. Rizaev, D.I. Manzhav, N. Israilov, and R. Islamov.⁸⁸ Many were publicly tried and executed, while others simply "disappeared" from their positions.⁸⁹ Whatever was left of the first generation of Uzbek elite was gone by 1938. In their places emerged political leaders more "acceptable" to the Soviet leaders.⁹⁰

The period from 1930 to 1938 was actually a continuation of the previous years with respect to Soviet policy. As with the previous decade, the Soviet leadership stressed control over local policies and their ability to rein in any indigenous leaders who might become too critical of the government. The purges of 1922-1923 and 1929-1930

⁸⁸Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, translated by Coleen Taylor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p.207. Also see Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoi partii Uzbekistana (Tashkent: "Fan," 1964).

⁸⁹Caroe, p.160; Bennigsen, p.92.

⁹⁰Dinerstein, p.506. Carlisle suggests that this "Class of '38" was made up of "servitors and political jesters," unlike the first generation which was guilty of "too long inhaling the heady air at the regional political summits." For a detailed account of Uzbek political elites after 1938, see Donald S. Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)," Central Asian Survey 5/3-4 (1986):91-132. The above remarks are on page 99.

indicate that this was true before the final purges of 1934-1938. The difference in the latter years was that Soviet policies began to directly attack the fundamental elements of Uzbek nationalism and that the remaining Uzbek leaders who had previously sided with the Soviet government were drawn into the dispute. On issues ranging from industrialization, collectivization, cottonization, education, and anti-party behavior, Khodzhaev suddenly found himself in an unfamiliar and ultimately dangerous position: that of defending his nationalist views against Soviet policy. It came as no surprise, especially in light of the Purge hysteria that was sweeping the Soviet Union, that Khodzhaev would come out the loser in these battles. Carrere d'Encausse observes that:

From 1924 to 1928, the majority of the national leaders tried to salvage what they could of their earlier hopes within the republic governments. In this respect, Faizullah Khojaoghli at the time of his trial revealed much, between forced confessions and disavowals, about how he had been led from the local struggle to cooperation with the Bolsheviks hoping that the presence of Central Asian personnel would prevent the Russians from seizing the machinery of local power.⁹¹

From 1928 onward, he began to oppose the Soviet policies as they clearly infringed upon what he felt was the Uzbek right of autonomy. Unfortunately for Khodzhaev, his push for

⁹¹Carrere d'Encausse, "The Republics Lose Their Independence," Allworth, p.264.

national autonomy was not strong enough to combat Stalin's push for centralization.

What does this say about Khodzhaev as a "nationalist?" On the surface, it is evident that he failed to attain his goal of creating a national identity in Central Asia. Both in Bukhara, and later in Uzbekistan, Khodzhaev failed to rally the general population and remained an elite isolated in his views. Mandel remarks that:

Unable, by their own admission, to come out as open opponents of the Soviet system because the people had been won to the support of that system, the bourgeois nationalists could not prevent, but only retard, the development of Central Asia.⁹²

Although the "people's support" for the new centralized system is questionable, it is evident that the nationalists did not present a viable alternative to the Uzbek people. The sense of a national identity was just beginning, and as exemplified by the failed experiment of the BPSR, it was impossible to create a strong state in this situation without some strong show of force. The Soviet state possessed such a force.

This was exacerbated by the fact that the Uzbek leadership confronted but never fully addressed the problem of their own intra-party disputes. The Party leadership was split between Khodzhaev and Ikramov, who sometimes worked at cross purposes. Previously, there was the split between the Right and the Center-Left, with many of the former Rightists

⁹²Mandel, p.408.

abandoning their political offices for the Basmachi. Before this was the problem of divisions within the entire Turkic reformist movement in Central Asia. Consequently, Khodzhaev failed to achieve his goal of a modern nation-state. That is, if this was his ultimate goal. The actions and tendencies of Khodzhaev suggest that an alternative motivation is possible: namely, that Khodzhaev was not so much concerned with the development of an Uzbek identity as he was with the modernization of Bukhara, and later, Uzbekistan. However, for in spite of his failure and possible lack of nationalist commitment, Khodzhaev can still be regarded as a critical actor not only for the specific time-frame of the first generation of Uzbek elites, but for Uzbek history in general. This is the subject of the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT -- CONCLUSION

I. THE POLITICAL REHABILITATION OF FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV

After his execution, Faizulla Khodzhaev's name was removed from the list of prominent Uzbek leaders and revolutionaries. This campaign to turn Khodzhaev into a non-person went so far as air-brushing him out of photographs, or altering pictures to make him unrecognizable.¹ More commonly used strategies were as basic as not identifying him in pictures and not mentioning him in historical accounts. For example, in his overview of Uzbekistan, the Soviet author, Babushkin, writes that:

The Uzbek people underwent many severe ordeals before they attained their cherished goal of national revival. In close contact with the Russian working class, the working people fought for the establishment and consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, and safeguarded their revolutionary gains in the sanguinary war against the basmachi bands, whiteguard counter-revolutionary forces and the foreign interventionists.²

This conscious effort to omit the names of influential Uzbeks and treat the course of history in the republic as one of sweeping generalization of events and actors became the standard practice of most of the published works. Indicative of this trend is A.I. Ishanov's first book on the

¹Donald Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy," Kritika VIII/1 (Fall, 1971):51. The "alterations" were usually in the form of giving the beardless Khodzhaev a beard.

²L.N. Babushkin (ed), Soviet Uzbekistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p.49.

Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic, Sozdanie bukharskoi narodnoi sovetskoi respubliki (1920-1924gg.), published in 1955. In a remarkable feat of editing, Ishanov traces the history of the BPSR and its inevitable incorporation into the Soviet Union without noting the contributions of the key Uzbek actors.³ Lenin, Stalin, and Frunze are the most frequently cited individuals in the book. The same can be said for his later work on the history of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan, and Shister's work on the Uzbek Communist Party.⁴ For several decades, this became the common practice regarding Faizulla Khodzhaev. His works were not readily available, nor was his role in the evolution of the Uzbek SSR discussed.⁵

It was during the de-Stalinization of the 1950s that a number of measures directed at rehabilitating the victims of Stalin took place. Despite this initial push for

³A.I. Ishanov, Sozdanie bukharskoi narodnoi sovetskoi respubliki (1920-1924gg.) (Tashkent: Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1955).

⁴A.I. Ishanov, Rol' kompartii i sovetskogo pravitel'stva v sozdanii natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti uzbekosogo naroda (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1978). G.A. Shister et al., Rukovodstvo kompartii uzbekistana podgotovkoi rabochikh kadrov v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma (Tashkent: "Uzbekistan," 1981).

⁵A good example of this is a 1965 article, U. Chariiarov, "Iz istorii deiatel'nosti revkoma Uzbekskoi SSR," Obshchestvenniie nauki v Uzbekistane 6/1965:37-39, on the Provisional Government of the Uzbek SSR. As noted in chapter seven, Khodzhaev headed this organization and became the appointed leader of the Uzbek permanent government. In this article, his name is not even mentioned.

recognizing such "mistakes," Khodzhaev was still singled out for rather brutal attacks in journals and books. As he was closely associated with the national communist movement of the 1920s, he remained an "undesirable."⁶ On those occasions when Khodzhaev was discussed, he was referred to as a "bourgeois nationalist" and a "traitor to the Uzbek peoples." Ishanov adds that Khodzhaev was the "worst enemy of the people" who "united around himself all counter-revolutionary elements -- the Pan-Turkists and the Pan-Islamists." Furthermore, he [Khodzhaev] actively sought the assistance of the British imperialists. "It [the Bukharan Communist Party] unceasingly struggled with the agents of foreign imperialism -- the Young Bukharans, cleansing its ranks of these bourgeois nationalist elements."⁷

In the 1960s, this interpretation of Khodzhaev changed. After Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, the Great Purge victims became topics of debate and rehabilitation. This applied to the purge victims in Central Asia as well. Oppenheim's research on the rehabilitation process points out that from the late-1950s to the early-1960s, there was a general trend towards rehabilitating "non-Oppositionist" leaders and members of the Communist Party. Seen as

⁶See A.I. Ishanov, Sozdaniie Bukharskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki (1920-1924) (Tashkent: "Fan," 1955), pp.88-9.

⁷Ishanov, Sozdaniie, pp.88-89. Translation by Donald Carlisle, "Review," pp.47-48.

unfortunate victims of Stalin's purges, these individuals did not pose a major ideological threat or challenge to the Soviet system. Their rehabilitation would not raise any serious ideological questions.⁸ Conversely, the rehabilitation of any key opposition figures would suggest that alternative approaches to Soviet leadership might be acceptable and, in general, the image of the CPSU would be "tarnished."⁹

This form of "selective rehabilitation" served two purposes. First, as the Soviet Union became a more active participant in international affairs, good role models for potential Third World allies were required. By downplaying Khodzhaev's nationalist tendencies and highlighting his support for the Soviet regime, the Soviet government of the 1960s could show its clients that the Soviet model of development could apply to their countries as well. Second, Khodzhaev could serve as a role model and "hero" to the Uzbeks already in the Soviet Union. If a Central Asian could be found, this would enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet system for the Central Asian peoples.¹⁰ Individuals

⁸Samuel A. Oppenheim, "Rehabilitation in the Post-Stalinist Soviet Union," Western Political Science Quarterly XX/1 (March 1967):97-115.

⁹Ibid., p.107. This situation has changed since the mid-1980s, with N. Bukharin's rehabilitation and the "re-examination" of the blank pages in Soviet history.

¹⁰This is the argument of Jane P. Shapiro, "Political Rehabilitation in Soviet Central Asian Party Organizations," Central Asian Review XIV/3 (1966):199-209.

such as Khodzhaev would fit this role if, and only if, deviational behavior was minimized or ignored. In this instance, we can point to his overt support for nationalist identity in place of socialism, and his opposition to Soviet policy regarding the development and exploitation of Central Asia. The same could be said with respect to the later generations of Soviet Central Asians.

At the Third Congress of Intellectuals of Uzbekistan, which was held in Tashkent on January 26-28, 1962, First Secretary Rashidov announced that there would be a full re-evaluation of writers, teachers, and journalists who had been accused of being Jadidists. The Jadidist movement itself was still a negative phenomenon, as it represented "bourgeois nationalism."¹¹ The official view was that the Jadidists, and the Young Bukharan movement in particular, were "based on religion, not class, striving to set up a constitutional monarchy, [and was] an anti-popular bourgeois political movement."¹² Thus, political figures who had Jadidist pasts were still "ineligible" for rehabilitation. In contrast, Akmal Ikramov, the former Uzbek First Secretary, was not so closely tied to the Jadidists and was consequently rehabilitated. This was exemplified two years later, in an issue of Pravda, when it was reported that

¹¹Pravda vostoka, January 26, 1962.

¹²"Jadidism: A Current Assessment," Central Asian Review 12/1 (1964):33.

Stalin was displeased with Akmal Ikramov for protesting the arrest of Khodzhaev.¹³ Both figures remained under a cloud of mystery and suspicion, but at least they had obtained some form of recognition.

The perception of Khodzhaev changed again in 1965, when an article in Pravda vostoka noted that Khodzhaev was a "talented cadre in the Central Asian elite."¹⁴ In 1966, a favorable discussion of Khodzhaev appeared for the first time in Izvestiia.¹⁵ The article commemorated the seventieth anniversary of his birth and described Khodzhaev as a supporter of the Communist regime in the building of communism in Central Asia. These notices signalled a revision in the Soviet writings on Khodzhaev. Now he was seen as a talented cadre who supported the incorporation of Central Asia into the Soviet Union.

By 1969, several publications made specific reference to Khodzhaev's role in the Uzbek Sovnarkom and his anti-Basmachi stance.¹⁶ A.I. Ishanov, a scholar of Soviet Central Asian history, published a revised and greatly expanded version of his 1955 History of the Bukharan Soviet

¹³Pravda, April 9, 1964.

¹⁴A. Azizkhanov, "Leninskaia zabota o turkestanе," Pravda vostoka, July 29, 1965.

¹⁵M Vakhobov and V. Ustinov, "Verno sluzhil narodu," Izvestiia, May 25, 1966.

¹⁶Carlisle, "Review of Faizulla Khodzhaev," and A.I. Ishanov, Bukharskaia Narodnaia Sovetskaia Respublika (Tashkent: "Fan," 1969).

Peoples Republic which included full references to Khodzhaev.¹⁷ Finally, the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party issued a decree highlighting the accomplishments and ideals of Faizulla Khodzhaev and commissioned a three-volume collection of Khodzhaev's writings, completed in 1973.¹⁸

The first volume was published in 1970 under the title of Izbrannye trudy (Collected Works). This project eventually included two additional volumes and became the first compendium of Khodzhaev's writings. What makes this project, and Ishanov's 1972 expanded biography of Khodzhaev, interesting is that they retained the formula for partial rehabilitation. Khodzhaev's writings from his pre-1920 period are noticeably absent. In addition, his most significant piece on the Jadidist movement, K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare, was that of the "revised" 1936 edition, which includes an entire section just on the development of socialism in Bukhara and the inevitable merger of the BPSR into the USSR. Khodzhaev wrote the first edition of this work in 1926, and in it, adheres to the belief that the Jadidists were integral to the successful Bukharan Revolution of 1920. In the revised 1936 edition,

¹⁷In the 1955 version, references to Khodzhaev are few in number and always negative. In the 1969 version, attention is paid to his contributions to the "building of socialism."

¹⁸Faizulla Khodzhaev, Izbrannye trudy (3 vols) (Tashkent: "Fan," 1970-1973).

the positive image of the Jadidists is toned down and replaced by a more pronounced glorification of the Bolshevik role. In the collected works, not surprisingly, the 1936 edition is used.

Ishanov's introductory biography is also sketchy about Khodzhaev's opposition to Soviet economic policy in the late 1920s, and does not address the events surrounding Khodzhaev's arrest and execution. Most importantly, the early, liberal and nationalist views expressed by Khodzhaev are also ignored. Nevertheless, Faizulla Khodzhaev, after nearly thirty years of anonymity, re-emerged as a topic of inquiry in Soviet scholarship and in the media.

Thus, we can say that Khodzhaev, as he is "officially" known, is now seen as a communist who supported the development of Soviet power in Central Asia. His nationalist leanings remain unmentioned. In the Third Edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, there is a brief biography of Khodzhaev that stresses his role in the anti-Basmachi campaign and his subsequent awards.¹⁹ There are also significant revisions in the official history of Uzbekistan regarding Khodzhaev's role. He is viewed as a leader who sought to democratize the Uzbek people and worked closely with such luminaries as Kuibyshev and Frunze. As is typical of the more recent works, there is no mention of the

¹⁹Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Third edition, Vol.28, (Moscow: "Sovetskaia entsiklopedia," 1978), p.324.

1938 Purge and execution.²⁰ Thus, from the late 1960s to the 1980s, at least Khodzhaev's name and his "more acceptable" activities are now open for discussion.

This is not to say all that is currently being published about Khodzhaev is positive. For example, Kamil Ikramov, the son of Khodzhaev's co-defendant Akmal Ikramov, has repeatedly suggested that Khodzhaev's record should not be completely exonerated. In 1989, his account of the events surrounding his father's death was published. In it, Kamil Ikramov suggests that Khodzhaev was the one who involved Akmal Ikramov's name in the charges of belonging to nationalist societies.²¹ Kamil Ikramov's claim that his father was wrongly charged and executed is the basis of the article, and it is not surprising that he levels similar claims against other political figures of that time.²² In addition to Ikramov, it is also possible that certain Uzbeks today would prefer not to have Khodzhaev fully exonerated. As a member of the Bukharan elite, Khodzhaev is not representative of the Tashkent-based political elite of today. Carlisle and Critchlow offer this as yet another

²⁰Uzbekskaiia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskiaia respublika (Tashkent: Glavnaia redaktsiia uzbekskoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1981), pp.95, 105, 108-109.

²¹Kamil Ikramov, "Delo moego otsa," Znamia 5/1989:61.

²²See Pravda vostoka, October 16, 1988, p.1, and Moscow News, November 18, 1988, p.12 for attacks Ikramov's successor, Usman Yusuov.

reason for the slowness in Khodzhaev's full rehabilitation.²³

One can argue that the significance of Khodzhaev's rehabilitation and re-evaluation is lessening as the contemporary nationalists take centerstage. However, with the renewed interest in the nationalist past of Uzbekistan, Khodzhaev can once again be set up as an example or model.²⁴ This process will depend primarily on the course of the present nationalist movement in Uzbekistan. Clearly, Khodzhaev could be characterized as a lackey of the Soviet Union. His actions regarding the intrusion of Soviet power in Central Asia and his subsequent position within the Soviet government are fairly incriminating. However, if his nationalist side, best characterized by his pre-1920 period and his historical works, surfaces, then he can be considered a direct predecessor to the current nationalists. More than likely, he will fall somewhere in between, as the nationalists of 1990 are more sophisticated and less conciliatory than Khodzhaev was.

²³Donald Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-1983), Central Asian Survey 5/3-4 (1986):129-132, and James Critchlow, "Did Faizulla Khojaev Really Oppose Uzbekistan's Land Reform? (An Old Document Resurfaces)," Central Asian Survey 9/3 (1990):39.

²⁴This is noted in Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p.251.

II. OVERVIEW OF FAIZULLA KHODZHAEV'S POLITICAL POSITION

The rehabilitation process once again raises the question of whether Faizulla Khodzhaev was a nationalist, a communist, both, or neither? As noted in the introduction, my initial response was to classify Khodzhaev a nationalist who saw the communist movement as an opportunity to enhance his own power as well as that of the Bukharan and Uzbek intelligentsia. However, due to the central authority of the Soviet state and the inability of the indigenous leaders to create a viable national identity, Faizulla Khodzhaev was not able to attain his goals. A closer look at several factors discussed in this dissertation suggest that this position is not so secure. In fact, the evidence supports a different conclusion on the grounds that Khodzhaev's priorities placed modernization above nation-building.

The first question that must be addressed pertains to whether he was a nationalist. Khodzhaev participated in the Jadidist movement and quickly became one of its key figures. It was through this organization that he most fully expressed his nationalist sentiments and ideas. During this period, he was influenced by such "senior" Jadidists as Behbudi, 'Ayni, and Fitrat, and saw the merit in reforming Islam and the Emir's state while not resorting to drastic measures. He remained, at least theoretically, supportive of this position later in life, as exemplified by his two key works written in the 1920s, K istorii revoliutsii v

Bukhare and O mlado-bukhartsakh. Written in 1926 when he was head of the Uzbek government, both convey the belief that the Jadidist movement was the crucial factor in the fall of the Emirate and the development of a "modern" state in Bukhara. It is crucial to note that within this organization, and later as head of the BPSR and the Uzbek SSR, Khodzhaev's primary concerns remained affixed on the issue of modernization and development.

As a "reformist" elite, Khodzhaev believed that the only way Bukhara could advance was to create social and economic conditions along the lines of the country he saw as being representative of the "modern world," namely Russia and later the Soviet Union. His support for educational and economic reorganization in the early 1920s, and the land reform measures in 1925 advance this view. Conversely, his lack of discussion and, perhaps, concern for such issues as cultural and linguistic reform weaken the view that he was a nationalist par excellent. Writers such as Donish, 'Ayni, and Cholpan would fit into this classification more easily.

In examining his actions, it seems that Khodzhaev was more concerned with issues of state and the economy, and less with the development of a nationalist identification. Bottomore, in his analysis of nationalist elites, notes that nationalist movements are often confronted with the complex problem of how to approach modernization. Specifically, in a colonial setting, can one advocate modernization and

retain the traditional values of that given society, even if those values go against the tenets of modernization?²⁵ In this struggle, Khodzhaev never fully merged the two strands of modernization and traditional beliefs, and consequently presented himself as more of an advocate of modernization. This, in turn, explains in part why Khodzhaev was never able to successfully court the local population of the region and foster a national identity. One must conclude that Khodzhaev did not accomplish this goal because, ultimately, it was not a top priority for him.

Khodzhaev's concern for modernization offers an explanation for his actions vis-a-vis the Bolsheviks and later CPSU. Khodzhaev courted the Bolsheviks only after his disastrous decisions in 1917 and 1918. If one recalls, it was during these years that Khodzhaev attempted to rally the Bukharan population against the Emir's government. In both instances, the Jadidist movement was severely beaten by the Emir's forces, and Khodzhaev nearly lost his life. As the Bolsheviks were the only viable alternative power in the area, it made sense for Khodzhaev to turn to them for help. As he was more familiar with the Russians, Khodzhaev probably felt more at ease in requesting this aid. In addition, one must view Lenin's strategic slogan of "national self-determination" as another reason why he opted

²⁵Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp.96-98.

to side with the Bolsheviks. In a very pragmatic way, both "sides" saw a strategic value in the other.

The "domination" of modernization over communism in Khodzhaev's mindset was also true in the period of the BPSR. From 1920 to 1924, Khodzhaev dealt with the Russians on the level of foreign affairs. At least in the first two years of the BPSR, there was the feeling that the two states could co-exist. However, with the series of defections in 1921 and 1922, as well as the increased presence of the Red Army in Eastern Bukhara, the question of Russian domination in Bukharan affairs became one not of for how long, but to what extent? Furthermore, Khodzhaev spent much of his time addressing the Basmachi rebellion and, although he supported a greater national self-determination for the Bukharan state, he did not have time to actively pursue it.

Khodzhaev's myopic perception of the gradual incorporation of the BPSR into the RSFSR also must be seen as a contributing factor to his lack of resistance to this process. As late as the Delimitation of 1924, Khodzhaev still believed that the Russian presence in Bukhara was not a threat. Indeed, he believed that the Red Army would help stabilize the region and facilitate the process of state formation. I contend that Khodzhaev's support for an increased role of the Russians was based on the notion that it would aid in the eventual stabilization of the Bukharan state.

Khodzhaev's career from 1924 to 1938 highlights an alternative perception of him: that he was a true, devoted communist. Later accounts suggest that the only reason Khodzhaev survived so long was that he had abandoned his nationalist ideals and had completely converted to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the Soviet Union.²⁶ I beg to differ, as one could better support the argument that Khodzhaev remained a modernist who, for the reasons noted above, sided with the communists. For example, one could conclude that his support for Red Army involvement in the Basmachi campaign and the 1925 Land Reforms signalled a change in Khodzhaev's priorities. On the other hand, I believe that both actions can be justified by stating that Khodzhaev considered them to be beneficial to the Bukharan, and later Uzbek, national regions.

By the 1930s, the seemingly agreeable relationship between Khodzhaev and the Soviet government must have changed. Stalin's moves to consolidate power and restructure the Soviet system had direct and profound ramifications for Uzbekistan and the Uzbek leadership. This was especially true with respect to the collectivization campaign and the language reform measures. Khodzhaev arrived at two conclusions by this time: he had lost all personal power in the Uzbek republic, and the right of

²⁶This is expressed by Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), chapter 17.

national self-determination, even in a modified form that focused exclusively on cultural autonomy, was a sham.

This line of reasoning supports the opinion that Faizulla Khodzhaev was ultimately not a national communist in the true sense of the word, but a political leader who allied with the communists for specific political reasons.²⁷ Brought up in the tradition of the Jadidists, he strongly advocated the creation of a national identity in Bukharan, and later in Uzbekistan. As early as 1918, Khodzhaev believed that the only way the Young Bukharans could succeed was to ally with a stronger, more sophisticated ally: the Bolshevik Party. He was sympathetic with the Bolshevik program of national self-determination and appreciated the modernizing techniques of the 1920s. These alone do not constitute an adherence to Marxism-Leninism, for if he had accepted the basic arguments of this doctrine, Khodzhaev would have had to renounce his past beliefs that he adamantly supported as late as 1929. More than likely, he was tolerant of the overall Soviet control during the 1920s because his sphere of activity in Uzbekistan was not significantly curtailed. When the Soviet policies challenged his own nationalist sentiments, weak as they might be, Khodzhaev became disillusioned and protested.

²⁷National Communism here is defined along the lines of Edmund Demaitre, "The Origins of National Communism," Studies in Comparative Communism 2/1 (January 1969):1-20, and Peter Zwick, National Communism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

Thus, when examining the broad questions surrounding Khodzhaev's activity as a national leader, two more can now be answered. As suspected, when addressing the question of how far can an indigenous leader go before that person's policies contradict Soviet nationality policy, the answer is a clear "within very strict limits." This is, to a large extent, a result of the general framework of Soviet nationalities policy as noted in chapter two. It was difficult for Khodzhaev to not contradict the policies of "national in form and socialist in content," as well as the belief that nationalism was a temporary phenomenon. Any activity that Khodzhaev promoted that, in turn, perpetuated his people's views over the Russians would lead to difficulties. It is also evident that the state and CPSU structure, emphasizing a central authority, further exacerbated these tensions. The conflicts and final collapse of Khodzhaev's cohort are testament to this.

In the end, as the last member of the first generation of Uzbek Jadidists, Faizulla Khodzhaev attempted to implement the policy goals of the Young Bukharans. Unfortunately for him, the Bukharan and Uzbek leaderships were often divided and conflictual. The goals were never unified to the extent that Khodzhaev could speak for the whole Young Bukharan movement. As suggested throughout the text, this played a role in weakening Khodzhaev's power and his ability to affect the political process.

Finally, Khodzhaev's window of opportunity was very short. By 1924, he had officially assumed a subordinate position in the larger, Soviet system. Khodzhaev was alone by the 1930s, as a result of the defections and deaths of his former allies. His own demise in 1938 was almost an afterthought to the collapse of this first generation of elite. Condemned as a traitor and a nationalist, Khodzhaev quickly fell into obscurity in Central Asian historiography.

III. THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN UZBEKISTAN

It was through the gradual rehabilitation and reexamination process that the most recent generation of Uzbek (and Central Asian) elite developed. Once again, in spite of the Soviet government's attempt to create a loyal indigenous leadership and assimilated population, forces in the region created conditions for just the opposite. The most recent manifestation of nationalism, which at present is moving from the literary and cultural arenas to the political, has the potential for being a more significant and effective force in light of several considerations.²⁸

Like the Jadidists of the early Soviet period, the current nationalists in Uzbekistan initially focused their efforts on issues of literary and cultural importance. As

²⁸This is the focus of such works as Steven L. Burg, "Central Asian Elite Mobility and Political Change in the Soviet Union," Central Asian Survey 5/3-4 (1986):77-89 and William Fierman (ed), Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

note above, writings glorifying the Uzbek past and heritage emerged in the 1960s and it was from this group of writers that modern Uzbek nationalism was expressed. In November of 1988, a number of prominent intellectuals and activists formed the "Birlik Movement for the Preservations of Uzbekistan's Natural, Material and Spiritual Riches" popular front.²⁹ Among the leaders was Dr. Abdu Rahim Pulatov, a writer and critic of the Soviet regime. On September 30, 1989, Birlik published their official charter in Komsomlets Uzbekistana in which they outlined their objectives of: 1) the struggle for establishing the genuine sovereignty of Uzbekistan within the USSR; 2) Genuine establishment of the Uzbek language as the official state language of Uzbekistan; 3) Unbiased and truthful interpretation of the history of Uzbekistan; 4) Broad-scale caring of the natural environment and, in particular, rescuing the Aral Sea; and 5) The elimination of cotton as the single crop of the republic.³⁰

Paralleling the early generation, there are now factions and infighting which is hindering the full development of an effective nationalist movement. Under the leadership of Muhammed Solih, a group from the Writers'

²⁹Birlik means "unity" in the Uzbek language. Unofficially founded in 1984, it has been the center of the nationalist movement in Uzbekistan. With the formation of ERK, Birlik is currently redefining its role and political position. One concern is that it is becoming more traditionalist in its views.

³⁰"Uzbek Popular Front," Central Asian and Caucasian Chronicle 8/6 (December 1989-January 1990):4-7.

Union split from Birlik in 1989 and created ERK. There are thus two national fronts in Uzbekistan that appear unable to cooperate. The tensions, based on objectives and strategies, resemble those of the Old Jadids versus the Young Bukharans. Whether these differences can be overcome, or remain a stumbling block in the nationalist movement in Uzbekistan, remains to be seen.

These recent activities point to a broader, yet reserved political program for the 1990s. Among the nationalists in Uzbekistan today there is agreement on the issue of the primacy of the Uzbek language. Through numerous interview reports, it is clear that the Uzbek language holds a secondary status in the native republic, due to the Russification policy initiated decades ago. Uzbek students complain about requiring Russian to advance into higher grade levels and professions, and the creative leaders bitterly remark that their works, such as films, novels, plays, must first be translated into Russian so as to accommodate the censors. This complete disregard for the Uzbek language has continually been a source of anger and frustration and has become a central focus of the current movement.³¹ Like their Jadidists predecessors, the

³¹This is a contrast to the argument presented by Medlin et al, who noted that the Soviet educational system actually weakened nationalist sentiments in Central Asia. The reason was that as Russian became a dominant language, the other, regional languages would lose their value and decrease in usage. This has not been the case. William K. Medlin et al, Education and Development in Central Asia: A

language issue is just the gateway to larger, more deep-seated concerns. For it is through language policy and education, that the general population can acquire some identification with the nationalists' goals and ideas. As Pulatov himself remarks:

The main goal of our movement is to educate people, to raise their social consciousness and their political activism. Only the people themselves can stand up for their own rights...Our movement will be virtually powerless if the people keep on hibernating politically. So our main goal is to awaken the people, to turn our people into a politically active society.³²

In order to achieve this goal of a "politically active society," the indigenous leaders need to raise issues that the general population will deem important.

One of the central issues for the nationalists is the economic catastrophe resulting from the cotton monoculture. It is now evident that the effects of the continual and excessive planting of such a high-demand crop as cotton are negative and perhaps irreversible. The singular focus on cotton production has deprived the Uzbek peoples of a diverse and self-sustaining agricultural system, requiring that grains and foodstuffs have to be imported from central Russia. In addition, the water needed for the cotton crop requires an extensive irrigation system, which draws water

Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).

³²Hedrick Smith, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), p.303.

from other uses and returns it back to the general water supply heavily tainted with pesticides and chemicals. Not only is the excessive irrigation wasteful (surveys suggest a 40-50% level of waste due to evaporation and poor canal planning), but harmful to the other possible uses of water: namely fisheries in what is left of the Aral Sea, livestock herding, and, of course, common drinking water for the general population. In protests and letters, it is clear that there is a push for a diversified economy, one that is less dependent on Moscow for basic needs. Of course, if the Soviet government were to grant the Uzbek request for republican economic self-planning, then the economic need to remain in the union would disappear. Not surprisingly, this has been a topic of recent discussion.³³

Thus, can one say that Pulatov, Solih, and the other nationalists of Birlik and ERK are the rightful heirs to Fitrat, Khodzhaev, and Ikramov? Yes and no. I believe so, on the one hand, because the mantel of Uzbek rights and identity is once again being lifted and offered to the Uzbek people themselves. There is a strong concern on the part of the nationalists to foster a sense of identity and maintain the cultural heritage that has been under attack for so many years. To this extent, they would agree with the Jadidists of the 1920s. On the other hand, the early Jadidist

³³For example, see James Rupert, "Uzbek Non-Revolution," The Washington Post, September 16, 1991:A18.

commitment to national socialism and the desire to work "within the system" appears to have been abandoned. As seen, the political naivete of such early leaders of Khodzhaev has been replaced with a much more savvy approach to dealing with the government in Moscow. This is not to suggest that the early leaders willingly went to their deaths with no understanding as to the overall scheme of Stalin. It is just that they felt committed to their official political positions within the Uzbek republic, and to this end, believed that through proper channels, their goals of cultural and economic autonomy would be achieved.

Unlike the Jadidists of the 1910s and 1920s, the current groups of nationalist leaders have no illusions about Soviet power and the promises of national and cultural autonomy. The history of the Stalinist era and the repressive measures directed against the Islamic faith, the Uzbek language, local customs, and the domination of the economic planning from Moscow in direct opposition to the regional interests, all point to a more sober and rational nationalist leadership that can critically evaluate the mistakes of their forefathers.

Thus far, this generation of nationalists has, for the most part, remained outside of official positions of power. With the most recent elections to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, several have been elected, but with the clear understanding of their individual political positions. Islam Karimov, the

First-Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party has been noted as being partial to the nationalists, and could be viewed as a possible ally. It is nevertheless clear that his position more closely resembles that of the early elite. The new generation, with the advent of Birlik and ERK, have struck out on their own.

Challenging the reformist nationalists of today is the fundamentalist right. During the Iranian Revolution and later, the invasion of Afghanistan, the concern that Islamic Fundamentalism would flare up in Central Asia was greatly discussed in the West and feared in the Soviet Union. During the past several years, there appears to have been a resurgence of interest in Islam and the re-opening of previously closed mosques. The Turkestan Democratic Party of Islam, headed by the Uzbek poet Dada-khan Hasan, is at least one very real manifestation of this trend. Hasan's goal is the creation of an Islamic state and the development of a strong religious infrastructure in the region. Evidence of this is the almost tripling of the enrollment at the Mir-i Arab medreseh in Bukhara and more open practices of Islam in Uzbekistan. This traditionalism could impair the success of the current nationalists in Uzbekistan who, although sympathetic to or even supportive of Islam, view it as a step backward.

The division of and confusion within the ranks of the potential Uzbek leadership is exemplified by the occasional

mass protests that result in violence. The previously-noted attacks on the Meskhetian Turks, and the 1990 Uzbek-Kirghiz riots indicate that there is still a lack of direction and unity within the republic. Regardless of how or why these incidents occurred, it is clear that Uzbekistan is not as far along as other nationalist-oriented republics in the Soviet Union. However, it should be noted that as the calls for independence increase throughout the country, elite activity in Uzbekistan is likewise accelerating. Already, rallies of tens of thousands people have taken place in the republic, a phenomenon unheard of since the days of the 1917 Revolution.

What does this say about the development of a strong and stable nationalist movement? If one accepts the argument that social bases, organizations, and a committed political elite that can communicate with the general population are all essential for success, then what is happening in Uzbekistan today sends a strong signal to Moscow. In addition, the Uzbeks are educated and aware of the current political situation, more so than their forbearers. In all areas regarding a national identity, the current manifestation is stronger than the previous one.³⁴

³⁴The result of this, as argued by scholars such as Gregory Gleason, will be a greater involvement of the republics in the future political structuring of the Soviet Union. See Gregory Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

The discussion in chapter two presented a possible approach to the study of nationalism and nationalist movements. In it, historical and causal factors are seen as essential in the development of a national identity. In addition, the role of the elite is crucial to the success of transforming this identity into an actual national phenomenon that will include the general population. Khodzhaev, as an elite actor, attempted to develop such a national identity in the former Bukharan emirate, and did not succeed. Although the elite itself may have been well-advanced, it did not achieve a union with the general population and thus lacked a strong base from which to work. Zenkovsky remarks that the reformist movement:

...remained no more than a movement of the intelligentsia, being neither extended to the entire population nor adopted by the state, and it barely affected the Moslem conservative mind in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, or even in the rural districts of the Volga-Ural region.³⁵

This was not only true for the Bukharan Peoples' Soviet Republic, but for Uzbekistan in its first years of existence. As previously noted, the very development of an Uzbek identity was difficult enough, and it took some time for the people of the region to associate with it.

The deeper national identity in Uzbekistan today can trace part of it's strength to the education and economic policies of the Soviet period that, as noted, have created a

³⁵Serge Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p.269.

revivalist mentality in the republic. This is seen as a critical causal relationship by Rakowska-Harmstone, who writes that:

Modern nationalist elites, educated under the system and so expected to have assimilated the new "socialist" content, have begun increasingly to search for identity in their own national past and national values, the trend largely engendered by the two key characteristics of the Stalinist system: the centralization of political control in Moscow and the dominant role played by the Russians in the Party and state hierarchies....An unexpected and, in a sense, an illegitimate byproduct of the nationality policy has been the growth of ethnic nationalisms among the new elites...³⁶

Written almost twenty years ago, this end-result is swiftly developing. It is now up to the Uzbeks themselves to see how far this current movement will go. It is also up to them to see how significant the experiences of their Jadidist predecessors will be in evaluating the history of nationalism in Uzbekistan.

Nationalism is not a fleeting phenomenon that will disappear in the future. On the contrary, nationalism is a force that is increasing in importance every day. From the Quebecois in Canada, to the nations that make up the artificial political entity called Yugoslavia, to the Kurds in Iraq, "nationalism" and "national rights" are still driving forces in world events. This is also true for the Soviet Union, where nationalism is clearly an issue of

³⁶Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Recent Trends in Soviet Nationality Policy," in The Soviets in Asia, edited by Norton T. Dodge (Washington, DC: AAASS, 1972), pp.8-9.

concern for Mr. Gorbachev. The Uzbeks are just one of the national groups that are currently striving to improve their status within the ever-changing Soviet Union. Increasingly, these groups are searching for status without the Soviet Union.³⁷ Now, more than ever, a greater understanding of the driving forces behind the nationalist movements is important.*

Overall, nationalism in Uzbekistan seems to be taking a step upward in sophistication and identification. The protest rallies indicate that the general population is now listening to the nationalist elite.³⁸ And in this sense, perhaps the Jadidists of the 1920s were successful. By creating a blueprint for political activity, and by laying out ideas that have been followed today, they at least established a possible role for the current generation of Uzbek intelligentsia. Their major faults, namely, the inability to identify with the masses and their political weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet government have been addressed and corrected as far as we know. It will now be up to the

³⁷A number of books have recently come out that describe the various nationalist movements. A solid, comprehensive account is Graham Smith (editor), The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (New York: Longman, 1990).

³⁸According to Carlisle, this is currently taking place in Uzbekistan parallel to a development of regional interests. In short, he sees the overlapping of these identities which will sharply contrast the weakening of an all-Union identification. See Donald S. Carlisle, "Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev," in Fierman, Soviet Central Asia, pp.119-120.

Uzbek people themselves to see how far they want to carry this movement. Will it be an independent nation? Part of a confederation? Or remain politically tied to the Soviet Union while maintaining the minimal rights of linguistic and cultural expression? These choices, as well as the more ominous alternative of a total systemic failure and civil war will be played out in the not too distant future.

APPENDIX -- BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF KHODZHAEV'S LIFE

1896	Born in Bukhara
1907-1912	Sent to Moscow for education
1910	Accession of Emir Alim
12/2/1910	Formation of Secret Society that was to become the Jadidist circle
1912	Returns to Bukhara upon father's death
3/1917	Khodzhaev becomes a negotiator for the Young Bukharan Party
4/7/1917	Protest rally against the Emir; Khodzhaev flees
11/15/1917	Tashkent Soviet becomes power source in Central Asia
3/1918	Failed attempt to overthrow the Emir by Kolesov. Khodzhaev again forced to flee.
9/1918	Founding of the Bukharan Communist Party
10/1918	Khodzhaev briefly captured by Dutov, escapes to Moscow
3/1919	Khodzhaev attends VIIIth RCP(b) Congress
12/1919	Turkkommissia arrives in Tashkent; Khodzhaev participates in their discussions
8/1/1920	Merging of YBP and BCP under Khodzhaev
9/2/1920	Bukharan Revolution; the Emir is overthrown and a government under Khodzhaev is formed
10/2/1920	First Qurultai of the BPSR Shura; the official founding of the Bukharan Peoples Soviet Republic and the installation of Khodzhaev as head of government.
2/1921	Initiation of land reforms
3/4/1921	Khodzhaev negotiates with RSFSR
11/1921	Defection of BPSR government officials along with Enver Pasha to the Basmachi

12/1921	Merger of armies of the RSFSR and BPSR
9/25/1921	Passage of the Bukharan Constitution
1922	Purge of BCP
7/22/1922	Khodzhaev awarded for contributions in cause against the Basmachi
9/1922	Tashkent Conference between the RSFSR and the BPSR; creation of Central Asian Economic Council
11/1922	Khodzhaev travels to Berlin for rest
3/4/1923	Formal military treaty between RSFSR and BPSR
9/1924	Approval of delimitation
2/13/1925	First Congress of Uzbek Communist Party
5/13/1925	Formal recognition of Uzbek SSR and Khodzhaev as Prime Minister
12/1925	Introduction of land reforms
1926	Beginning of Industrialization policy
1926	Khodzhaev writes <u>K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare</u>
3/8/1927	Beginning of "hujum"
1927	Khodzhaev writes <u>Desiat' let bor'by i stroitel'stva</u>
10/1927	Khodzhaev first accused of being a "nationalist"
7/1929	Khodzhaev approves of collectivization
4/1931	Basmachi rebellion briefly flares up
1931-1933	Purge of Uzbek Communist Party
1932	Khodzhaev re-writes <u>K istorii</u>
6/27/1937	Khodzhaev removed from office; arrested
3/1938	Trial and execution of Khodzhaev

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